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My dissertation consists of three essays on behavioral and experimental economics.
In Chapter 1, I introduce an integrated model of risk attitudes and other-regarding
preferences that extends the standard notion of inequity discount to lotteries. In
this model, a decision maker perceives inequity partly by comparing the marginal
risks she and others face. It predicts that fairness considerations will alter risk atti-
tudes, in particular, a higher tolerance to positively correlated (fair) risks compared
to negatively correlated (unfair) risks. It is also capable of explaining the behavior by
which people help others probabilistically (known as ex ante fairness). Furthermore,
in contrast with the existing view of ex ante fairness based on expected outcomes, my
model does not imply that stronger ex ante fairness behavior is associated with less
risk sensitivity. I study these predictions with evidence from an experiment. I find
that subjects take more risks when outcomes are ex post fair compared to when they
are ex post unfair. I confirm ex ante fairness behavior is a common choice pattern
and document how, according to the model, it responds to its relative price. Finally,
I reject the implication of existing models that stronger ex ante fairness behavior
correlates with less risk sensitivity.
Chapter 2 is a joint work with Professor Brit Grosskopf (University of Exeter, UK).
People communicate in economic interactions either aiming to alter material outcomes
or because they derive direct satisfaction from expressing. In our study, we focus on
the latter, the non-instrumental motivates, and find that this less researched aspect
of expression has important economic implications. In particular, we experimentally
study ex-post verbal expression in a modified Power-to-Take game and document
people’s willingness to pay for this kind of expression possibility. Our experiment
contributes to previous studies discussing the role of mood-emotional states. We find
that purely expressive as well as reciprocal motives are both non-trivial components
of the valuation for non-instrumental expression. We demonstrate that expression
possibilities have important impacts on welfare beyond what our standard economic
view predicts.
In Chapter 3, Emel Filiz-Ozbay, Erkut Ozbay and I study multi-object auctions
in the presence of post-auction trade opportunities among bidders who have either
single- or multi-object demand. We focus on two formats: Vickrey auctions where
package bidding is possible and simultaneous second-price auctions. We show that,
under complementarities, the Vickrey format has an equilibrium where the objects
are allocated efficiently at the auction stage whether resale markets are present or
not. The simultaneous second-price, on the other hand, leads to inefficiency with or
without resale possibility. Our experimental findings show that the possibility of resale
in second-price auctions decreases the efficiency rate at the auction stage compared to
the no resale case. However, after resale, the efficiency rate in second-price is as high
as that of Vickrey auction without resale outcomes in the experiment. Preventing
resale neither benefits nor hurts auction revenues in a second-price format. This last
chapter has been recently published in Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 89,
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Chapter 1
Risk Attitudes and Fairness:
Theory and Experiment
1.1 Introduction
Many decisions we make have consequences not only for ourselves but for other
agents we care about – or with whom we compare ourselves – and such consequences
are uncertain at the moment we make the decision. Similarly, risk taking choices of-
ten occur in environments where comparisons with respect to others are unavoidable.
Financial officers decide on risks borne by others; entrepreneurs make decisions that
imply different risks for themselves and for their partners; climate change policies aim
to increase the odds of positive outcomes for future generations; and colleagues com-
peting for a promotion (or a prize) face uncertainty but also might exhibit concerns
about unfair opportunities and unfair final outcomes. All these are examples where
risks and others are both essential considerations in the decision.
In this paper, I research on two relevant aspects of the interplay between risk
attitudes and other-regarding preferences. First, I ask to what extent the regard for
the welfare of others affects risk attitudes. Second, I ask how the behavior in which
people help others probabilistically (known as ex ante fairness) arises. To motivate
these two questions, I start discussing two simple examples.
Suppose there are two people, you and a partner, and two coin-flip risks A and
B. Both risks pay to you either 5 dollars or 20 dollars. Further, in each risk your
partner’s luck is determined by the same coin and involving the same amounts. But
2
risks A and B differ in one thing: in risk A you two receive the same amount always,
and in risk B you two are always paid unequally. Formally, A : 12(5, 5) ⊕
1
2(20, 20)
and B : 12(5, 20) ⊕
1
2(20, 5). If you dislike both unequal outcomes and risks, then your
desire to avoid risks will be higher for risk B than for risk A. Equivalently, you will
optimally take more fair risks (like A) than unfair risks (like B), disregarding the fact
they both expose you to the same marginal uncertainty.1 You will behave differently
facing the same personal risk.
This behavior – known as ex post fairness seeking – is a relevant pattern to study
because, on one hand, it is predicted by standard extension of models with inequity
aversion (Fudenberg and Levine, 2012), and, on the other hand, previous experimental
research has claimed there is no link between social preferences and risk attitudes
(Brennan et al., 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010) or that people prefer independent
risks over correlated ones (Rohde and Rohde, 2011). As will be detailed below, my
model predicts people will tolerate more risks that are ex post fair than risks that are
ex post unfair, and my experimental evidence backs such prediction.2
Consider now this example related to my second question. As before, you and
some partner that you care about are affected by your decisions. This time you have
two mutually exclusive outcomes: one comparatively advantageous to you (outcome
A) and one comparatively advantageous to your partner (outcome B). Suppose despite
caring about him/her, you still prefer alternative A over B. However, even if you can
decide the chances of these two outcomes, you might choose to give B some chance of
occurrence rather than no possibility at all. If so, you will share with the other person
the chance that something “good” will happen at the expense of your own prospects.
In fact, while doing so, you are also taking on more risk. This type of behavior is
known as ex ante fairness seeking, and experimental evidence shows it is a common
behavioral pattern (Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013). This raises the
second main question of this paper: how ex ante fairness behavior arises. As pointed
in previous literature (Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013; Saito, 2013),
while this is a common behavior it cannot be explained by theories purely based on
1Notice I use the term “fair risk” to denote uncertainty that guarantees ex post egalitarian out-
comes across agents. This should not be confused with the term “actuarially fair gambles” that in
part of the literature denotes lotteries with zero expected value.
2In section 1.2, I offer an explanation regarding why previous experimental research either did
not look into the right question or presented some design deficiencies.
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the assessment of ex post outcomes such as our standard expected utility theory.3 But
it is not obvious how to extend the standard theory to incorporate ex ante fairness.
One possible answer is that individuals with this kind of behavior present pro-social
preferences but care little about risks and so for them, sharing in chances and in sure
dollars look the same. An alternative view is that these people do care about risks but
their sense of equal opportunity consists of comparing the possibilities or prospects to
which each person gets access. In this view, an individual shares in chances because
– to some extent – she wants both sides to have the possibility of favorable outcomes.
The model I introduce in this paper corresponds to this latter view, while main
existing theory of ex ante fairness (Saito, 2013) conforms to the former. Due to the
strong implications about risk attitudes the existing view presents, I will argue in this
paper that my model has conceptual and empirical relative advantages.
More specifically, in terms of theory, I propose a model that takes the following
form:
U(L) = E [W ( g(x, y) , D(Fx, Fy) ) ] (1.1)
where L is a lottery over two-people social outcomes (decider, other), W is increasing
in g and decreasing in D. g captures the main features of deterministic preferences
and ex post fairness. D captures the ex ante fairness penalty by being sensitive
only to differences in marginal risks. Although this model might look too general
–it is after all defined over distributions– and therefore capable of organizing data
better just by being more flexible, I show that, provided with the proper structure, it
incorporates ex ante motives at the modeling cost of one single additional parameter.
In that regard, it is comparable to the most utilized model (Fudenberg and Levine,
2012; Saito, 2013). In the new model, the conditions imposed on D are crucial. The
most important and intuitive of these conditions is that D must extend the notion of
inequality discount to the lottery space, in a way U(L) behaves as a standard social
preferences model in risk-free situations.
Let me show one example of how my model operates. Consider the following utility
3As we will discuss in the theory section, ex ante fairness behavior does not conform to the
Expected Utility Theory because the independence axiom behind this theory implies option A will
be strictly preferred to any non-degenerate lottery. This behavior is the same nature of Machina’s
Mom famous example in which a planner (aka mother) with two equally valued citizens and, sadly,
only one indivisible good, might strictly prefer to randomize over who gets it instead of giving the
item to one of the citizens with certainty (Machina, 1989).
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for lottery L: U(L) = E[x − (1 − δ)d(x, y) − δD(Fx, Fy)], where Fx and Fy denote
the corresponding marginal risks, D(Fx, Fy) =
´ 1
2 |Fx−Fy|
2dt and d(x, y) = 12 |y−x|.
This extends the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model to the uncertainty domain, while
incorporating ex ante fairness motives when δ > 0.4 Importantly, in full certainty,
D = d; which means ex ante fairness motives merge with the ex post fairness motives,
and the whole utility simplifies to U(x, y) = x− 12 |y−x|. That is, this instance of my
model simply becomes an instance of the standard Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model
(hereafter F&S).5 Although this example gives a flavor of how my theory operates,
it still lacks some important elements. First, because the F&S utility is piece-wise
linear, it predicts that individuals are not responsive to the price of helping others.
Second, it does not incorporate reasonable risk attitudes. For example, it predicts
attitudes towards perfectly fair risks will be neutral. A full instance of my model will
incorporate both: reasonable risk attitudes and convex deterministic preferences.
I contrast my model with the expected inequality aversion (EIA) model, introduced
in Fudenberg and Levine (2012) and axiomatized in Saito (2013). In the EIA model,
the decision utility of lottery L is given by U(L) = δu(Ex,Ey) + (1 − δ)Eu(x, y),
where u(x, y) represents deterministic social preferences and δ the strength of ex ante
motives.6 I show that a core implication of this theory is that, holding other motives
constant, more ex ante driven individuals will do more risk taking compared to less
ex ante driven decision makers. In that sense, the former are supposed to exhibit
higher risk tolerance than the latter individuals.
In the empirical section, I present evidence from a laboratory experiment that
allowed me to study the main questions of the paper with observed behavior. Indi-
viduals in the study performed decisions in four different types of tasks. There were
eleven decision rounds for each type of task. Task type 1 (the sharing chances task)
is the decision environment that elicits ex ante motives. Here each decision problem
gives the decider two fixed, mutually exclusive (undominated) outcomes as in my
first example above. Subjects are then asked to decide on the probabilities of these
4For example, if A = (1, 0) and B = (1, 2), then a 50-50 lottery over A and B is strictly preferred
to either A or B.
5In this particular instance of the F&S model, I assume α = β = 12 . But an asymmetric measure
inside terms D and d replacing the absolute values will fully generalize F&S model for arbitrary α
and β.
6In all mentioned papers, except Gaudeul (2013), u(x, y) is the standard Fehr and Schmidt (1999)
utility.
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two outcomes. Task type 2 (the taking fair-risks task) elicits risk attitudes free of
fairness concerns. In this task, subjects decide how much risk to bear in a two-state
contingent commodity environment with the feature that either state of the world
pays the same amount of money to the decider and her counterpart. Task type 3 (the
taking unfair-risks task) elicits risk attitudes that also contain fairness concerns. In
this task, subjects face the same environment as in task type 2, except in this task
risks are perfectly negatively correlated; and each state pays unequally unless no risk
is taken. Still, both subjects in each pair face the same marginal risks. Task type 4 is
the standard deterministic giving decision environment where other-regarding prefer-
ences are elicited in a standard deterministic dictator-like game varying the budget
and the price of giving.7
The experimental results are as follow. First, as predicted by my theory, I find
that social considerations impact risk attitudes in the ex post fairness seeking direc-
tion: subjects exhibited higher tolerance to fair risks (choices of type 2) than to unfair
risks (choices of type 3). I also confirm ex ante fairness behavior is a rather common
choice pattern and, building upon previous literature, I document how it responds to
changes in its relative price and how agents trade off this motive with other. Impor-
tantly, I empirically study the property of expected-outcomes-based models by which
a stronger ex ante fairness behavior implies less risk sensitivity. The experimental
evidence is not consistent with such behavioral pattern. To the best of my knowl-
edge, mine is the only model consistent with the full set of evidence my experiment
presents.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 1.2, I discuss the previ-
ous theoretical and experimental literature. In Section 1.3 I present my model and
discuss the main existing model. Section 1.4 describes the experimental design and
procedures. Section 1.5 present the empirical results. Section 1.6 provides the main
concluding remarks and discusses future research agenda.
7An attractive feature of my experiment is that the graphical interface utilized allowed me to
elicit a larger set of choices compared to previous experiments.
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1.2 Related Literature
The study of decision making incorporating uncertainty along with the consid-
eration for others is relatively recent. Although attitudes towards risks are among
the most studied matters in economics, for the most part they have been regarded
as invariant or determined only by demographic characteristics.8,9 Similarly, other-
regarding preferences have been mostly studied in riskless environments (see e.g.
Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; and Meier, 2006).10
In recent years, the question about how other-regarding behavior operates under
uncertainty has received more attention. Karni and Safra (2002) present a model
of individual preferences over procedures that randomly allocate one indivisible item
among N individuals. The decision maker in such a model has one fair/moral self
that cares about others getting chances to get the prize, and one egoistic self. Balanc-
ing her preferences for equalized chances with her standard self-centered attitudes,
the resulting combined preferences are capable of explaining ex ante fairness seeking
behavior. Interestingly, the authors require these preferences to conform to expected
utility theory when restricted to the set of fair procedures.11 Though Karni and
Safra’s work is restricted to the specific case of one indivisible good, random pro-
cedures, and it does not discuss the role of risk attitudes, it can be thought of as
a precursor of my model. Other models that are defined over distributions include
Borah (2013). His model, presented axiomatically, has a representation that is linear
with respect to two components: an individual’s expected utility over social outcomes
and a (ex ante) component that depends only on the risks faced by the other agent.
One undesired feature of this model is that its departure from the expected utility
theory remains even within perfectly fair uncertainty.
The majority of the remaining theories of fairness or altruism in probabilistic en-
vironments have a common property: they are based on the idea that people, in
different degrees and manners, look at and compare expected outcomes. Bolton et
8The first formal study of risk attitudes is almost three centuries old: Bernoulli (1954/1738).
9See Dohmen et al. (2011) for a study of demographic determinants of risk attitudes.
10Connections between decision theory under uncertainty and social choice theory have been
studied for longer; see Gajdos (2005) for a short survey and Grant et al. (2012) for an example of a
model of an impartial planner with ex post inequality aversion.
11As we shall see in the next section, this intuitive criterion is not met by some of the main models
of a more general environment.
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al. (2005), for example, extend the ERC model (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) assum-
ing, as in the original model, that people care about relative payoffs except these
are replaced by relative expected values. Similarly, Trautmann (2009) extends Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) to the uncertainty case by simply making the F&S inequality
discount to depend on expected outcomes. In the same spirit, Krawczyk and Le Lec
(2010) propose a formulation that linearly combines an egoistic expected utility com-
ponent and a fairness component that depends, in turn, on the (subjective) expected
outcomes of the decider and the other agent. An issue with this last model is that it
lacks of ex post fairness concerns.
A model that stands out is the Expected Inequality Aversion (EIA) model. Intro-
duced in Fudenberg and Levine (2012) and axiomatized in Saito (2013), it has also
been used to organize experimental data in Brock et al. (2013) and Gaudeul (2013).
In this model, decision utility takes the form of a linear combination between the
utility of expected outcomes u(E[x, y]) and the expected utility E[u(x, y)]. u(x, y)
is the standard Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility in all articles mentioned, except in
Gaudeul (2013), where each individual outcome is replaced by a power function of
the corresponding outcome. Since this model presents interesting features and has
received the most attention of all theories based on expected outcomes, I discuss it
further in the theory section and study it empirically along with the model I propose
in the paper.
Experimental research has been active on this topic as well. Two bodies of research
are the most relevant for the purposes of this paper: the experimental research on ex
ante fairness and the studies of attitudes towards risks over social outcomes. In the
case of ex ante fairness, Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010) and Brock et al. (2013) both
document evidence from probabilistic Dictator-Game decisions like the one described
in the first introductory example. In these tasks, subjects decide the chances of two
fixed, mutually exclusive and undominated outcomes. In both papers, authors find
sharing in chances (exhibiting ex ante fairness) to be a common behavior; at least one
third of subjects assigned positive probabilities to unfavorable outcomes. However,
only the first paper finds that subjects share less in chances than in deterministic
terms (comparing the corresponding expected values).12 Importantly, none of these
12My experimental evidence shows the same pattern.
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papers discuss in depth the role of risk attitudes in these situations.13
In the case of attitudes towards risks over social outcomes, interestingly –and
surprisingly– there is not a clear answer to the question whether individuals avoid
risks with negative correlation (between their outcomes and others’) more than risks
with positive correlation. A central implication of ex post fairness is that people will
strictly prefer positively correlated (more fair) lotteries over negatively correlated
ones, so risk taking must be affected by social considerations. Nonetheless, Brennan
et al. (2008) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) both claim there is no empirical link
between fairness concerns and risk taking. There are, however, important design and
analysis features in both works suggesting this conclusion needs to be re-examined.
In the case of Brennan et al. (2008), their design does not allow them to directly test
this hypothesis because outcome correlation, a key feature to elicit ex post fairness,
is absent from all risky options in their design. My reading of their finding is that
it only shows that the regard for others’ risks is a very weak motive (which per
se is an interesting finding). Bolton and Ockenfels (2010), on the other hand, do
have alternatives where risks are perfectly correlated (positively and negatively) but
in the pure comparison between each of these lotteries against a safe-fair option,
their experiment only has 25 individual choices. This gives the authors insufficient
statistical power. To gain power, they combine data from the correct comparisons (a
perfectly correlated risk vs a safe-fair option) with other tasks where the safe option
was unfair. Doing so, however, confounds risk attitudes with inequity concerns: if the
safe options already have inequality built-in, the impact of fairness concerns in the
attempted comparison is weakened. As expected by their low power and confounded
statistical exercise, they find no significant difference in risk taking between fair-risks
and unfair-risks. Rohde and Rohde (2011) report on an experiment testing whether
“risk attitudes are affected by the risks others face”. They find own-risk attitudes
to be only marginally affected by others’ risks. More importantly, subjects in their
13Although not the same environment as my paper, Cappelen et al. (2013) research on a related
aspect. They ask what are people’s typical fairness views regarding risk-taking behavior. Fairness
views are cleverly associated with whether or not an external observer redistributes post uncertainty
payoffs in a society where subjects can choose different degrees of risk. Because an ex post loser
comes in two flavors: he might have taken too much risk or he might have been just too unlucky,
different redistribution to these two loser-types indicate different fairness views. They find great
heterogeneity in people’s fairness views. It must be noted that in this paper, however, the notion
of ex ante fairness is defined over subject types (risk-takers and risk-avoiders) not only over social
lotteries as is in my paper.
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experiment strictly preferred imposing the same lottery uniformly on other subjects
(for example where each other person receives an independent lottery yielding 20
euro with 30% probability and 10 euro with 70%) over an unequal allocation with the
same average value (i.e. paying 20 euro to 30% of these other subjects and 10 euro
to the rest). They incorrectly used this finding (which is an ex ante fairness driven
pattern) to claim that “people prefer risks to be independent across individuals in
society rather than correlated”. Although it is true there is correlation in the most
chosen option, this correlation is rather weak even for small societies (laboratories
for that matter). Therefore, it is not an appropriate design to study the role of risk
correlation on risk attitudes.
Experiments in Gaudeul (2013) also include tasks with positively and negatively
correlated risks. Although this paper reports individuals being “slightly more risk
averse if outcomes are negatively correlated”, there are two important shortcomings
with the experimental design. First, the elicitation of preferences occurs via the BDM
mechanism (Becker et al., 1964), which adds a layer of uncertainty to each choice
problem. Second, the “safe alternatives” are never perfectly fair because by design
their exact position is jittered randomly to make subjects “think” more carefully
about the choice they face. In my view, this adds even another layer of decision
processing that is problematic. In a context where inequality aversion is likely to be
a central force shaping behavior, including options that are already (slightly) unequal
might weaken the power of these motives. 14
1.3 The Model
Setup: I focus on a two-person environment where each agent faces uncertain
prospects over a single resource (money). Behavior is modeled via preferences for
lotteries over social outcomes. Each ordered pair (x, y) indicates the resource allocated
to the decision maker (DM) and her counterpart, respectively. The full set of outcomes
14Other less related, but still relevant papers are the following. Karni et al. (2008) study em-
pirically the predictions of Karni and Safra (2002). Chakravarty et al. (2011) find that individuals
making decisions for an anonymous stranger exhibit less aversion towards risks faced by the stranger
than towards own risks. Van Koten et al. (2013) study risk attitudes restricted to uncertain pie-
sizes in bargaining games. Finally, Harrison et al. (2012) study how risk attitudes towards social
outcomes vary with information regarding risk preferences of the other agent, finding that learning
others’ risk preferences makes individuals more risk averse.
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X ⊂ <2+ is assumed to be convex. For the model to be meaningful, I assume at
least some risks are fairness-irreducible in that ex post transfers –i.e. reallocations
after uncertainty is resolved– are not possible. I assume preferences < are rational,
continuous and represented by a continuous utility function U(L) of lotteries over
outcomes in X. It is also assumed that, when restricted to degenerate lotteries, DM’s
preference relation < is strictly monotonic along the set {(x, y) : x = y} and smooth
almost everywhere. When it is not ambiguous, I use U(F ) as interchangeable with
U(L), if F is the CDF associated with lottery L.
In this environment, the following motives may potentially coexist: First, DM’s
regards for her own payoffs and risks. Second, DM’s considerations for her counter-
part’s payoffs and risks. And, finally, DM could present fairness concerns in the ex
post sense (i.e., preferences for risks that are positively correlated among agents over
risks with negative correlation, Fudenberg and Levine, 2012) and in the ex ante sense
(i.e., preferences for helping others probabilistically – giving chances).
The novel element of my theory is that it incorporates a notion of ex ante fairness
based on how balanced (marginal) possibilities are distributed between DM and her
counterpart. In this model, ex ante forces arise from a comparison of marginal risks,
regardless the correlation of personal outcomes the joint risk implies. Every lottery
where the two agents do not face the exact same marginal risk will be interpreted
by DM as if they are not getting access to the same opportunities and therefore a
utility discount will apply. This discount need not be symmetric: it can be lopsided
towards discounting advantageous positions less than disadvantageous. Outside this
ex ante discount, the rest of motives are modeled in standard fashion. The general
formulation of my model is given in equation 1.2:
U(L) = EW ( g(x, y) , D(Fx, Fy) ) (1.2)
where W is increasing in g and decreasing in D. g, is the main component capturing
standard deterministic social preferences and ex post fairness. It is assumed g is
concave and increasing in its first argument and also along the 45 degree line. D is
the penalty for ex ante unfairness. W ’s main role is to balance the relative strength
of ex ante forces with respect to the rest of standard motives. A simple formulation
for W that will accommodate most interesting and tractable instances is:
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U(L) = EW (g(x, y)− δ D(Fx, Fy)) (1.3)
I now discuss in more detail the ex ante fairness discount term, D. I describe first the
properties we want D to exhibit and then provide an intuitive formulation that satisfies
such properties. First, we want D to be well defined and bounded for arbitrary
marginal risks Fx and Fy. Second, and more importantly, we want D to extend the
notion of inequality discount that already exist in deterministic models to the lottery
space. In particular, we want D to be minimized if and only if Fx = Fy. We can
achieve this by defining D in relation to a notion of distance in the function space
where Fx and Fy are defined. These basic criteria can be achieved by defining D as:
D(Fx, Fy) =
ˆ
|Fx(t)− Fy(t)|p dµ(t) (1.4)
In this formulation, D is the Riemann-Stieltjes integral, with respect to function µ,
of the absolute difference between the marginal CDFs, and where this difference is
raised to the power p (it is assumed that p ≥ 1). This is a notion of distance between
the involved marginal risks. Notice also D is a positive transformation of the distance
between these CDF functions based on the familiar Lp norm. For that reason, it is
immediate to see D is minimized if and only if Fx = Fy (with D = 0).
Three elements characterize ex ante motives in this formulation: the absolute value
inside the integration sign, the exponent p, and the function µ. The absolute value in
this equation assumes a symmetric discount for inequality. By changing this absolute
value for a redirected or asymmetric absolute value we achieve a lopsided inequality
discount. This generalizes the notion of asymmetric inequality discount proposed in
Fehr and Schmidt (1999). The exponent p captures a more subtle component of ex
ante motives related to how much one values giving at least some chance to the other
side. For example, by setting p = 1, the ex ante discount associated with these two
lotteries 12(1, 0) ⊕
1
2(1, 2) and 1(1, 0) ⊕ 0(1, 2) is the same. When p > 1, instead,
the former exhibits a smaller ex ante discount than the l.15 The function µ allows
for the incorporation of decreasing marginal utility. For example, when µ(t) = t,
displacing the same pair of unequal marginal risks to the right will maintain the
15This assumes µ(t) = t, for simplicity.
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same ex ante discount D. But this will be unreasonable if the ex post component
g(x, y) exhibits decreasing marginal utility because the displacement will make ex ante
forces unreasonably larger relative to the ex post ones. By setting the µ(t) 6= t and
making it compatible with the curvature of g, we can guarantee risk displacements
will not exacerbate ex ante motives unreasonably. In the next subsection, by means
of two examples, I show how the asymmetric discount (example 1) and the function
µ (example 2) operate.16
Importantly, D generalizes familiar measures of inequality discount. Take for
example p = 2 and µ(t) = t. If L is a degenerate lottery at (x̄, ȳ), D becomes simply
the absolute distance between x and y: D = |x̄ − ȳ|. That is, D becomes a simple
measure of inequality that shows up in standard models of inequity aversion. In
particular, assuming the formulation in equation (1.3), deterministic preferences are
fully given by some u(x, y) = g(x, y) − δD(x, y), since W in such case will be an
order-preserving transformation.
The function g(x, y) also determines whether these preferences present ex post
fairness or not. As will be formally stated in subsection 1.3.2, when g presents a form
of supermodularity (a formal expression of inequality aversion) the model yields ex
post fairness behavior the model.
To summarize, when the model consists of equations (1.3), (1.4) and a standard
concave function g, it presents the following relevant properties: First, it behaves
as a standard social preferences model in absence of risks. Second, if δ > 0 and
large enough, there always exist two outcomes A and B such that the decision maker
prefers a non-trivial lottery between these two outcomes rather than either outcome
for sure. In other words, the model presents ex ante fairness, as desired. Further,
this model is able to introduce ex ante motives at the modeling cost of one single
additional parameter (δ), although it could also accommodate more flexibility from
the exponent p. Third, attitudes towards fair-risks can be independent from deter-
ministic preferences for giving as well as from ex ante fairness motives. Fourth, if
g presents inequity aversion, the model exhibits ex post fairness behavior. Finally,
this model satisfies the corresponding extension of Karni and Safra (2002) axiom of
fairness independence that requires behavior to conform to the expected utility theory
within the set of fairness procedures (in our environment, the set of lotteries that
16I use p = 2 in all examples.
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make FX = FY ).
Because of the familiarity of the proposed D (in equation 1.4) with the Lp−norm,
I call my model the LP model.
Examples
These two examples show how model extends previous deterministic other-regarding
preferences to risky environments while incorporating ex ante motives (and, in the
second example, risk attitudes as well).
Example 1: Extending Fehr and Schmidt (1999) with ex ante fairness.– Consider
the following utility:




α(Fx − Fy)2+ + β(Fy − Fx)2+dt (1.6)
and
d(x, y) = α(y − x)2+ + β(x− y)2+ (1.7)
To economize, I use: (z)+ = max{0, z}. In this formulation, we have setW = g−δD,
g = x − (1 − δ) d(x, y) with respect to equation (1.2), and dµ = dt. The relative
strength of ex ante motives is captured by δ. The functional D in this example is a
lopsided norm with the same parameters as the regular F&S model. In absence of
risks D(x, y) becomes simply d(x, y) and the whole model collapses to the standard
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) utility. This model exhibits ex ante behavior as desired: For
example, assuming α = β = 12 , and setting A = (1, 0) and B = (1, 2), we have that
a 50-50 lottery over A and B is strictly preferred to either A or B. Figure 1.1 shows
how D extends the F&S inequality discount d to the lottery space. Depicted in red,
we have the DM’s marginal CDF and, in blue, the counterpart’s. The left panel, the
case with no risk, shows how standard deterministic inequality discount works as in
the F&S model. The right panel shows how D extends this inequality aversion to the
14
lottery space.17
Figure 1.1: Deterministic Fairness Concerns (left) - Ex ante Fairness Concerns
(right). In red, the DM’s marginal CDF; in blue counterpart’s marginal CDF. The
arrows indicate the direction of inequality concerns that operate in the current deter-
ministic models (left) and in the model I introdude (right).
Example 2: Extending Andreoni and Miller (2002) with inequality aversion, ex ante
fairness and risk attitudes.– Consider the following utility:






|Fxρ − Fyρ|2dt (1.9)
and
d(x, y) = |xρ − yρ| (1.10)
Here, Fx is the marginal CDF of x within lottery L, and Fxρ is the marginal CDF
of xρ (similarly for y). Notice that another way to express the ex ante discount is
this: D =
´
|Fx(t) − Fy(t)|2dµ(t), with µ = tρ. This shows how function µ operates
in equation (1.4).
Parameters a, ρ and θ fully describe deterministic preferences among which θ is the
weight given to all inequality concerns. Within these inequality concerns, d captures
the discount for ex post inequality and D captures the discount for ex ante inequality.
δ gives the relative weight of the latter. γ shapes attitudes towards perfectly fair-risks.
For simplicity, I assume symmetric inequity aversion in this example. It can be seen
17In this particular case, the graph represents ex ante motives in the particular case in which the
two fixed outcomes are symmetric: A=(x, y) and B=(y, x) where x 6= y.
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that if lottery L guarantees perfect equality (i.e. there is risk but Pr[X = Y ] = 1),
then d = D = 0 and this function U(L) = E(xγ
γ
) fully determines preferences towards
fair-risks. On the other hand, in risk-free situations, we have that D(Fx, Fy) =´
(Fxρ − Fyρ)2dt = |x̄ρ − ȳρ| = d(x̄, ȳ). Therefore, the deterministic instance of this
model are given by:
U(x, y) = min {(a− θ)xρ + (1− a+ θ)yρ , (a+ θ)xρ + (1− a− θ)yρ}1/ρ (1.11)
This utility models preferences with altruism that is responsive to the price of giving,
as documented in Andreoni and Miller (2002) and in Fisman et al. (2007), and also
with inequality aversion when θ > 0 which generates the corresponding kink along
the 45 degree line. The deterministic case where there is no inequality aversion (i.e.
θ = 0) makes this utility simplify to the original Andreoni and Miller (2002) model
of altruism with constant elasticity of substitution (CES).
1.3.1 The Expected Inequality Aversion Model
In this subsection, I briefly discuss the Expected Inequality Aversion (EIA) model
(aFudenberg and Levine 2012; Saito 2013) and a more general version that I refer
to as the Generalized EIA (GEIA) model. The utility function in the EIA model is
given by:
U(L) = δsu(E[x, y]) + (1− δs)E[u(x, y)] (1.12)
where u is the classic F&S utility: u = x − α(y − x)+ − β(x − y)+. Fudenberg
and Levine (2012) and Saito (2013) argue that the first term of the RHS of this
equation captures the ex ante motives and the second term the ex post motives. In
this model δs indicates the relative strength of ex ante fairness concerns. What I
refer to as the Generalized Expected Inequity Aversion (GEIA) model, has the same
formulation of equation (1.12) except the F&S utility is replaced by a generic social
preference utility u(.), with the condition that u(.) must be concave in each argument
and along the 45 degree line. The concavity condition rules out both: risk loving
behavior and non-convex deterministic preferences for giving. The concavity along
the 45 degree line captures the aversion to risks that are egalitarian in ex post sense.
One important virtue of the GEIA model is that it extends existing other-regarding
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models to incorporate ex ante motives using only the first moment, the expectation.
Furthermore, it does so at the modeling cost of one single additional parameter.
The reason why I want to focus on the GEIA formulation and not on its simpler
EIA version is because the latter yields some unreasonable predictions that can be
easily corrected precisely by replacing the F&S utility with a concave utility. For
example, in the EIA model, the piece-wise linearity of the F&S utility implies that
in riskless situations the DM is (a.e.) unresponsive to the price of giving, and that
attitudes towards perfectly fair risks are neutral.18 The GEIA solves those minor
issues but keeps its core tenet: that people exhibit ex ante fairness behavior because
they partly assess and compare their expected outcomes with others’. This postulate
directly implies these two testable predictions: (i) tolerance to risks increases with ex
ante fairness motives, and (ii) highly ex ante fairness oriented individuals disregard
differences in risk correlation. Additionally, also testable, the GEIA model does not
conform to the expected utility theory even regarding perfectly fair risks. That is, it
does not satisfy Karni and Safra’s axiom of fairness independence.
Because my model differs from the GEIA in all these predictions, one of the
objectives of the experimental exercise is to test such implications. In subsection
1.3.2, I present these implications formally.
1.3.2 Empirical Predictions
In this section, I present the propositions that describe the main behavioral pat-
terns predicted by the LP model. I also present some propositions with predictions
that are exclusive to the GEIA model. Later, in the empirical part of the paper
(sections 1.4 and 1.5), I test these behavioral implications.
In what follows, for simplicity, I assume X = <2+ and the formulation of the model
that is given in equation (1.3) with W linear, µ(t) = t, and p > 1. Also, I assume
that deterministic preferences are positively monotonic in both x and y.
Let me first state the predictions about ex post fairness behavior. Consider lot-
teries Lfair and Lunfair to depend on a choice variable α:




⊕ 12 ((1− α)Z , (1− α)Z) and,
18See López-Vargas (2014) for a detailed comment o n the EIA model.
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2. Lunfair(α) = 12
(




(1− α)Z , αZ̄
)
where Z̄ > Z. Notice that both lotteries make outcomes for the DM and her coun-
terpart perfectly correlated. In Lfair this correlation is positive and in Lunfair it is




When this choice problem is over fair risks (Lfair(α)), the decision consists of bal-
ancing risks and returns according to DM’s preferences. When, instead, this problem
is over unfair risks (Lunfair(α)), the decision necessarily incorporates DM’s fairness
considerations as well, because ex post outcomes are always unfair in such a deci-
sion problem. Notice that in this context α is a measure of risk tolerance. The
personal expected value in either lottery is Ex = Ey = 0.5
(





Z + α(Z̄ − Z)
)
. Therefore, if the DM tolerates risk perfectly she will choose
α = 1. If, instead, she behaves with extreme risk aversion, she will choose making
sure this equality holds αZ̄ = (1− α)Z by choosing α = αsafe ≡ (1 + Z/Z̄)−1 < 1.19
I define αfair∗ as the solution to problem (1.13) when L(α) = Lfair(α), and αunfair∗
as the solution when L(α) = Lunfair(α).
For Proposition 1, I also need to define the property of supermodularity.
Definition g : X → < is (strictly) supermodular with respect to z, z′ ∈ X, if g(z ↑
z′) + g(z ↓ z′) ≥ (>) g(z) + g(z′) where z ↑ z′ denotes the component wise
maximum and z ↓ z′ the componentwise minimum of z and z′. We say g is
globally supermodular if it is supermodular with respect to any z, z′ ∈ X.
The supermodularity assumption that will be imposed on g is a formal expression
of inequality aversion.20 Intuitively, it states that the incremental utility associated
to an positive change in DM’s resources (x) is bigger if such a change in x improves
equality compared to when it hurts equality. Proposition 1, formally states that this
weak form of inequality aversion implies ex post fairness behavior.
Proposition 1 (ex post fairness) In the LP model, if g is (i) globally supermod-
ular, and (ii) strictly supermodular with respect to any two outcomes A =
19Any choice below αsafe is irrational.
20All standard models of inequity aversion satisfy this property.
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(xA, yA) and B = (xB, yB) with yA > xA and xB > yB, then the optimal risk
tolerance to fair lotteries is higher than to unfair lotteries: αfair∗ > αunfair∗.
Proof in Appendix A.
Notice that α is directly observable from choice problems like the one in expression
(1.13), so this proposition can be empirically tested.
Next, I state the predictions about ex ante fairness behavior. Let L(p,A,B)
denote a lottery over outcomes A and B where p is the probability of A:
L(p,A,B) = p (xA, yA) ⊕ (1− p) (xB, yB) (1.14)
Without loss of generality, I will assume for the rest of this subsection that A and
B satisfy yA > yB and xB > xA. That is, A and B are undominated and A is





Define p* to be the solution to this problem. This is the choice problem where DM
chooses or not to share chances with others and, if p∗ is a non-trivial probability, we
say DM exhibits ex ante fairness seeking behavior.
Proposition 2 (ex ante fairness) In the LP model, if δ > 0, then there exist two
outcomes A and B in X such that the corresponding optimal p∗ satisfies: (i)
p* ∈ (0, 1), and (ii) for low enough δ, p* is increasing in xA, yA and decreasing
in xB, yB.
Proof in Appendix A.
Proposition 2 states formally that the LP model exhibits ex ante fairness behavior
that manifests in DM’s preferences for sharing chances with her counterpart. Fur-
thermore, the proposition states that when ex ante forces are present but are not
predominant (δ is positive but low enough) DM will react to the attractiveness of
(the relatively disadvantageous) outcome A.
Next, I state propositions describing the behavioral predictions of the GEIA
model. The core implications of the GEIA model are: (i) risk tolerance correlates
positively with ex ante fairness behavior, and (ii) ex post and ex ante fairness concerns
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trade-off in behavior. Propositions 3 and 4 state these implications formally, and the
following discussion provides their intuition and the kind of test we can implement
about them with observed behavior.
Proposition 3: In the GEIA model, the optimal tolerance to fair risks, αfair∗ in
problem in expression (1.13), is increasing in the ex ante motives δs.
Proof in Appendix A.
Proposition 4: In the GEIA model, the ex post fairness observable measure, αfair∗−
αunfair∗, converges to 0 as δs goes to 1.
Proof in Appendix A.21
These propositions describe how, in the GEIA model, risk taking behavior is
affected by the ex ante fairness parameter δs. Intuitively, Proposition 3 simply says
that the higher is the weight (δs) of u(Ex,Ey) in the GEIA utility, the less responsive
to risks the DM becomes.
Importantly, while risk attitudes are observable through chosenα′s in decisions like
the one problem (1.13), δs is not directly observable. For this reason, in Proposition
5, I establish how the parameter δs of the GEIA model can be approximated from
observed behavior. To see how Proposition 5 operates, I need to define a new choice
problem. As in problem (1.15), consider two outcomes A and B, and, without loss




U(sxA + (1− s)xB , syA + (1− s)yB) (1.16)
where s is the weight given to outcome A in the convex combination between A and
B. Let s* be the solution to such problem. Notice that problem (1.16) is a general
way to express the standard deterministic Dictator Game. To
see how I use choice problems like the ones in expressions (1.15) and (1.16) to
approximate δs, consider the simple case where A = (0, a), B = (b, 0). Notice that
in the GEIA model, a perfectly ex-ante motivated decision maker (δs = 1) will assess
21It is important to note that if u satisfies inequity aversion, captured by the same supermodularity
property I previously imposed on g, we have that αfair∗ > αunfair∗, as in the LP model. Therefore,
in such case, αfair∗ − αunfair∗ is on average decreasing in δs.
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any lottery L(p,A,B) only by its expected values – i.e. by looking at U(L(p,A,B))=
u(Ex,Ey)=u(pxA + (1 − p)xB , pyA + (1 − p)yB). Therefore, for such a decision
maker choosing p in problem (1.15) and choosing s in problem (1.16) are actually
the same decision, and so they have the same solution: p* = s*. Suppose instead
the decision maker is perfectly ex post driven in the GEIA model (δs = 0). In such
case, U(L(p,A,B))= Eu(x, y)=pu(xA, yA) + (1− p)u(xB, yB) and therefore p∗ = 0 as
I assumed B  A. In the in between case (0 < δs < 1), and for A and B such that
s* > 0, we have that p* < s* and that p* increases with δs. For that reason, the
observable measure δ̂s = p*/s* is a good proxy of δs that I use to test empirically
propositions 3 and 4. Proposition 5 states this formally.
Proposition 5: In the GEIA model, p*, the solution to problem in expression (1.15),
satisfies:
(i) p* is weakly increasing in δs, and
(ii) p* ∈ [0, s*].
Proof in Appendix A.
With the proxy δ̂s, I can test Proposition 3, the core implication of the GEIA
model regarding how risk attitudes are affected by ex ante motives (δs). To see how
this test works intuitively, consider again the simple case of δs = 1. Such a decision
maker will always choose p* = s*, and, because her utility is U(L) = u(Ex,Ey), she
will also choose always α∗fair = 1. Therefore, individuals that behave as strongly or
perfectly ex ante fairness driven (p*=s*), but at the same time avoid risks to some
degree (αfair∗ < 1), are inconsistent with the GEIA model. Furthermore, this test
of the GEIA model does not restrict to individuals that exhibit p* = s*. Suppose
two individuals have the same deterministic preferences u (that can be elicited via
decisions in deterministic Dictator Games) and so they both choose the same s*,
always. Suppose also that, compared to individual 2, individual 1 chooses p* (in
problem 1.15) closer to s*. This can only mean that he has a higher δs and so, by
the utility of the GEIA model (equation 1.12), he must tolerate fair risks more than
individual 2: αfair∗1 > αfair∗2 . The empirical analogue of Proposition 3 is then that
αfair∗must correlate with δ̂s once we control for deterministic choices. This will be
one of the hypotheses I test with experimental data.
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1.4 Experiment
In this section, I present evidence from a laboratory experiment designed to jointly
study other-regarding preferences (ex ante and ex post fairness concerns, in particular)
and attitudes towards risks in a social setup. I focus on studying the empirical
correlate of the propositions in Section 1.3.2 that described the choice pattern of ex
post and ex ante fairness in the LP model, as well as how risk attitudes interact with
fairness motives in the GEIA model.
1.4.1 Design
Individuals in the experiment performed decisions in four different types of tasks.
There were eleven decision rounds for each task type. The experimental protocol
and the interface in which subjects made all decisions are described in the procedures
subsection.
Task type 1 – sharing in chances.- This decision environment elicits ex ante
motives. Each decision problem of this type gives decider two fixed, mutually exclu-
sive (undominated) outcomes e.g. A = (0, 90) and B = (90, 0). Subjects are then
asked to allocate probabilities between the two outcomes. Formally, for two given
outcomes (xA, yA) and (xB, yB), each decider was asked to choose p ∈ [0, 1] to form
his preferred lottery L(p∗) from this set {p (xA, yA) ⊕ (1− p) (xB, yB) : p ∈ [0, 1]}.
Each decision round had a different pair of fixed outcomes A and B. The graphical
interface that was presented to subjects can be seen in Figure 1.2. The full list of
specific choices presented to subjects is reported in the first column of table 1.1.
Task type 2 – taking fair-risks.- This task elicit risk attitudes free from fair-
ness concerns. In each choice of this task, subjects decide how much risk to bear
in a two-state contingent commodity environment, with the feature that either state
of the world (A or B) pays the same amount of money to decider and her coun-
terpart (i.e. marginal risks are perfectly positively correlated). The probability
of each state is given and subjects are informed about it. Formally, given pA,






Figure 1.2: Interface of Tasks Type 1: Sharing Chances
(1− pA) ((1− α)Z , (1− α)Z)}α∈[0,1], where Z̄ and Z denote the maximum total
payoff that each agent could potentially obtain in State A and State B, respectively.
I am assuming here that state A has always the highest return. In the actual ex-
periment, across choices, the higher return varied from A to B randomly. Each of
the eleven decision rounds had a different pair of fixed Z̄ and Z. Six decisions used
pA = 0.5, Z̄ 6= Z, three decisions used pA 6= 0.5, Z̄ = Z, and two decisions used
pA = 0.5, Z̄ = Z. The graphical interface that was presented to subjects can be seen
in Figure 1.3. The full list of specific choices presented to subjects is reported in the
first column of table 1.2.
Notice that this choice problem can be interpreted as a two-state environment
with two securities or claims (one for each state). Each security pays one token to
each agent if the corresponding state is realized. Furthermore, each subject is given
a budget and face potentially different relative prices for securities A and B (or state
prices). If, for example, the given budget is Z̄, and price of B-security is 1, then the
price of A-security is Z/Z̄, and the quantities of A-securities and B-securities that is
aquired are αZ̄ and (1− α)Z, respectively.
Task type 3 – taking unfair-risks.- This task elicits attitudes towards risks
with unfair outcomes. Similar to task 2, subjects decide how much risk to bear
in a two-state contingent commodity environment. However, in this task, either
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Figure 1.3: Interface of Tasks Type 2: Taking Fair-Risks
state of the world (A or B) pays are unequally to decider and counterpart, unless
no risk is chosen to be borne. In fact, marginal risks are perfectly negatively cor-
related. The probability of each state is given and subjects are informed about it.
Formally, given pA, each subject was asked to choose a lottery L(α) from this set:
{pA
(




(1− α)Z , αZ̄
)
}α∈[0,1], where Z̄ and Z denote the
maximum total payoff that the decider (partner) could potentially obtain in State
A (B) and State B (A), respectively. Each of the eleven decision rounds had a dif-
ferent pair of fixed Z̄ and Z. Six decisions used pA = 0.5, Z̄ 6= Z, three decisions
used pA 6= 0.5, Z̄ = Z, and two decisions used pA = 0.5, Z̄ = Z. As in task type
2, marginal risks are the same between decider and her counterpart. The graphical
interface that was presented to subjects can be seen in Figure 1.4. The full list of
specific choices presented to subjects is reported in the first column of table 1.2.
Task type 4 – deterministic giving.- It is the standard riskless giving decision
environment where deterministic other-regarding preferences are elicited in a standard
dictator-like game varying the budget and the price of giving. Formally, a subject was
asked to choose y to form an allocation (x, y) from those satisfying the constraint:
q y+x = M . Across rounds, the price of giving q and the size of the budgetM varied.
The graphical interface that was presented to subjects can be seen in Figure 1.5. The
full list of specific choices presented to subjects is reported in the first column of table
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Figure 1.4: Interface of Tasks Type 3: Taking Unfair-Risks
1.3.
1.4.2 Hypotheses
Hypothesis 1 (Ex post fairness): Tolerance to fair-risks (αfair’s from tasks 2)
is higher than tolerance to unfair-risks (αunfair’s from tasks 3).
This hypothesis states the prediction of Proposition 1.
Hypothesis 2A (Ex ante fairness): Subjects exhibit ex ante fairness behavior:
they commonly choose non trivial probabilities, p ∈ (0, 1), in tasks of type 1.
Hypothesis 2B (Ex ante fairness): Ex ante fairness behavior (probabilities p
chosen in tasks of type 1) respond positively to the relative benefits of helping a part-
ner. That is, p is increasing in yA−yB
xB−xA
.
Together, these two hypotheses state the predictions of Proposition 2. While
existing evidence already indicates ex ante fairness is a common behavior, and so
Hypothesis 2A is backed by evidence, further characterization of how individuals
trade-off this motive with other motives – like the one stated in Hypothesis 2B – has
not been studied in detail.
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Figure 1.5: Interface of Tasks Type 4 - Deterministic Giving
Table 1.1: Statistics - Task Type 1 - Sharing Chances
Decision Rounds − yA−yB
xB−xA Pr[A] s.e.Outcomes A, B
A:(10,60); B:(80,30) -0.43 11.09 2.61
A:(10,45); B:(80,10) -0.50 19.65 4.09
A:(0,90); B:(90,0) -1.00 17.55 3.76
A:(10,80); B:(80,10) -1.00 19.62 4.12
A:(10,50); B:(50,10) -1.00 21.75 4.07
A:(30,60); B:(60,30) -1.00 22.85 3.71
A:(10,80); B:(45,10) -2.00 30.29 4.57
A:(30,80); B:(60,10) -2.33 28.02 4.39
A:(10,80); B:(45,45) -1.00 10.33 3.09
A:(45,45); B:(80,10) -1.00 36.78 5.43
A:(30,30); B:(60,60) 1.00 8.96 2.82
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Table 1.2: Statistics - Tasks 2, 3 - Taking Fair and Unfair Risks
Decision Rounds R = Pr[B] IBPr[A] IA
zA zA Safe
Task 2 Task 3 Choice
Pr[A]=50%; IA=100; IB=25 0.25 51.6 47.1 20.0
Pr[A]=50%; IA=75; IB=37.5 0.50 39.5 33.4 25.0
Pr[A]=50%; IA=90; IB=66 0.73 48.8 44.7 38.1
Pr[A]=50%; IA=50; IB=50 1.00 25.5 25.9 25.0
Pr[A]=50%; IA=76; IB=76 1.00 38.9 38.6 38.0
Pr[A]=50%; IA=66; IB=90 1.36 30.5 35.2 38.1
Pr[A]=50%; IA=37.5; IB=75 2.00 18.6 21.2 25.0
Pr[A]=50%; IA=25; IB=100 4.00 10.4 13.1 20.0
Pr[A]=70%; IA=60; IB=60 0.43 39.5 38.9 30.0
Pr[A]=30%; IA=60; IB=60 2.33 18.5 21.3 30.0
Pr[A]=90%; IA=60; IB=60 0.11 52.4 47.5 30.0
Notes:




ȳx̄ s.e. x ȳ s.e. y
Max X=25; Max Y=100 0.25 17.12 1.06 31.32 4.26 1.83
Max X=37.5; Max Y=75 0.50 26.41 1.35 22.23 2.7 0.84
Max X=65; Max Y=100 0.65 46.96 2.32 27.72 3.58 0.59
Max X=66; Max Y=90 0.73 46.17 2.36 27.08 3.22 0.59
Max X=50; Max Y=50 1.00 33.65 1.61 16.43 1.61 0.49
Max X=76; Max Y=76 1.00 54.73 2.21 21.3 2.21 0.39
Max X=90; Max Y=90 1.00 65.32 2.89 24.72 2.9 0.38
Max X=100; Max Y=65 1.54 70.5 3.63 19.26 2.36 0.27
Max X=90; Max Y=66 1.36 67.39 2.89 16.62 2.13 0.25
Max X=75; Max Y=37.5 2.00 53.16 2.86 11.03 1.43 0.21
Max X=100; Max Y=25 4.00 72.3 4.15 7.03 1.04 0.10
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Hypothesis 3 (GEIA - ex ante vs risk tolerance): Tolerance to fair risks (α
from tasks 2) correlates positively with ex ante fairness seeking behavior (choices from
task 1 and the proxy of δs).
This hypothesis provides the empirical test of Proposition 3, where δs is approxi-
mated following the result in Proposition 5.
Hypothesis 4 (GEIA - ex post vs ex ante): The measure of ex post fairness,
αfair − αunfair (from tasks 2 and 3) decreases with stronger ex ante fairness seeking
behavior (choices from task 1 and the proxy of δs).
This hypothesis provides the empirical test of Proposition 4, where δs is approxi-
mated following the result in Proposition 5.
1.4.3 Procedures
Interface:
The experiment used a graphical interface for all decisions. Tasks of type 1 were
presented as shown in Figure 1.2. In such a screen, deciders are informed about the
two outcomes (in tokens) by means of a graph and a table. They were then asked
to use a slider tool to choose the probability of allocation (xA, yA). Tasks of types 2
and 3 were presented as shown in Figures 1.3 and 1.4. In such screens, deciders are
informed about the odds of each state (in percentage terms). They were then asked
to drag with the mouse the shapes that determine the lottery for herself (blue square)
and for her counterpart (orange circle). Tasks of type 4 are the standard Dictator
Game, shown in Figure 1.5. Interface design for tasks 1 is novel. Interface design for
tasks 2-4 are similar to those used in Choi et al. (2007) and Fisman et al. (2007).
Sessions and Protocol:
The experiment was run at the Experimental Economics Laboratory at the Univer-
sity of Maryland (EEL-UMD). The program was coded in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
For a total of 7 sessions, 110 undergraduate students were recruited via EEL-UMD’s
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online recruitment system. A session took about 60 minutes, in which every subject
was asked to make choices in a series of decision rounds. At the start of a session,
pairs were formed by anonymous matching. In a pair, one subject was assigned to the
role of decider and the other subject was assigned to the role of partner. Both pair-
ing and role assignment were done randomly, and they remained fixed for the entire
session. Subjects were informed of their role at the start of the interaction, before
any decision was made. For each pair, both the decider and partner were posed the
same decision problems, however, only the choices made by the decider determined
the payoffs.
The order in which tasks were presented within a session was randomized to elim-
inate order effects. Also, for each task, subjects were posed eleven decision problems
(“decision rounds”). The order in which each round appeared was also randomized.
At the end of the session, subjects were paid according to one randomly selected
decision made by the decider plus a fixed participation fee of 5 USD. Exchange rate
was 1 USD for every 5 experimental tokens. The experimental instructions can be
found in Appendix A, Section A.2.
1.5 Results and Discussion
Result 1 (Ex post fairness): Ex post fairness considerations affect risk taking
behavior. In particular, tolerance to fair-risks is higher than tolerance to unfair-risks.
To build a measure of risk tolerance in each choice of the contingent commodity
settings (tasks of types 2 and 3), I use the proportion of a given budget that is allo-
cated to the high return security normalized by the perfectly safe choice. Formally,
if IA and IB represent the intercepts of the budget line with the axes for State A and
B, respectively, then our risk tolerance measure is:
α̂ = zhigh − Safe
Z̄ − Safe
(1.17)










If IA 6= IB, it can be seen that α̂ = 0 when DM is perfectly risk averse; and α̂=1
when she is (highly) risk neutral. I use this measure to compute two different Indices
of risk tolerance. Consider this example to see how α̂ is a measure of tolerance to
uncertainty. Suppose IA = 6 and IB = 3. By equation (1.18), safe = 2. If, for
example, DM takes a big risk and chooses 5 units for state A and only 0.5 units for
State B (i.e. zhigh = 5). Then α̂ = 5−26−2 = 0.75. If, instead, DM chooses a more
conservative zhigh = 2.1, then α̂ = 0.025.
In Risk Tolerance Index 1 (RTI_1), I averaged at individual level all α̂’s from
choices that induced tension between risks and returns (i.e. IA 6= IB). There were
9 of such choice problems see Table 1.2. In the second index, Risk Tolerance Index
2 (RTI_2) I used only α̂ from the choices that implied the highest tension between
risks and returns (Z̄/Z = 4). This occurred in two choice problems of task 2. I follow
the same procedure for tasks of type 3 (unfair risks).
I compare RTI_1 obtained from behavior facing fair risks (tasks of type 2) and
behavior facing unfair risks (tasks of type 3). I find RTIunfair1 = 20.23 (s.e. 3.67) and
RTIfair1 = 30.45 (s.e. 3.99). That is according to this index, tolerance to fair risks
is nearly 50% higher than to unfair risks. The difference is statistically different in
simple one-sided mean tests (p=0.0023) as well as in sign-rank test (p=0.0007). This
result is robust to alternative formulations of risk tolerance, such as RTI_2. Figure
1.6 shows that the comparison of histograms between RTI1 in tasks of type 2 vs tasks
of type 3. It can be seen that when risks are ex post unfair, more subjects decide to
avoid risks almost completely, as my model predicts.
Result 2 (Ex ante fairness): Helping partners probabilistically – i.e. exhibiting
ex ante fairness behavior – is a common behavioral pattern (Hypothesis 2A). Fur-
thermore, this conduct responds to the relative benefits of helping a partner. This is,
if A is Decider’s comparatively disadvantageous outcome, chosen p∗A is increasing in
the relative benefits of A over B: yA−yB
xB−xA
(Hypothesis 2B).
This result utilizes only choices from tasks of type 1 (sharing chances). Choices
from these tasks confirm that ex ante fairness concerns are an important force in
these environments. Considering only choices involving undominated outcomes (first
10 rows of Table 1.1), subjects assigned a positive probability to the disadvantageous
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Figure 1.6: Tolerance to fair risks (orange) and unfair risks (white)
outcome in 46% of all choices. Further, 40 out of 55 deciding subjects (72%) gave
a positive probability to the disadvantageous outcome in at least one choice of this
task.
The second part of Result 2, is fully reported in Table 1.1. The first column of
this table describes each choice by stating the two outcomes A and B.22 The second
column indicates the substitution rate of expected values, yA−yB
xB−xA
. That is, how much
partner’s expected dollars increase when decider gives up one expected dollar ; which is
a broad measure of the benefits achieved by each (expected) dollar decider sacrifices
to help the other. The third column indicates the average probability deciders gave to
outcome A. In this table that outcome A is always the more advantageous to partner
side.23 Also, all up to row 8, this table is sorted by the substitution rate.
With this information, we can see that subjects, on average, responded strongly
to the relative benefit of sharing in probabilities. When giving up one expected dollar
implied only a 0.43 increase in partner’s expected dollars, deciders gave to outcome
A a probability of only 11.1% (1st row). When instead the relative benefit was 2.33,
the probability of outcome A went up to 28%, on average (8th row of the table). This
difference is statistically significant (p-value<0.01). Rows 3-6 of this table shows
choices where the relative incentive to share chances (in column 2) is constant and
always 1. Instead, across these choices, the experimental design varied the degree of
22E.g. “A:(10,60); B:(80,30)” means: if outcome A realizes, Decider gets 10 tokens and Partner
gets 60. And if outcome B realizes Decider gets 80 tokens and Partner gets 30.
23In the experiment outcomes labels were allocated randomly.
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risk. Data shows subjects shared more chances when the was less risk involved. For
this choice A:(0,90); B:(90,0) subjects shared on average only 17.5% (row 3). However,
when facing these outcomes A:(30,60) and B:(60,30) they shared 22.9% (row 6). The
latter being statistically higher (p-value<0.05). Interestingly as well, comparing rows
9 and 10 of the same table, we observe subjects shared substantially more chances if
helping others also involved increasing the odds of a perfectly fair outcome (row 10 –
32.8%) as opposed to when it involved moving away from it (row 9 – 10.33%).
The last choice reported in this table is a rationality check. Outcomes for this
choice are A:(30,30) and B:(60,60) implying that rational subjects can only choose
Prob[A]=0. We instead find that 11 subjects assigned a positive probability. Al-
though on average this probability is 8.9%, it is mostly driven by five subjects that
gave 50%. This result is somewhat striking given how consistent and well behaved
results are on average. One possible explanation is that because all ten of the other
choices presented undominated outcomes, some strongly ex ante fairness oriented
subjects might have mixed this choice with the one involving outcomes A:(30,60) and
B:(60,30). Four of these five subjects gave 50% in both of these choice problems.
Result 3 (GEIA - ex ante vs risk tolerance): Tolerance to fair-risks does not
relate positively to ex ante fairness seeking behavior as the GEIA model predicts.
To test Hypothesis 3, I estimate a series of regressions where the dependent vari-
able is a measure of tolerance to fair risks, and the main regressors is a measure of
the strength of ex ante fairness behavior, a proxy of delta. The GEIA model, as a
core implication, prescribes that individuals with stronger sense of ex ante fairness
will necessarily become less sensitive to risks, my model predicts they do not relate.
I use the same measures of risk tolerance utilized and described in Result 1, the Risk
Tolerance Indices 1 and 2 (RTI1 and RTI2).
As independent variables, where I need a proxy of ex ante fairness motives, I
use the following regressors. According to Proposition 5, I built a proxy of δs based
on the comparison between what is given deterministically (s*) and what is given
probabilistically (p*) in a task with the same pie size and relative prices. I use the
deterministic task with the constraint x + y = 90; and the probabilistic task with
outcomes A : (0, 90) B : (90, 0). The proxy for δs is then δ̂s = Pr[A] ∗ 90− y.
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I also run specifications where I directly use as regressors choices from the tasks of
type 2 (ex ante fairness), using as controls choices from tasks 4 (deterministic giving).
These variables are reported in the regression Tables 1.4 and 1.5 as “ex ante fairness
Indices” and “deterministic giving”. 24
Results from Tobit regressions are reported in Tables 1.4 and 1.5. In the first
table, dependent variable is RTI1 and in the second table is RTI2. In both cases, the
first five rows contain ex ante fairness variables (our variable of interest). In all these
regressions, there is no statistical indication of a positive relation between stronger ex
ante fairness behavior (giving more chances) and tolerating risks more. Hypothesis 3
is rejected.
Result 4 (GEIA - ex post vs ex ante): Ex post fairness behavior does not
correlate negatively with ex ante fairness behavior, regardless we control or not for
deterministic preferences.
To test hypothesis 4, I run a regression where the dependent variable is RTIfair1 −
RTIunfair1 and the independent variable is the proxy of δs constructed for Result 3.
Testing the hypothesis that the sign of the corresponding coefficient in this regression
is negative is rejected (p<0.05).
From results 3 and 4, I conclude the following about the GEIA model. Although
the GEIA model predicts ex ante fairness behavior, its core implications regarding how
risk attitudes relate to fairness behavior do not hold in observe behavior. I interpret
this as evidence favoring my model since these results imply that a formulation of ex
ante fairness solely based on first moments do not match the data. And therefore we
need a model the considers further moments, like mine.
24In these regressions, “Ex ante fairness index 1” equates to chosen p* when A=(0,90); B=(90,0);
“Ex ante fairness index 2” equates to average chosen p* among choice problems where relative
expected benefit of A over B equals 1; “Ex ante fairness index 3” equates to average chosen p*
among choice problems where relative expected benefit of A over B is below 1; and “Ex ante fairness
index 4” equates to average chosen p* among all choice problems where neither A or B dominate
the other outcome in first order stochastic sense. “Deterministic Giving 1 - 4” in those regressions,
correspond to the analogous choices except for tasks of type 4.
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Table 1.4: Tobit Regr. - Attitudes Towards Fair Risks - RTI1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delta Proxy 0.089
(0.141)
Ex-ante fairness index 1 -0.153
(0.162)
Ex-ante fairness index 2 -0.068 -0.279
(0.300) (0.298)
Ex-ante fairness index 3 -0.012 0.275
(0.288) (0.297)
Ex-ante fairness index 4 -0.053
(0.342)
Det. Giving 1 -0.036
(0.217)
Det. Giving 2 -0.205 -1.366***
(0.424) (0.408)
Det. Giving 3 0.326 0.923*
(0.400) (0.502)
Det. Giving 4 -0.020
(0.486)
Constant 29.706*** 33.826*** 36.005*** 21.959*** 31.885*** 31.668***
(4.589) (6.086) (6.981) (7.140) (7.378) (6.664)
Pseudo R2 7.0e-04 1.9e-03 1.8e-03 4.9e-03 1.7e-04 .033
N 55 55 55 55 55 55
Notes: See text for detailed construction of depvar. All Tobit regressions used LL=0
and UL=100. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: * 0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Tobit Regr. - Attitudes Towards Fair Risks - RTI2 (Robustness)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Delta Proxy 0.073
(0.182)
Ex-ante fairness index 1 -0.363*
(0.194)
Ex-ante fairness index 2 -0.117 -0.294
(0.366) (0.372)
Ex-ante fairness index 3 -0.226 0.200
(0.356) (0.347)
Ex-ante fairness index 4 -0.258
(0.438)
Ex-post fairness index 1 -0.524*
(0.309)
Ex-post fairness index 2 -0.921 -2.496***
(0.563) (0.616)
Ex-post fairness index 3 0.285 1.342**
(0.455) (0.602)
Ex-post fairness index 4 -0.440
(0.607)
Constant 44.979*** 64.586*** 67.127*** 44.394*** 60.100*** 61.547***
(6.933) (10.749) (12.089) (10.969) (12.219) (10.931)
Pseudo R2 2.5e-04 .015 .013 1.4e-03 5.9e-03 .042
N 55 55 55 55 55 55
Notes: See text for detailed construction of depvar and regressors. All Tobit
regressions used LL=0 and UL=100. Standard errors in parentheses. Significance: *
0.10; ** 0.05; *** 0.01.
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Further Descriptive Results
Taking fair and unfair risks (task types 2 and 3)
Table 1.2 reports summary statistics from choices in tasks 2 and 3. The first
column details the choice problem. For example, the first choice: “Pr[A]=50%; Max
A=100; Max B=25” represents the choice problem where State A occurred with 50%
probability and paid a maximum of 100 tokens and where State B pays a maximum
of 25 tokens.25 The second column shows the probability adjusted price of a State A
security relative to a State B security. In the first row of the table, for example, the
price of A-security is 1/4 of the price of B security. The third and fourth columns
show how many State A securities decider bough in choice problems of Tasks 2 and
3, respectively. The fifth column in this table shows what a perfectly risk averse
agent would choose in each choice problem. Table 1.2 is sorted by the relative price
(column 2) all up to the 9th row which includes choices with 50-50 States. We see in
the behavior of all these 9 choice problems two stylized conducts. First, that subjects
responded to the risk / return tension as standard theory predicts: when securities
were priced the same, on average, no risk was taken. When one security offered
a higher return than the other by having lower relative price, some risk was taken
towards the high return security.
More importantly, exactly as Result 1 states, we can observed that every time
there was a risk/return tension (all choices except choices in rows 5 and 6) deciders
took more risk in Task 2 than in Task 3. We can observe that by realizing that in all
such cases, the quantity of State A-securities of Task 3 is closer to the the perfectly
risk averse (safe) choice of column 5.
Deterministic Giving (Task Type 4)
Table 1.3 the results of the deterministic giving task. The first column details the
budget intercepts at Decider’s axis (X) and at partner’s (Y). The second column shows
the relative price of giving: Py/Px. Columns 3 and 5 report the average amount in
tokens deciders allocated to themselves (X̄) and to partners (Ȳ ), respectively. Column
7, reports the ratio Ȳ /X̄. Again, on average, behavior in this tasks strongly conforms
25In notation from our propositions: Z̄ = 100 and Z = 25 in this example.
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to standard consumer theory. When giving sure dollars is very cheap relative to
keeping them, Py/Px=0.25, subjects give partners about 1.8 times what they keep
for themselves. On the other side of the price range, if the price of giving relative to
keeping is 4, subjects pass one tenth of what they keep (see last row of Table 1.3).
1.6 Conclusions and Research Agenda
My paper studies two important questions involving risk attitudes and other-
regarding preferences. First, I asked whether or not risk attitudes are affected by the
regard for others – and if so, how. Second, I asked how fairness concerns operate under
uncertainty. In particular, what drives ex ante fairness. To answer these questions,
I propose an integrated model of risk attitudes and social preferences. This model,
which I name the LP model, extends the standard notion of inequality discount to
lotteries assuming an individual makes a comparative assessment of the marginal
risks she and others face. Following the intuition of ex post fairness, the LP model
predicts a higher tolerance to risks with positively correlated outcomes compared to
tolerance to risks with negatively correlated outcomes. Importantly, my model is
capable of explaining ex ante fairness behavior manifested in people’s preferences for
helping others probabilistically. I also briefly present and study the core implications
of the expected inequality aversion (EIA) model (Saito, 2013) that are at odds with
my model.
I report on an experimental study of my model’s predictions as well as of the
distinctive implications of the EIA model. I find that social considerations impact
risk attitudes: subjects take substantially more risks when outcomes were ex post fair
compared to when they were ex post unfair. To the best of my knowledge, mine is the
first lab experiment that precisely measures the impact on risk taking behavior of ex
post fairness considerations. This result is important because previous experimental
literature (Brennan et al., 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010; Rohde and Rohde, 2011)
had claimed the impact of social considerations on risk attitudes was virtually null.
I also confirm ex ante fairness behavior is a common choice pattern and docu-
ment how, according to the model, this motive responds to the attractiveness of the
outcomes involved. Finally, I also studied the core implications of the EIA model con-
cluding that, although this model is capable of explaining ex ante fairness behavior
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its predicted positive link between risk tolerance and ex ante fairness does not hold
in observed behavior.
There are several directions in which the literature on this topic can expand.
My model and experimental findings have important implications for our theoretical
understanding of economic interactions that involve risks and that are prompt to
social comparisons, calling for an extension of our current modeling approaches in
such contexts. Think of a tournament, for example, where risk attitudes and fairness
concerns have been studied separately and found to be important forces for behavior
and achieved efficiency. My model offers a framework to study those two forces jointly,
accounting for their interaction.
At a more aggregate level, my model sheds some light on how risk taking behavior
might vary across the income distribution. In particular, it predicts that, other things
constant, higher risk taking behavior will be observed among individuals at the tails
of the distribution compared to individuals in the middle.
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Chapter 2
On the Demand for Expressing
Emotions1
2.1 Introduction
There is a simple but important puzzle regarding the communication that occurs
in many face-to-face economic interactions: the amount of communication we see
in real life far exceeds the amount of content flow our standard economic theories
predict. If we pay attention to a negotiation process between two strangers in a
flea market, we would probably observe a lot of back and forth—sometimes even of
seemingly unrelated topics—while our models predict mostly no communication in
such environments.
This gap in our understanding mainly emerges because current economic models
leave out some fundamental purposes that communication has in reality. Our stan-
dard approach sees communication as fundamentally instrumental in the sense that
it is capable of altering material outcomes. In particular, the most standard models
predict that communication will transmit effective content only when parties’ inter-
ests are at least partially aligned (Crawford and Sobel (1982) and Farrell and Rabin
(1996)). In conflict situations (such as bargaining) there will be no meaningful content
1This paper is coauthored with Brit Grosskopf (University of Exeter, UK). The authors would
like to thank James Konow, Erkut Ozbay, Elke Renner and John Shea for valuable comments,
and seminar participants at the Universite de Cergy–Pontoise, George Mason University, Loyola
Marymount University, University of Nottingham, University of Zurich and the audience at the
North–American ESA Meeting, 2013 in Santa Cruz. Financial support from the NSF under grant
SES 1321 1025034 is gratefully acknowledged.
39
flow. However, this view clearly contrasts with our human intuition that commonly
utilizes communication with broader strategic purposes than those contemplated in
this orthodox view and that often perceives communication as being a good or a bad
in and of itself.
Previous experimental literature has already presented evidence of broader strate-
gic uses of communication in bargaining environments. Galinsky and Mussweiler
(2001) and Andreoni and Rao (2011) all document instances in which communication
commonly favors the speaker in the material allocation. These studies further imply
that people are somewhat aware of some behavioral reactions to communication and
are able to exploit those biases to achieve better material positions. Persuadability,
over-reaction to information, and empathy sensitivity are some of the mechanisms in
play.
Economic studies of the type of communication that has no further material im-
plications (for example, because it takes place after the allocation is determined) has
been minimal. Existing studies document that this kind of expression in bargaining
environments is a likely behavior and its anticipation does in fact change material
outcomes. However, there is no systematic study of its full economic value: how
much is this type of expression possibility worth? To the best of our knowledge ours
is the first study to answer this question. In particular, we study a type of expression
and environment that have been linked to mood and emotional states in previous
studies: unidirectional, ex-post verbal expression in bargaining-like settings. Brain
scans, self–reports as well as physiological measures of emotional arousal support the
idea that bargaining environments are indeed charged with emotional states.2 Xiao
and Houser (2005) and Xiao and Houser (2007) document that verbal expression in
ultimatum and dictator games is likely to emerge as an expression of emotions. Im-
portantly, while the existing research relates emotion and mood to communication
observed in bargaining interactions, it has not yet been established what motives
drive such expressions or how exactly they affect traditional measures of welfare as
well as subjective well–being. Our research tries to address these questions as well.
We implement in the laboratory a modified version of the Power–to–Take game
2E.g. Pillutla and Murnighan (1996); Bosman and Van Winden (2002); Sanfey et al. (2003);
De Quervain et al. (2004); Reuben and Van Winden (2005); Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007). Note that
we often use ‘emotional state’ to refer what psychologists more accurately call ‘feeling state’. That
is, the situation where a subject experiences a ‘feeling of’ a certain emotion.
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(PTT, hereafter). This is an asymmetric bargaining environment where previous
research has identified strong emotional–mood changes experienced by the vulnerable
side (e.g., Bosman and Van Winden (2002)). In our experiment, each subject first
earns money in a real effort task. Then, subjects are randomly matched to one another
and assigned roles, T and R. Role T (the taker) is given the authority to withdraw
a percentage of the counterpart’s labor income, while role R (the responder) is only
asked to guess what percentage that will be. All treatments share this interaction, but
differ in what comes afterwards. To study the broad value of expression, we elicit in
our main treatment R’s valuation of sending an ex–post verbal message to the taker.
To isolate the purely expressive motives from the reciprocal ones, we implement a
treatment where a third party – not the taker – is the recipient of the message. We
also implement some additional treatments to check the robustness of our findings.
Our evidence confirms that people value the ability to express and are willing to
pay significant amounts of money for it. Purely expressive and reciprocal motives
are both nontrivial components of this valuation. We show that when expression is
allowed the vulnerable side experiences a smaller decrease in subjective well–being.
This suggests that beyond the instrumental purposes expression can have a real im-
pact on well–being in economic interactions. This can be useful for further theoretical
modeling, in particular, the design of institutions.
The chapter is organized as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the related literature on
the topic as well as some theoretical considerations. Section 2.3 details the experi-
mental design and Section 2.4 presents and discusses our results. We conclude with
some final remarks in Section 2.6.
2.2 Conceptual Framework and Literature
This section presents the predominant conceptual framework of communication
and expression in economics. It summarizes the literature that studies the presence
of mood and emotional elements in economic interactions and discusses the previous
studies of expression in bargaining setups.
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2.2.1 Communication and Expression in Economics
Communication in economic interactions has been long studied for its instrumen-
tal purposes, that is, for how it can alter play and therefore impact material outcomes.
Within this approach, the most standard view states that agents in strategic inter-
actions with material interests will use communication in an attempt to coordinate
actions or to shape the opponent’s beliefs about his/her own private information. For
communication that is costless and occurs before and during play, i.e. cheap talk, it
has been shown that the more incentives are aligned and the bigger the coordina-
tion surplus, the more informative and welfare improving communication becomes.
Although these theories predict a multiplicity of equilibria, reasonable refinements
predict informative equilibria to be among the most likely (e.g. Crawford and Sobel
(1982); Farrell and Rabin (1996) and Charness (2000)).
This view, however, predicts that in environments where agents’ interests are per-
fectly opposed to one another – such as in fixed–pie bargaining situations – commu-
nication will convey virtually no information and will not have an impact on material
allocations. Experimental evidence shows otherwise and suggests that communica-
tion can have instrumental purposes even in such situations. Allowing expression
can sway opponents’ motivations through different channels often bringing benefits
to the “speaking” side. For example, in an experimental bargaining setup, Croson et
al. (2003) find that under imperfect information, lies and threats do have an impact
on the material surplus distribution. In a similar setup, Galinsky and Mussweiler
(2001) find that, by stating a high initial price, a party at a negotiation might anchor
the range of counter offers at a higher level than otherwise possible. They refer to
the same type of anchoring effect first discussed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974).
Another relevant instance is provided by Andreoni and Rao (2011) who document
that even in a Dictator Game, the party that is able to issue a pre–play message
gets a higher material payoff. The authors point out that from the perspective of the
receivers, communication is a social cue capable of activating altruistic behavior by
heightening empathy.
Less research exists within economics regarding types of communication that have
direct welfare implications without necessarily affecting the distribution of resources.
We use the term noninstrumental for this type of communication and the verbal
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expression we study in this paper mostly lies in this category.3 Two potentially
relevant sources of noninstrumental communication are mood and emotion. Although
these are in effect partially incorporated in any utility–based theory, some essential
features of their functioning inform further extensions of our more standard models.
In particular, they could explain part of the observed noninstrumental communication
and give reasons why noninstrumental communication can be important for welfare
outcomes. In fact, as we shall see later in this section, the evidence for the presence
of mood and emotions (and their expression) in bargaining environments is growing.
Therefore, a more precise look into how they affect welfare is needed. The rest of this
section briefly discusses the approaches and evidence related to mood, emotion and
noninstrumental expression in economics.
2.2.2 Emotions and Mood
Although there is still debate on the definition and approaches to emotions, most
psychologists would agree that emotions are mechanisms that involve reactions in
brain, mind and body. The degree to which cognition (the subjective appraisal of the
situation), other neurological activity or bodily changes are regarded as the essential
part of these processes, is the main difference between different theories of emotion.
In most approaches, however, we find the following main features or components:
emotions have aboutness (or intentionality) and valence. Aboutness means that an
emotion occurs in reference to an event or some stimulus, and valence that emotions
are not typically experienced as neutral; instead, they take a position on a pleasure–
pain scale. They also present action tendencies in that they make certain behaviors
more likely to occur during the emotional episode. This highlights another important
feature: emotions are temporary processes where the mechanism involved is active
for a finite, often short span of time.4 Mood, on the other hand, is intimately linked
3Although it is a broader term that encompasses many ways in which internal and subjective
states are reflected in behavior, we use expression mainly as interchangeable with noninstrumental
communication.
4For a discussion on definitions and essential features of emotions see Frijda (1986); Ekman
(1994); Oatley et al. (2006). Another important dimension that has long received attention in
the definition and characterization of emotions is the degree to which they are more innate and
less cognition-based mechanisms. What the literature has termed as basic emotions (e.g., Plutchik
(1980); Ekman (1992)) commonly refers to these more automatic mechanisms that emerged earlier
in human evolution.
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to the feeling of emotions for it is a signed mental state. However, it has received less
detailed study because it is less traceable to specific mechanisms, stimuli, and behav-
ior. Mood, in general, involves more awareness and lower arousal levels than a typical
emotional episode. As a mostly conscious state, moods are active for longer spans of
time. Similar to emotion, moods have valence and tendencies: they have a sign as
they are most commonly perceived nonneutral, and they make certain behavior more
likely while they last. Finally, they operate more as a background state where past
or anticipated stimuli or thoughts are all combined or synthesized (Dingman (2008)).
In the economics literature, progress has been made in extending the standard
model to incorporate emotions and mood. Elster (1998); Loewenstein (2000); Rick
and Loewenstein (2007) and Manzini and Mariotti (2011) are examples of this ad-
vance. Given that the incorporation of these elements in our modeling implies aban-
doning the idea that motives are invariant, a big challenge this literature faces is
separating the actual influence of mood and emotion on decision–making from other
sources of indeed inconsistent behavior. Rick and Loewenstein (2007), for example,
categorize emotions according to how they operate on decision making. Their first
category, expected emotions, refers to the expected collateral psychic value of each
alternative, the emotional states that an outcome provides along with those benefits
directly caused by the realization (consumption) of the outcome. This is already as-
sumed in the standard model. A second category, and new to the standard model,
comprises of emotions experienced at the moment of the decision–making and occur-
ring only in relation to it. These are called integral immediate emotions. Finally,
there are emotional states whose origin is unrelated to the choice but happen to occur
at the same moment of decision–making and affect it. Rick and Loewenstein (2007)
call these incidental immediate emotions. Manzini and Mariotti (2011) incorporate
this last category into their model of moody choice. They propose a formal extension
of the revealed preference approach to incorporate mood–influenced decision making
into the standard model. Their main contribution is giving content to the broad idea
that, unlike indecisiveness or plain randomness, mood must have a signature pattern
when it shapes decisions, and choice data should reflect that. They narrow down the
type of data and tests that help identify this influence.
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2.2.3 Previous Research on Emotions and Bargaining
This subsection presents in more detail the previous experimental research on
emotions and expression in bargaining environments. A series of studies have doc-
umented mood and emotion reactions in such environments, especially among the
disadvantaged party. Pillutla and Murnighan (1996) document that feelings of anger
and spite are common among responders in ultimatum games. Sanfey et al. (2003),
using fMRI scans, find that responders who reject unfair offers presented higher ac-
tivity in the anterior insula, a brain area associated with disgust. De Quervain et
al. (2004) observe that effective punishment in the ultimatum game activates a brain
area implicated in processing rewards, indicating that punishment gives actual satis-
faction.
Bosman and Van Winden (2002) study behavior and emotions in a two–player
Power–to–Take game. In their design players earn income in an individual effort task
preceding the game. Then, one player can claim any proportion of the other’s income.
The second player can respond by destroying a percentage of his/her own income in
order to reduce the amount actually transferred. They find that a higher take rate
by the first player increases (decreases) the intensity of negative (positive) emotions
experienced by the second player, and that negative emotions drive destruction. At
high emotional intensities, responders have the tendency to destroy everything. In
the same environment, Reuben and Van Winden (2005) report feelings of shame and
guilt among takers. The authors also find an important asymmetry: responders that
punished others who treated them badly do not always treat others nicely when they
switch positions in later rounds. Pure social preference motives are inconsistent with
this, since such motives would predict a certain symmetry in the behavior of the same
subject across roles. Their evidence is not compatible with self–serving biases as the
cause of this asymmetry. Therefore, this behavior might be induced by immediate
emotions that are specific to the type of choice that proposers and responders make.
Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) use physiological as well as self–reported measures of
emotional states in the PTT game. To measure physiological changes they apply skin
conductance response (SCR) measures, widely used in scientific research of emotional
arousal. They find a strong correlation between the responder’s resource–destruction
behavior and both measures of emotional arousal, with more negative states pre-
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dicting higher chances of destroying all resources. It is important to notice that the
observed strong correlation between physiological measures of (actual) arousal and
the self–reported ones supports the use of self–reports to measure emotional changes,
as we do in our experiment.
In relation to ex–post verbal expression, previous research has studied bargaining
setups where the disadvantaged party can send free written messages to counterparts.
It is found that messages are likely being driven by emotional states. Xiao and
Houser (2005), in particular, conduct an experiment in which an ultimatum game
(UG) is augmented to allow responders to send an ex–post free written message
to the proposer. They find that rejections of small offers (i.e., 20 percent of the
pie) went down from 60 percent to 32 percent compared to the ordinary UG. The
authors leave open the question of the underlying cause of this behavior, that is,
whether expression gives relief or whether it is seen as an alternative punishment.
Xiao and Houser (2007) observe that very unfair donations (i.e., 10 percent percent
of the pie in the dictator game DG) decrease from about half to one fourth when the
receiver can send an ex–post free written message to the dictator. Finally, Ellingsen
and Johannesson (2008) find that when verbal feedback is allowed, the fraction of
zero donations decreases from about 40 percent to about 20 percent, and there is a
corresponding increase in the incidence of equal splits from about 30 percent to about
50 percent. Recipients who receive no money almost always express disapproval of the
dictator, sometimes very strongly. Following an equal split, almost all recipients praise
the dictator. In all cases, low donations or offers are associated with messages entailing
negative emotions. Fairer donations from dictators facing possible verbal responses
are interpreted by Xiao and Houser (2007) as being cognitively dissonant (Festinger
(1962)). In a no expression environment, dictators take advantage of the ambiguity
(the self–serving biased thought that it is fair to be selfish, Babcock and Loewenstein
(1997)) but under expression possibilities they cannot avoid recognizing the conflict
between their convenient beliefs and reality. This implies dictators or proposers would
prefer a no expression environment, but this has not been established yet. It could
also be the case that dictators might want to buy and feel positive expressions.
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2.3 The Experiment
Our experiment is designed to measure valuations for expression in an economic
setup where, as discussed previously, it has been shown that the motivation for ex-
pression is substantially emotional. We use a modified version of the Power–to–Take
game. This game is a somewhat extreme bargaining environment where only one
side’s resources are vulnerable. It is also seen as a tax–authority/citizen relationship
or a very asymmetric negotiation.
In order to restrict our analysis to expressions that are largely originated in mood
and feelings of emotions or aim to induce emotional states in others (i.e., to eliminate
instrumental cheap talk type of motives) we focus on a type of expression that has no
material consequence; this expression occurs after material resources of the interaction
are settled. To properly elicit valuations, our design innovates with respect to previous
experiments in two aspects. First, we separate the size of the stimulus from the
opportunity cost of responses. This is in contrast to the usual UG or PTT, where the
size of the stimulus (money offered and taken, respectively) is deterministically related
to the cost of responding (one gives up what is offered or destroys the money left,
respectively) and where in consequence valuations cannot be studied independently
from the size of the stimulus. Second, we implement a BDM mechanism to induce
sincere revelation of the corresponding material value of expression (Becker et al.
(1964)).5
The second main question of the research is regarding the purpose of the emotion
expression. As discussed previously, the purpose can be either intrinsic, stopping the
negative feeling of anger for example, or extrinsic, such as harming the opponent. As
Xiao and Houser (2005) point out, lower rejections when expression is possible can be
interpreted as a relief effect, but such behavior is also consistent with an attempt to
harm. Their research did not disentangle the two. In the case of physical health, for
example, emotional expression seems to follow the venting hypothesis that is associ-
ated with taking–it–out/relief motivations. However for the type of feelings occurring
during bargaining and with a clearer defined intentional object, the opponent, it seems
very plausible for us that the main motive might be actually harming. In order to
5We argue this elicitation method does not seem to be taxing cognition excessively in our envi-
ronment.
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disentangle emotion expression goals we run different treatments that differ in the
recipient of the message. While under the venting/relief emotions hypothesis some
valuation will be assigned even if the message is not directed at the source of the
stimulus, but at a third party; under the extrinsic purpose hypothesis, most value will
be assigned to messages that are directed at the origin of the stimulus.
2.3.1 Experimental Design
Our design modifies the Power–to–Take Game (Bosman and Van Winden (2002))
as follows. Each player receives $3.00 as an endowment and earns additional income
by completing a number of search tasks.6 These search tasks are real effort tasks
where each individual has to search for the top of a mountain in a two–dimensional
grid using the mouse of the computer. The search tasks are calibrated so that all
participants roughly earn the same amount of money (about $10) in order not to in-
troduce any differences in initial income. After the search tasks are over, participants
are randomly matched in pairs and roles are assigned. Each pair consists of a taker
(T ) and a responder (R). Each T player then decides what percentage of R’s task
income (excluding the $3 of initial endowment) to transfer into his/her own account.
T ’s strategic move is referred to as the stimulus since this move is the cause of R’s
emotional arousal. Likewise, T is referred to as the source of the stimulus and the
amount subtracted is referred to as the size of the stimulus as it is reasonably conjec-
tured that higher transfers from R’s account will trigger a stronger arousal. Another
simple way to think of the stimulus is by defining it as the difference between the
expected and the actual take rate, also referred to as the surprise gap.
Then, R is informed about T ’s action and asked about his/her maximum will-
ingness to pay to send a written message. As explained previously, the willingness
to pay is elicited in an incentive compatible way using a BDM mechanism (Becker
et al. (1964)). This is an important feature of our design. In previous research,
the cost of an action, for example rejecting in the Ultimatum Game, was perfectly
tied to the size of the stimulus (i.e., the amount offered). An offer of $1 implied
an opportunity cost of rejection of $1 too. This makes proper assessment of the
valuation for rejection/destruction impossible as we can only observe one price of the
6The small size and symmetry of this initial endowment are expected not to change the perception
of fairness by either player.
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Table 2.1: Summary of the Experimental Design: Main Treatments
Recipient/Cost of the message
OFU Costly message read by T player
SLTM Costly message read by a third party
FM Free message to T player
NM No message
action for each size of stimulus. In our design, the cost of an action (the price of
sending a message) will be independent of the size of the stimulus (the amount taken
by T ). After each R has stated his/her value, he/she is informed about the actual
price which is randomly drawn from a uniform distribution between $0 to $3. If the
stated willingness to pay is higher than the random price, the participant pays the
actual (randomly generated) price and can take the action. If the stated willingness
to pay is lower than the random price, the participant will not be able to take any
action and will not have to pay anything. Some expression desires might be left
unfulfilled as the random price turns out higher than the stated willingness to pay.7
The initial endowment of $3 is given to ensure that even somebody whose entire
task income has been taken by T can respond if she/he really wants to. Table 2.1
summarizes the main four treatments that differ with respect to who will be the
recipient of the message. OFU – Only for You – allows for messages to be sent
to the source of the stimulus, i.e. the T player with whom the R player is paired.
SLTM – Somebody Listen to Me – allows for messages to be sent to a third party
that is not involved in the decision making and whose payoff is unaffected by the
decision. We recruited one extra participant for every 5 pairs and assigned him/her
the sole purpose of reading messages that are sent. All participants know at the
very beginning of the experiment what kind of expression can potentially be used.
Senders of messages receive acknowledgement of when the designated party has read
the message. We also study behavior in two polar control treatments. One in which
no message can be sent, NM (no message) and one in which a free message can be
sent to T, FM (free message) (see Table 2.1).
Besides eliciting the willingness to pay for writing a message (and following Char-
ness and Grosskopf (2001); Bosman and Van Winden (2002) and Konow and Earley
7The BDM mechanism was explained in detail at the beginning of the experiment, before subjects
knew their roles or any emotional arousal occurred.
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(2008)), we also collect self–reports of subjective well–being, emotions currently ex-
perienced and mood states at the very beginning of the experiment. We repeat the
corresponding questionnaires at the end of the experiment. The self–report of a
variety of emotions experienced at that moment will also help us to control for some
incidental background feelings/states of participants. An important issue with the
self–report is the discrepancy between what is actually felt in the emotional episode
and the beliefs people form about it. This gap is exacerbated by the quick fading out
of the episodic memory; so it can bias the self–report (Robinson and Clore (2002)).
Some of these considerations are taken into account for our design. For example, we
embedded the application of the questionnaires into the same computer interface as
the game, so we keep participants in a hot state, minimizing the perception that the
interaction had finished.
2.3.2 Hypotheses
Our design allows us to properly elicit the valuation for a certain type of response
conditional on the size of the stimulus and other covariates. This allows us to formulate
our first hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Takers are responsive to the possibility of expression by their coun-
terparts (instrumental effect of expression).
Hypothesis 2: People are willing to pay for expressing, i.e., there is a demand for
expressing emotions.
Hypothesis 3: The stimulus size does affect the valuation, i.e., the stimulus does
shift the demand: the more money is taken the higher is the valuation.
Hypothesis 4: The valuation (the demand) is higher when the expression is directed
at the source of the stimulus.
Hypothesis 5: Material outcomes as well as expression possibilities affect mood




Experimental sessions were conducted at the Economic Research Laboratory at
Texas A&M University and at the Experimental Economics Lab at University of
Maryland. Our participants were undergraduate students with a non-economics ma-
jor. All sessions were computerized, using a computer interface programmed in zTree
(Fischbacher (2007a)). Instructions were read aloud and questions answered in pri-
vate. After reading the instructions and having questions answered, all participants
had to answer a set of questions that were meant to test whether the instructions
had been understood. All answers were checked and corrected by the experimenters
and remaining questions answered. Throughout the sessions the subjects were not
allowed to communicate with one another and dividers separated the individual com-
puter terminals.
2.4 Results and Discussion
In this section we present the results of the experimental study. We implemented
our four main treatments in 34 sessions recruiting a total of 472 subjects (236 pairs).8
It is important to highlight that we obtained a different number of observations in
each treatment across the two campuses, and although the main behavioral patterns
were equivalent, some measures present nonnegligible differences between the two
universities. To correctly account for this fact, we regard the data of each treatment
as coming from a stratified sample, where each campus represents a stratum. We
then assumed that both campuses have same–size populations. Also, we needed more
observations to conduct statistical analysis focused on the OFU treatment. Therefore,
we collected more pairs (71) for this treatment compared to the rest of treatments.
Table 2.2 shows the distribution across treatments of the most relevant variables in
the experiment, summarized by their means, as well as the number of pairs studied
in each treatment.9
Notice that, as our design dictated, the task income is virtually the same ($10.3)
for all treatments and both types of participants with negligible dispersion (a coeffi-
8Additionally, the SLTM treatment combined had seven third–party receivers/readers of the
messages, which were not studied for obvious reasons.
9Reports in Table 2.2 broken down by university can be found in the Appendix B.
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics
FM OFU SLTM NM
Number of pairs 57 71 44 64
Task Income T ($) 10.34 10.32 10.32 10.34
Task Income R ($) 10.34 10.34 10.35 10.33
Take ratio (percent) 47.91 63.83 64.86 67.88
Expected take ratio (percent) 53.55 56.28 55.66 54.94
WTP>0 (percent) 82.6∗ 68.3 48.0 N/A
WTP for msg. ($) 0.78 0.33
Final Earnings T ($) 18.3 19.92 20.03 20.36
Final Earnings R ($) 8.38 6.58 6.54 6.32
All statisticss are sample means, except for the number of pairs.
∗ This refers to the percentage of people who write a message when writing is free.
cient of variation of approximately 1 percent). All tests either across treatments and
participant roles within treatments do not reject the null hypothesis that task incomes
come from the same distributions and have the same central tendency measures.10
The discussion of the take rate, the willingness to pay and the self–reported measures
of emotions require further analysis presented in separate subsections.
2.4.1 The Take Rate Behavior
The take rate is the percentage of the responder’s labor income that is appropri-
ated by the taker. Each taker decides how much to take from his/her counterpart
after learning how much both players have made in task income. We find that the
take rate is statistically equivalent across all treatments except in the free message
treatment where the take rate is lower. While the mean take rate was 67.8 percent in
NM, 63.8 percent in OFU and 64.8 percent in SLTM ; this rate was only 47.8 percent
in FM (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.1). We run a regression, reported in Appendix 2.4,
of the take rates over treatment dummies, considering the stratified structure of the
data. We tested if the mean take rates differ across treatments; and only the tests
of FM against OFU, SLTM and NM, were significant. The null hypotheses of same
mean are rejected in all cases in favor of typical FM take rates being lower (one–sided
p–values = 0.007, 0.007 and 0.001, respectively for OFU, SLTM and NM ). We also
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Figure 2.1: Take Rate and 95 percent C.I.
implemented Hodges–Lehmann tests for median differences (Hodges and Lehman,
1963). This nonparametric test gave the same results: all comparisons against FM
resulted in positive median differences at 95 percent level of confidence; and no other
contrast rejects the null of zero difference.
Confirming Hypothesis 1, the contrast between FM and NM establishes that tak-
ers do care about the message they might receive as a response when deciding how
much to take. The 16 percent lower take rate under FM compared to NM (which
amounts to about $1.60) is an approximate measure of how much takers value mod-
ifying their counterparts’ behavior regarding sending a message. This can be either
because the taker believes that a lower take rate will reduce the probability of re-
ceiving a negative message or increase the probability of receiving a positive one.
The similarity of takers’ behavior between NM and the rest of treatments (OFU
and SLTM ) is less immediate. Intuitively, these results suggests that takers possibly
perceive FM as the only environment where they could get a response with high
chances. This might be because FM is the only treatment where responders are able
to express freely and costlessly. Also, takers might underestimate responders’ valua-
tions for writing messages in the same way individuals tend to mispredict reactions
driven by emotions in themselves and in others. Therefore their extraction behavior
is qualitatively distinct only in the FM environment.
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While takers are asked about their take rate decision, responders are asked to guess
how much that take rate will be. We find responders believe that takers’ behavior is
roughly independent of the message features of the environment and expect the take
rate to be around 55 percent in all treatments (see Table 2.2 and Figure 2.2). That
is, expected take rates do not vary significantly across treatments. We tested two
measures: means, via a regression as for the actual take rate, and median difference,
via a Hodges–Lehmann test. We do not find the self–reported beliefs about the
take rate to be statistically different between treatments. Every test based on the
regression that compares the expected take rates of any two treatments fails to reject
the null of equal conditional mean and every median difference test did not reject the
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Figure 2.2: Expected Take Ratio and 95 percent C.I.
This result is consistent with the idea that a typical responder cannot predict
the impact of expression possibilities on the taker’s behavior; therefore, they see the
situations the taker faces as equivalent across treatments. There could be several rea-
sons why this happens. For example, responders failing to anticipate takers’ feelings
regarding different chances of getting a message, or responders, when guessing coun-
terparts’ behavior, mostly focusing on the material dimension of the environments.




As explained in the design section, in the message–enabled treatments, responders
are asked about their valuation to write a message after they learn the take rate
(OFU and SLTM ) or whether or not they want to write a message (FM ). A first
basic question is then whether or not responders value using messages at all in this
context. The relevant environment to answer this question is our free message setting
(FM ) where we found that 82.6 percent of responders did send messages. Given
that there is a small yet positive cost of doing so, it is reasonable to conclude that
responders value the possibility of writing messages to the takers. The second basic
question is whether or not this tendency to write a message depends on the take
ratio that responders faced. It could be that higher take rates would cause a bigger
tendency to respond verbally. We found, however, that the propensity to send a
message does not have the take rate as a significant explanatory variable.11 So, we
know that writing a message in this environment is valued in that most people do
it when the material cost is zero. Our main focus here, however, is finding out
what part of this valuation can be materialized (i.e. can be substituted with money).
While the FM data suggested that, broadly speaking, most people found sending
messages worthwhile, the OFU data informs us about the monetary equivalent of
this valuation. Our evidence suggests, first, that the majority of people do translate
this valuation into the monetary dimension, as we find that 68.3 percent of responders
in OFU have a strictly positive willingness to pay and second, that the probability
of having a strictly positive material valuation (WTP>0) does indeed depend on the
size of the stimulus: the take rate. In our probability regressions with the OFU
data, the take rate did in fact explain the probability of having a strictly positive
valuation for sending a message in the OFU treatment.12 But not only did people
have a strictly positive valuation for expressing, confirming Hypothesis 2, we also
find that this material valuation is sizable relative to the resources the responder has
11We run probit regressions with the FM data testing if the probability of sending a message is
affected by the take rate (with and without its squared term, to allow for simple nonlinearity). We
do not reject the null hypothesis of the whole model having no explanatory power over deciding to
write a message. We repeat this exercise with the surprise term (actual take rate minus expected
take rate), finding that the probability of sending a message is not explained by surprise either.
12We also found that the index underlying this relation is nonlinear in the take rate. The surprise,
on the other hand, is not explanatory for having a strictly positive WTP. The regressions are reported
in Appendix B.
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available after the material interaction. This means that the possibilities of expression
in this type of economic setting are important determinants of the final well–being.
In particular, we find that, on average, a responder in the OFU treatment is willing
to pay $0.78 to write a message to the taker, which corresponds to 11.6 percent of
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Figure 2.3: Mean Willingness to Pay with 95 percent C.I.
Now that we have established that the typical WTP represents an important
amount in relation to the resources available, we might ask whether or not this valua-
tion varies with different take rates. As detailed in Section 2.3, one of the contributions
of our design is that, unlike the original PTT game and other bargaining games used
in experiments, we can study this valuation conditional on different sizes of stimuli.
Put simply, we can see how the WTP varies with different take rates.
We find that the take rate influences the monetary valuation of ex–post verbal
expression and, in fact, there exists a nonlinear relationship between the take rate
(the stimulus) and the WTP. This means that responders’ valuation for being able
to reply is stronger when facing very low (pro–social/nice) take rates or very high
(self–interested/harming) ones. In particular, in OFU, for take rates up to 33 percent
the average willingness to pay is $0.59, for take rates above 33 percent and below 66
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percent the average WTP is only $0.29, and for high take rates (above 66 percent)
the average WTP is $1.07 (see Figure 2.3). The comparison of the take rates over
these three groups is not very precise as the number of observations in the categories
is not very large (the upper category gets 37 observations, 52 percent of all cases).
However, it gives enough information to show: (i) that the WTP is positive over all
take rate ranges (one–side test for zero mean WTP had p—values of 0.002, 0.021 and
< 0.000 for the bottom, middle and upper ranges of the take rate, respectively) and
(ii) that there is a nonlinear u–shaped relationship between the WTP and the take
rate. This confirms Hypothesis 3 as very high take rates induce higher valuations.
However, this hypothesis did not consider the nonlinear nature of this relationship.
Table 2.3: Regression WTP in OFU
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4) (Model 5)
Take Rate -0.030∗∗ -0.032∗∗
(0.012) (0.015)




Surprise (Squared / 100) 0.002 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006)
Surprise (Abs Value) 0.003
(0.018)
Surprise (Abs Val. Sqrd / 100) 0.000
(0.000)
Good Surprise (tk≤Etk) 0.004
(0.004)
Bad Surprise (tk>Etk) 0.008
(0.007)
Constant 0.846∗∗ 0.684∗∗ 0.677∗∗ 0.661∗∗ 1.013∗∗
(0.319) (0.169) (0.325) (0.226) (0.488)
Observations 71 71 71 71 71
R2 0.18 0.09 0.01 0.09 0.20
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parenthesis.
We test this nonlinearity by running a regression of the WTP against the dif-
ferent polynomial expressions of the take rate. We find that a quadratic equation
is appropriate to describe this u–shaped relationship.13 One alternative conjecture
13We provide the Figures associated to these regressions in Appendix B. We also run a fractional
polynomial regression. While it mildly improved the regression’s explanatory power, its predicted
WTP correlate near perfectly with those of the simpler regression with a quadratic term. We keep
the quadratic specification for the rest of our analysis.
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about the relationship between WTP and the take rate is that responders react to
the difference between the expected and the actual take rate, the surprise, as opposed
to the take rate itself. It is intuitive to think that highly positive or highly negative
surprises will result in a stronger desire to submit a message. If surprise is the actual
(or just a better proxy of the perceived) stimulus, we should observe that this variable
explains the WTP behavior better than the raw take rate. However, we found that
the surprise does not explain the observed WTP as well as the raw take rate. Table
2.3 report various specifications for regressions of the WTP against either the raw
take rates and/or the surprise (allowing for nonlinearities via quadratic terms). We
found that the raw take rate performs better than any specification that includes the
surprise term. The evidence indicates that the raw take rate is what causes variation
in the material valuations for expressing.
2.4.2.1 Directed Expression Vs. Being Listened to
We have established that the majority of subjects in the responder position at-
taches a monetary value to being able to respond verbally, and also that this valuation
comprises a nonnegligible percentage of the resources available to him/her. Further
we have shown that the desire to reply is bigger if the taker’s behavior is highly pro–
social or highly egoistic. Now we need to unbundle further the value of the message to
characterize better the motivations involved. Under OFU, the two main components
of a message are (i) the expression possibility itself (being listened to by anyone)
and (ii) the response/reciprocal possibility (taking an action directed at the source
of the harm/good itself). The SLTM treatment gives us only the first component for
in this treatment the responder is able to write a message as in OFU but now the
recipient of the messages is a third party, not the taker. Since the reader remains
anonymous to takers, we claim that the willingness to pay to send a message in SLTM
fundamentally pins down the value of being–listened–to, what we had earlier called
the purely expressive motive.
Our experimental findings confirm that typical responders do value positively this
pure expression possibility (48 percent of participants presented a strictly positive
WTPSLTM , and we reject the null of zero mean WTPSLTM in favor of the alternative
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of mean WTPSLTM > 0, p < 0.001). On average, responders’ value of being listened
to is $0.33, which accounts for 42 percent of the $0.78 that was the total value of
directing a message to the taker. Further, we found that this difference is statistically
significant, and that the value of pure expression is lower than the value of directed
expression (WTPSLTM < WTPOFU , one–sided p = 0.002).14 This means that both
the value of pure expression as well as the value of taking it back and directing a
message to the source of the harm (the reciprocal motive) are important components
of the material valuation of expressing in this setting. This favors Hypothesis 4 that
stated simply that WTPSLTM < WTPOFU .
Our evidence also indicates that the value associated with pure expression motives
(WTPSLTM) does not depend on the take rate as the total value of directed expression
(WTPOFU) did.15 In particular, in relation to the three categories of take rates we
discussed previously, the mean WTPSLTM is significantly greater than zero in all of
them. Differences in WTPSLTM across categories were insignificant. Finally, we need
to point out that the importance of the purely expressive motive relative to the total
value of the directed expression varies with the take rate. The stylized fact is that at
very high and very low take rates, addressing the taker becomes more important and
the purely expressive motive is less important. In fact, only for the bottom and the
top categories do we reject the null that mean WTPSLTM is equal to mean WTPOFU
in favor of being lower (p = 0.031 and p = 0.006, respectively). Intuitively, this is
in line with the conjecture that an important part of these material valuations for
expression is mediated via changes in the emotional or mood states of responders.
Presumably, extreme take rates (low or high) trigger mood and emotional changes
that relate more to reciprocal forces increasing the value of addressing the source of
stimulus.
14The reason why we use a direct comparison of the WTP across treatments is because previously
we have established that OFU and SLTM have statistically equivalent take rates.
15Regressions of WTPSLT M against the take rate with and without a quadratic term rejected the
null of the take rate explaining the WTP in this environment.
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2.4.3 Robustness
We run some additional treatments as robustness checks. Although the compar-
ison with these treatments is imperfect for they were run only at one of the two
campuses were this study was conducted (University of Maryland), they are useful
and confirm our findings. The first treatment is a modified OFU which reverses the
order in which the willingness to pay and the mood–emotional reports were elicited.
In the main treatment we elicited the WTP right after the interaction as its measure
is the main interest of this paper; in the robustness treatment instead, the subjective
states were elicited before the valuation. If reporting emotions acts as a close substi-
tute for expression or if the time passed after the interaction until being asked about
the WTP is so long that subjects’ desires to express get colder, we would expect the
WTP to decrease significantly. However, we find the WTP is still strictly positive
and although it is slightly lower than in OFU (mean=0.54, s.e.=0.17, n=24), this
difference is not significant.
A second robustness treatment isolates alternative explanations for our finding of
positive WTP for expression. We run a treatment where we elicit subjects’ willingness
to pay for just writing something on the computer even though it will go nowhere,
not even the experimenter. This is an extreme version of studying purely expressive
motives as there is no receiver of the expression. Although this should receive more
attention in future research, our results suggest that this kind of expression has either
very little or no material value at all. The valuation of this expression is not statisti-
cally different from zero (p=0.1) and statistically lower than WTPSLTM or WTPOFU
(p=0.000 and p=0.038, respectively).
2.4.4 The Role and Change of Mood and Emotional States
We now study the relationship between the take rate (the stimulus), the mood–
emotional states and the material valuation of expression. As indicated before, we
collected responses to self–reported well–being, mood and emotional questions before
and after the economic interaction. These measures have been previously used in
Batson et al. (1988); Charness and Grosskopf (2001); Bosman and Van Winden (2002)
and Konow and Earley (2008), and they contain information about general well–being,
momentary well–being, feelings of the most basic emotions (intensity of feeling anger,
60
fear, irritation, etc.), mood related states (opposite scales for: bad mood - good
mood; sad - happy; gloomy - cheerful, etc.) and some other fillers (see Appendix B
for details).
Although the analysis for specific items is informative, different groups of emotions
and mood dimensions are closely related and comove as different shocks and mental
states occur. From the perspective of the modeler, this comovement of feelings and
states suggests that a substantial part of the activity boils down to a few main mech-
anisms (or factors) that the stimulus acts on. Therefore, it makes sense to focus on
the few factors whose sign and/or intensity changed significantly over the course of
the interaction. Along those lines, we identified one main group of eight mood and
emotion items that behave exactly in this way: across different factor analyses we
conducted, with ex–ante reports, with ex–post reports or with their difference, this
set of variables behaves as if associated with an underlying factor. There were eight
variables included 7–valued scales for feelings of happiness and joy, opposite 9–valued
scales for bad mood – good mood, sad – happy, depressed – elated, gloomy – cheer-
ful, displeased – pleased, and sorrowful – joyful. We study a normalized before–after
difference of this index. To generate this measure we first built the ex–ante index
with a factor analysis that includes these variables. We then used the same coeffi-
cients and the ex–post reports to compute the ex–post index. Finally we compute
the change in this index normalized to the ex–ante standard deviation, σ. We study
the ex–ante/ex–post change of this index.
As measured by this mood–emotion index, henceforth MEI, our results show that
the environment generates very different experiences for the two roles. When we
pool all treatments, responders’ MEI changes are on average negative and dispersed
(mean = −1.05σ, sd = 1.4σ). Takers, on the other hand, experience a positive and
less volatile change (mean = 0.67σ, sd = σ; see Figure 2.4). Similar patterns are ob-
served in all treatments: takers improve their state and responders deteriorate around
twice as much (see Table 2.4). Interestingly, when expression is completely free, re-
sponders experience a substantially milder shock compared to any other treatment
where expression is either costly, impossible or directed at a third party. More pre-
cisely, comparing the two polar treatments FM and NM we find expression does not
impact the takers’ MEI (they show a mean change of 0.68 in FM and 0.58 in NM,
which is statistically not significantly different from oneanother) but it does have a
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Table 2.4: Ex–ante and Ex–post emotional–mood states by roles and treatment
Taker Responder
Before After Diff Before After Diff
FM -0.09 0.60 0.68*** -0.11 -0.56 -0.44**
OFU -0.15 0.51 0.66*** 0.08 -1.26 -1.34***
SLTM 0.06 0.85 0.79*** 0.29 -0.86 -1.15***
NM 0.08 0.66 0.58*** 0.03 -1.26 -1.29***
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, for null Diff 6= 0.
significant impact on responders as their mood-emotional state deteriorates much less
compared to the completely silent treatment (responders MEI change is -0.44 in FM,
and -1.29 in NM ; p=0.00. Table 2.4). This difference in our measure of subjective
well–being for responders that amounts to 0.85σ and goes in favor of the expressive
environment (FM ) can be conjectured to have two sources. First, it can be related
to the fact that responders under FM do receive on average higher final payoffs as
the take rates are lower and, second, to the fact that under FM they fulfill their ex-
pression desires. Using data from FM and NM , we conduct the simple test whether
or not expression possibilities have a positive impact on subjective well–being by re-
gressing the ∆MEI against the total monetary payoff and the indicator of expression
possibilities (a dummy that takes 1 for FM treatment and 0 for NM treatment). We
find that expression possibilities account for aproximately 0.4σ after controlling for
the effect of the material payoff (p=0.03).
Another central question to our research is how the emotional states are affected
by the stimulus and how they relate to the material valuation of expression. First,
we find that the take rate has a strong negative effect on the mood–emotional states.
The regression analysis shows that a ten percent increase in the take rate decreases
the mood and emotional index by 0.25σ. This implies, as expected, that events in
the material dimension cause strong mood emotional reactions. This impact of the
stimulus on the self–reported emotional states is remarkably stable across treatments.
We find that mood–emotional reactions are associated with higher valuation for ex-
pression. The more negative or the more positive these reactions are, the higher
the willingness to pay.16 These results suggest, as conjectured, that the relationship
between the WTP and the MEI mirrors the relationship between the WTP and the
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Figure 2.4: Change in Mood-Emotion Index
take rate.
The relationship between the take rate, the emotional states and the willingness
to pay can be put in a shock–mediator–outcome framework if the material valuation
is seen as the final outcome and the change in MEI as the mediator. By means of
conducting a seemingly unrelated regression comprising of the following equations:
∆MEI = α + β
−.024 (.003)
τ + εM (2.1)




∆MEI2 + δ3τ + δ4τ 2 + εW (2.2)
we implement a standard mediation analysis, except for a customized nonlinear
relationship. The results indicate that the mediated impact of the take rate on the




∂∆MEI = β(δ1 + 2δ2∆MEI) (2.3)
is statistically different from zero when ∆MEI is below -2 or above 0.17 These
17Detailed results are available upon request.
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results suggests that emotional and mood states mediate the impact of the take rate
only (or more strongly) when the reaction in such states is strong enough. Now,
although the results are appealing, there are also reasons to be skeptical with respect
to a mediation interpretation in this context. As it is pointed out in the recent
literature, estimation biases might potentially emerge from the fact that our design
did not randomize the mood emotional state (the mediator) with another shock (see
Imai et al. (2010) and Bullock et al. (2010)). We acknowledge this shortcoming but
believe that using the change in the emotional state – as opposed to the ex–post
level – partially takes care of this problem; that is, the omitted unobservable factors
that might simultaneously impact the levels of MEI and the WTP are less likely to
show up in the ∆MEI equation. Again, these results favor Hypothesis 5: expression
possibilities as well as material outcomes do affect peoples’ mood–emotional states,
pointing to the non–instrumental effect of expression.
2.5 Well–Being
Incorporating expression while not increasing the pie–size, does shift substantial
gains toward the disadvantaged side of the bargaining. This can be seen by conducting
a nonstandard well–being analysis based on the self–reports. We use two measures
for this purposes, the change in MEI, discussed previously, and a simpler measure
of current happiness, a 1–9 scaled question on how subjects describe how they feel
at that very moment from extremely unhappy to extremely happy. With both mea-
sures we find the combined effect of the interaction on both roles to be negative for
all treatments except the free message treatment (FM ). This is because while in all
treatments takers increase their perceived well–being roughly the same, responders
do experience the free message treatment differently. Responders decrease their well–
being in all treatments approximately twice as much as taker increase theirs, except
in FM where responders well–being falls only one third compared to the other treat-
ments. In particular, combined ∆MEI is 0.12 (s.e. = 0.137) in FM and is -0.34 (s.e.
= 0.13) in NM. For the change in the 1–9 scaled momentary well–being measure, the
combined effect in FM is -0.17 (s.e.=0.19) and -1.02 (s.e.=0.25) for NM.
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2.6 Conclusions
Departing from the traditional approach to communication in economics that
emphasizes its instrumental purpose – i.e. how it affects play and outcomes in the
material interaction – we focus on the noninstrumental aspect of communication.
We study the value and purpose of ex–post (written) verbal expression in a modi-
fied Power–to–Take game, where previous research suggests expression is likely to be
driven by mood–emotional episodes. We measure the value of directed verbal expres-
sion and isolate purely expressive motives from the reciprocal ones by varying the
recipient of the messages across treatments. In order to conduct a welfare analysis of
incorporating expression, we run polar treatments where expression is totally costless
and where expression is not possible.
Our evidence confirms that this type of expression has a nonnegligible material
value, and, moreover, that purely expressive and reciprocal motives are both nontriv-
ial components of this valuation. We show that (self–reported) mood and emotional
states are associated with a higher material desire to express. Our evidence suggests
that, beyond the classical purposes (such as cheap talk), whether or not verbal ex-
pression is possible has a real well–being impact in usual economic interactions as,
on average, the disadvantaged side experiences less of a reduction in self–reported
well–being when expressions are allowed. We further document that the anticipation
of expression possibilities alters the behavior of the taker in a pro–social direction.
Our findings are useful for the design of institutions. In fact, a recent change in
the way court rulings are conducted in England and Wales seems to acknowledge the
value of expressions. Victims of crime will get a chance to speak in court. The new
Victim’s Code will entitle victims to personally address offenders to explain how a
crime has impacted them by reading a statement in court.18 This new code is seen to
give victims the choice to explain to a court and the offender(s) in their own words the
personal and emotional impacts a crime has had on them and their families, a process
that is known to help victims cope and recover from crime. This ruling acknowledges
the intrinsic motivation behind the noninstrumental effect of emotion expression as
currently, judges read such statements in private with only parts being read alloud
by the prosecutors. This new ruling is not meant to change verdicts but is predicted
18http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-24710184 accessed November 10, 2013.
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to increase the subjective well–being of the disadvantaged side. Whether this change
also has instrumental effects remains to be seen as a decrease in crime rates might
take time to manifest itself.
Participatory democraties clearly go a step further in asking for expressions be-
fore decisions are made. Interestingly enough, citizens report to be happier in such
circumstances (see e.g. Frey and Stutzer (2002)). Human beings seem to value the




Multi-object auctions with resale:
Theory and experiment1
3.1 Introduction
The large scale of privatization of assets, such as spectrum licenses, and gas and
electricity supply, attracts attention to multi-object auctions (see e.g. Krishna and
Perry, 2000; Ausubel, 2004). Unlike the auctioning of non-government owned assets,
the efficiency of the allocation, rather than revenue maximization, is the main objec-
tive of these auctions (see McMillan, 1994; Ausubel and Cramton, 1999; Cramton,
2002). This objective may be achieved at the auction stage or by allowing post-auction
trade among bidders.
As a means of allocating objects efficiently, Vickrey auctions are often considered.
The attractiveness of a Vickrey auction is that it extracts the true value of the bidders
via simple strategies that are independent of the underlying distribution of values
(see Ausubel and Milgrom, 2006). On the other hand, conducting a Vickrey auction,
explaining its pricing rule and its transparency to the bidders, can be quite complex,
especially when there are large packages of objects and many bidders. Due to these
complexities, most spectrum auctions in the US do not allow for package bidding
and, in rare cases, such as a 700 MHz auction, allow bids on only a limited number
1This is a coauthored work with Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Erkut Y. Ozbay. We thank Lawrence
Ausubel, Peter Cramton, Jacob Goeree, Isa Hafalir, Dan Levin, Thayer Morrill, Dan Vincent and
seminar participants at Duke University, Johns Hopkins University, North Carolina State University
and Sabanci University for fruitful discussions. Emel Filiz-Ozbay and Erkut Y. Ozbay thank NSF
SES-0924773 for research support.
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of packages (Cramton, 2002). Running simultaneous second-price auctions may be
more practical but may lead to inefficient allocations when complementarities exist
(see De Vries and Vohra, 2003; Cramton et al., 2006). In that case, bidders are
naturally interested in resale at the conclusion of the auction.
Post-auction trades among bidders are observed in various settings, such as auc-
tions of antiques, real estate, art, emission allowances, or spectrum licenses. In gov-
ernment auctions, where one would expect the government to be able to forbid resale,
it is hard to prevent companies from merging (as was the case after the UK spectrum
auctions in 2000 and 2003).2Therefore, it is important to understand both theoret-
ically and empirically how auction outcomes are affected by the existence of resale
markets. Various studies have shown that, typically, auction behavior is affected by
the possibility of resale and therefore the efficiency and revenue of the auction may
change depending on the existence of resale markets (see e.g. Haile 1999; 2000; 2001;
2003; Gupta and Lebrun, 1999; Hafalir and Krishna, 2008; Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002;
Garratt and Tröger, 2006).
When multi-objects are auctioned, bidders’ demands may differ depending on
how large or small they are. For example, in FCC auctions, some bidders are smaller
than others because of geographical restrictions or financial constraints, or because
they have different uses for the objects. Therefore, they prefer to bid on only a
small number of licenses. Moreover, in spectrum auctions (as well as in many other
settings), large companies might value multiple licenses to serve large geographical
locations more than the sum of the values of each license because the marginal cost
of serving a larger area can be lower. In our model, we consider one large bidder
(the global bidder) and N small bidders (the local bidders). There are N units to be
sold. The global bidder is interested in all units, and each local bidder is interested
in a single unit (see Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996, and Chernomaz and Levin, 2012
for similar settings3). The valuations of the bidders are independent and private.
This setup resembles the situation of telecommunications firms interested in radio-
2Hutchison, a telecommunications company, bought TIW, a Canadian firm which won the most
valuable license, just after the spectrum auctions in 2000. Pacific Century Cyberworks, a large Hong
Kong company, took over Red Spectrum and Public Hub, two small firms, less than a year after the
UK spectrum auctions in 2003.
3Krishna and Rosenthal (1996) develop this model in order to study the FCC auctions of licenses
for the radio-frequency spectrum. Chernomaz and Levin (2012) study theoretically and experimen-
tally first-price auctions in this setting. Neither of these models allows for post-auction resale.
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frequencies in different areas, which might have independent valuations due to the
varying demands in different geographical regions.
We study both Vickrey auctions where package bidding is allowed and simultane-
ous second-price auctions where an auction is conducted for each unit. We consider
the case where resale among bidders is allowed and the case where it is not. The resale
markets, when they are allowed, are designed so that the winners of the auction can
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the unsuccessful bidders as in Hafalir and Krishna
(2008).
We show that the Vickrey auction with package bidding has an equilibrium that
allocates objects efficiently at the auction stage with or without resale possibility.
Particularly, truthful value bidding is equilibrium when resale is allowed. Hence,
resale trade will not occur after a Vickrey auction in that equilibrium. On the other
hand, simultaneous second-price auctions do not allocate the objects efficiently at the
auction stage when resale is possible or prohibited in any equilibrium. Moreover, in
any equilibrium of these auctions, full efficiency cannot be achieved by resale.
Based on these theoretical findings, it is important to investigate experimentally
the tradeoff between running a complex but efficient Vickrey auction, and a simple
but inefficient simultaneous second-price auction. First, our Vickrey auction experi-
ments with or without resale do not achieve efficiency. The complexity of this pricing
rule makes it hard for the subjects to discover that simple efficient equilibrium. Ad-
ditionally, our experiments compare simultaneous second-price auctions when resale
is allowed and not allowed in terms of efficiency. We show that the presence of resale
markets diminishes the efficiency rates at the auction stage of the second-price for-
mat compared to the no-resale case. However, in this format, after resale, efficiency
rates improve to the level of the outcome of our Vickrey auctions without resale
experiments.
Although revenue may not be the main concern of government auctions, resale
activity is typically considered a loss of the seller from the gains of trade. Contrary
to this intuition, our experiments show that the resale possibility does not affect
seller’s revenue significantly in second-price auctions.
The existing models of auctions with resale in the literature mainly consider single
object problems. The literature on auctions with resale provides six main reasons for
resale: (i) new information regarding the values of objects arrives after the auctions
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(see Haile 1999; 2000; 2001; 2003 and Gupta and Lebrun, 1999), (ii) new buyers arrive
after the auction is over (Haile et al., 1999), (iii) asymmetry in the auction may lead
to inefficient allocation (Zhoucheng Zheng, 2002; Hafalir and Krishna, 2008), (iv)
presence of speculators in the auction (Garratt and Tröger, 2006; Pagnozzi, 2007;
2009; 2010), (v) coordination on collusive outcome (Garratt et al., 2009), and (vi)
misperception of resale markets (Georganas, 2011). Our setup is closest to the third
type because a multi-object auction setting with complementarities provides a nat-
ural asymmetry in terms of demand of bidders and therefore may lead to inefficient
allocation under different formats.
The experimental literature on auctions with resale is limited, probably because
the theoretical developments on this topic are relatively recent. Lange et al. (2011)
experimentally study symmetric first-price auctions where bidders’ valuations are
initially noisy and there is room for resale. Georganas and Kagel (2011) test Hafalir
and Krishna (2008). Georganas (2011) experimentally studies symmetric English
auctions with resale and shows deviations from equilibrium that he interprets as
misperception of resale. The only other paper, to the best of our knowledge, studying
a multi-object setting with resale possibility is Pagnozzi and Saral (2013). Their
paper complements ours as they analyze different bargaining mechanisms at resale
stage following a uniform price auction without complementarities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 presents our theoretical
model and states the theoretical results that motivate the experiments. Section 3.3
summarizes the experimental design and findings. Section 3.4 concludes. The proofs
of the statements presented in the theoretical section, the instructions used in the
experiments and the auxiliary empirical results discussed in the text can all be found
in the Appendix C.
3.2 Model
Our setup is similar to the model introduced by Krishna and Rosenthal (1996)
(see also Chernomaz and Levin, 2009, and Goeree and Lien, 2014). There are N > 1
markets, each containing one object for sale. Markets are indexed by i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
There are N local bidders and local i ∈ {1, ..., N} is denoted by li. Local i is present
only in market i. There is a global bidder (denoted by g), who is present in all
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markets.4 All bidders are risk-neutral.
Before the auction, each bidder privately observes a signal. Each bidder’s signal
is drawn from a commonly known distribution function F defined on a support [0, s̄]
with s̄ > 0. Signals are independently and identically distributed.
The value of the objects for the seller is zero. For each local bidder, her signal is
her private value for the object that she is interested in. Also, for a given signal of
the global bidder, any two packages of the same size are valued the same.5 Formally,
vn(s) is the value of obtaining n ≥ 1 objects when the signal of the global bidder
is s. There are complementarities for the global bidder: vn(s) > vn−k(s) + vk(s)
for any 0 < k < n ≤ N and s > 0. For each n, vn(s) is strictly increasing and
differentiable in s, and the derivative is strictly increasing in n, i.e. vn′(s) > vn−1′for
any s. As a normalization, v1(s) = s. Also, vn(0) = 0 for any n. For example, when
N = 2, v2(s) = 2s + α with α > 0 (as in Krishna and Rosenthal, 1996) and v2(s) =
2βs with β > 1 (as in Chernomaz and Levin, 2012) satisfy all the aforementioned
assumptions.
The objects are first auctioned to the bidders and then the bidders may trade the
objects with each other at a post- auction resale stage when it is allowed (we will
study auctions with and without resale possibility).
Auction stage
We study two types of auction formats:
• Simultaneous second-price auctions: N simultaneous auctions are run, one for
each market. In market i, local i and global submit their bids. The highest
bidder receives object i and pays the losing bid (the second highest bid) of that
market.
• Vickrey auction6: N objects are sold in one auction. Local i submits a bid
4For example, a local broadcaster is interested only in the license to serve its region, while a
national broadcaster is present in markets for all regions. This is in line with the motivation of
Krishna and Rosenthal (1996). Nevertheless, the local bidders may want to bid in other markets
when there is resale possibility. Allowing this kind of speculative bidding may lead to having many
buyers at the resale stage and hence complicate the post auction trading. Additionally, in reality,
some restrictions, such as geographical or legal, may prevent such speculative bidding. Therefore,
we rule out this possibility.
5Given the auction formats that we analyze, this assumption is made to simplify the notation.
6This is equivalent to the second-price auction when a single object is auctioned. It is considered
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for objecti; the global submits bids for each possible package of objects. The
objects are allocated to those bidders who have the highest total bids for all the
auctioned objects. Each winner pays a price that is equivalent to the externality
she exerts on other bidders.
Independent of the auction format, all bids are disclosed after the auctions.7
Resale stage
After the auction stage is completed, each winner may offer a price at which to
sell the object to the losing bidder of the corresponding market (as in, e.g. Hafalir
and Krishna, 2008). These take-it-or-leave-it offers cannot be negotiated. If an offer
is accepted, the trade takes place at the offered price. If it is rejected, the winner of
the auction keeps the object. The timing of the offers is as follows: If the global wins
all the objects, she makes Nsimultaneous offers to the losing locals. If the locals win
n objects and the global wins N − n objects, first the n winning locals make offers to
the global, sequentially.8
The order of the locals’ offers is randomly determined, and every local observes
each offer as it occurs. After the global sees n offers that are made to her, and before
deciding whether to accept them, the global makes simultaneous offers to N−n losing
locals. After all the offers are made, first the losing locals decide whether to accept
or reject, then the global observes these decisions and decides whether to accept or
reject the offers that are made to her.9
the appropriate generalization of the second-price auction for multi-object settings (see e.g. Krishna,
2009).
7In these auctions the losing bids are, naturally, disclosed to the winners because the losing bids
determine the prices that the winner pays. When the global wins all the objects or none of the
objects, announcing the winning bids reveals redundant information since the winner sets the price
in the resale stage (see the description of the resale stage). Although observing all winning bids may
potentially affect a local’s offer in the resale stage when global wins in other markets, in Table 3.8
we see that this information is not a significant variable affecting the resale price of the local.
8This sequential take-it-or-leave-it offer protocol generalizes to the standard bilateral case in the
sense that under complete information the trade is efficient and the unique equilibrium price gives
the full surplus to the offering party. This unique equilibrium property wouldn’t hold with some
other generalizations such as simultaneous offers.
9Although we commit to this resale protocol in the theoretical model and the experimental design,
our results on auctions with resale, Propositions 2 and 3, hold if instead losing bidders make the
resale offers or the proposer of the resale offer is randomly determined at the resale stage. Moreover,
even if the global bidder is allowed to make conditional offers in the resale stage, the theoretical
results still hold. Although it is experimentally possible that global bidder who wins both objects
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Throughout the paper, we study Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium. It is common
knowledge among bidders whether or not a resale stage will follow the auction.
Simultaneous second-price auctions with and without resale
When there are no complementarities between objects and resale is not allowed, it
is well known that sincere signal bidding is an efficient equilibrium in weakly dominant
strategies. Our first observation states that when complementarities exist, there is
no equilibrium in which goods are allocated efficiently at the auction stage. This is
true regardless of whether resale is allowed or not.
The equilibrium bid strategies are denoted by {bi(si), bgi(sg)}i∈{1,...,N} where bi(si)
is the bid of local i with signal si , and bgi(sg) is the bid of global in market i when
she has signal sg.
Proposition 1. The simultaneous second-price auctions do not have any equilib-
rium where the auction stage allocates objects efficiently. This is true whether resale
is allowed or not.
The intuition behind this proposition is as follows. Without complementarities,
efficient allocation depends only on the ranking of values within each market. Conse-
quently, any equilibrium that is monotone and symmetric will be efficient (in partic-
ular, sincere bidding). Under complementarities, however, the efficiency of the whole
game is entangled. Although the bidding strategies must depend only on the bidders’
own signals, the efficient allocation in market i might depend on the realization of
signals in other markets.
This result indicates that the auction stage is inefficient, but it is not clear whether
or not allowing for resale will lead to efficient allocation eventually. Next, we show
that any equilibrium of the SP auctions with resale will be inefficient in the final
outcome (after the resale stage).
may end up selling only one object at a low price while expecting to sell both at a profitable level, such
an exposure problem is observed very rarely (only 1.57% in SPR and 1.62% in VR). Nevertheless,
it is important to note that such global bidders might have set a price anticipating this exposure
problem in the resale stage. One may investigate whether the bidders take into account the potential
exposure problem in the resale stage by running a treatment by allowing for conditional offers.
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Proposition 2. The simultaneous second-price auction with resale has no effi-
cient equilibria.
The idea of the proof of Proposition 2 is that if a small downward deviation by a
bidder who loses inefficiently for some realization of signals was not beneficial, then
her upward deviations would be beneficial. This means that the bid strategy of a
bidder cannot be strictly monotone for signal ranges where she may lose inefficiently.
Hence, whenever a bidder loses the auction inefficiently, the winner could not infer
the loser’s value from her bid. Such a “ratchet effect” as studied by Laffont and
Tirole (1988) has been applied to auctions by Lebrun (2010) and Xu et al. (2012).
The techniques used in the literature are not applicable to our setting because we
have multiple auctions at the same time. Our proof uses a vector calculus technique
extensively used in physics (Flanders, 1973). This technique is novel in auction theory
and might be found useful in other applications.
Proposition 2 implies that this game does not have a separating equilibrium. As
can be seen from the proof, this means that the equilibrium bid functions should have
some pooling portion. Moreover, this result is robust to the resale protocols where
losing bidders make the resale offer, the proposer is randomly determined, the global
makes the first offers when she wins only some of the objects, or the global is allowed
to make contingent resale offers. The exact nature of the resale protocol is irrelevant
for this result because it is a proof by contradiction where we assume that the auc-
tion bids reveal the signals of the bidders whenever the auction outcome is inefficient.
This implies that the bidders know the nature of the efficient trade and which prices
are acceptable or not at the resale stage of such equilibrium. Those different resale
protocols affect the resale price but not the post trade allocation of objects (because
in the proof by contradiction the final allocation is always assumed to be the efficient
one). Since the proof does not particularly rely on the resale price, the arguments
still hold under these alternative protocols.
Remark 1.The simultaneous second-price auction with resale has a pooling equi-
librium where locals bid zero and the global bids vN(s̄) in each market for any re-
alization of signals. In this equilibrium, the global always wins the auctions, and
no information regarding the signals will be revealed in the resale stage. The global
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offers the price vector that maximizes her expected payoff given her signal.
It is also a pooling equilibrium for the global to bid zero in each market, and the
locals bid vN(s̄) independent of their signals. The resale stage prices are set optimally.
In both of these equilibria, the after resale allocation will be inefficient with positive
probability.
The two equilibria characterized in Remark 1 are completely uninformative at the
auction stage, and they are “collusive” in the sense that the bidders should somehow
coordinate on who bids zero. Since the theory predicts impossibility of a separat-
ing equilibrium or any other equilibrium with a stronger solution concept (such as
dominant strategy), coordination on one of the pooling or partially pooling equilibria
will be unrealistic to expect from the subjects in our experiments. Nevertheless, the
theory predicts inefficiency, and experiments can help us understand the severity of
this inefficiency.
Vickrey auction with and without resale
In the auction stage, a single auction is run to sell all the objects. Each bidder
submits bids for all possible packages of the objects that she is interested in. In our
setup, this means that each local submits a bid for object i and the global bidder
submits bids for each package. The auction allocates the objects to the bidders who
have the highest combined bids for all objects. Each winner pays a price that is
equivalent to the externality she exerts on other competing bidders (Vickrey, 1961).
This means that each winner pays the difference between what the highest total bid
would have been if she did not participate in the auction (and the others bid the
same) and what the highest total bid excluding her bid is in the current situation.
If resale is not allowed after the auction, it is known that a Vickrey auction has an
efficient equilibrium (Vickrey, 1961). In this equilibrium, value bidding is a weakly
dominant strategy.10 In Proposition 3, we show that when there is resale possibility,
a Vickrey auction still has an efficient equilibrium. Although bidding true valuation
10A Vickrey auction has other equilibria as shown in the literature (see Blume et al., 2009).
Similarly, when resale is allowed, there are implausible equilibria. As noted in Blume et al. (2009),
in any equilibrium, except the value bidding equilibrium, the bidders need to coordinate on who bid
zero similar to the equilibria of SPR discussed in Remark 1.
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for each package remains an equilibrium strategy for the auction stage, it is no longer
a weakly dominant one.
Proposition 3. The Vickrey auction with resale has an equilibrium that allocates
the objects efficiently in the auction stage.
The proof of Proposition 3 constructs this efficient equilibrium where local i bids
b∗i (si) = si and the global bids bgI (sg) = v|I|(sg) for a package I ⊆ {1, ..., N}. Hence,
the auction outcome is efficient, and no resale will occur. It is important to notethat
this result is robust to aforementioned alternative resale protocols.
3.3 Experiment
In the previous section, we saw that a Vickrey auction has an efficient equilibrium
with and without resale. On the other hand, simultaneous second-price auctions
may allocate the objects inefficiently at the auction stage whether there is a resale
possibility or not. Furthermore, the existence of resale markets does not guarantee
the efficiency of the final outcome. Our experiment is designed to study the following:
(1) comparisons of the efficiency rates in SP and Vickrey auctions with and without
resale; (2) sources of efficiency losses when there are any; (3) rankings of formats by
the bidders and the seller.
3.3.1 Design of the experiment
The experiments were run at the Experimental Economics Lab at the Univer-
sity of Maryland (EEL-UMD). All participantswere undergraduate students. The
experiment involved four treatments: simultaneous second-price auctions without re-
sale (SPNR), simultaneous second-price auctions with resale (SPR), Vickrey auctions
without resale (VNR), and Vickrey auctions with resale (VR). We conducted six ses-
sions for each auction format. In each session, there were 15 subjects. No subject
participated in more than one session. Therefore, we had 360 subjects. The random
draws were balanced in the sense that we used the same sequence of random num-
ber “seed” signals for all auction formats, so that the random draws matched across
treatments. A new set of random draws was used for each session in each format.
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Participants were seated in isolated booths. Each session lasted less than two hours.
The experimental instructions are provided in the Appendix C. To test the subjects’
understanding of the instructions, they had to answer a quiz before the experiment
started. The auctions did not begin until each subject answered all of the questions
correctly.
In each session, each subject participated in 30 auctions. Each subject was as-
signed a role, global or local, and the roles remained fixed throughout the session.
Each auction had one global and two locals who were randomly matched. Two objects
were auctioned. The global bidder was interested in both objects and each local was
interested in a single object. More specifically, local 1 was interested in the object sold
in Market 1 and local 2 was interested in the object in Market 2. Bidders were ran-
domly re-matched after each auction. All bidding was anonymous. Bids were entered
via computer. The experiment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007b). At
the conclusion of each auction, the bidders learned the outcome of the auction (i.e.
whether the global or a local won in each market and the submitted bids).
At the beginning of an auction, each bidder received a private signal from uniform
distribution on [0, 100], independently. The signal of a local was her valuation for
the object that she was interested in. The signal of a global was her valuation of the
single object. A global’s valuation for the package of two objects was 3×(her signal).
In treatments without resale possibility, the payoff of a subject in a round was the
difference between the value of the object(s) that she received in the auction and the
auction price. In treatments with resale possibility, a subject earned.
Payoff=(Value of the object(s) owned after resale)+(any amound received in a re-
sale trade)-(any amound paid in auction or resale stage)
All the amounts in the experiment were in Experimental Currency Units (ECU).
Subjects received $7 as participation fee and $3 initial endowment to cover any pos-
sible losses in the experiment. No subject lost all of the initial endowment. The final
earnings of a subject were the sum of her payoffs in 20 randomly selected rounds
in addition to the participation fee and the initial endowment. The payoffs in the
experiment were converted to US dollars at the conversion rate of 50 ECU = $1.
Cash payments were made at the conclusion of the experiment. The average subject
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payment was $19.85.
Simultaneous second-price auctions without resale (SPNR): Each local
bidder submitted a bid only for the object in her market. The global bidder submitted
bids for each object. Bids could be any integer number from {0, 1, 2, ..., 300}. The
computer allocated each object to the bidder who submitted the highest bid for that
object. A winner’s payment was what the losing bidder bid for the object.
It is immediate to show that, when resale is not allowed, truthful value bidding is
the local bidders’ weakly dominant strategy. Only the global bidder has a non-trivial
problem. Proposition 4 shows how the equilibrium can be constructed in this case
for the parameters used in the experiment.
Proposition 4. In the simultaneous second-price auctions without resale when
N = 2, v2(s) = 3s, and the signals are independently and uniformly distributed on
[0, 100], truthful value bidding is the locals’ weakly dominant strategy and global’s








Vickrey auction (VNR): Each local bidder submitted a bid only for the ob-
ject in her market. The global bidder submitted a bid for each object and a bid
for the package containing both objects. Therefore, the global submitted three bids.
Bids could be any integer number from {0, 1, 2, ..., 300}. The computer allocated the
objects to the set of bidders who submitted the highest combined bids for the two
objects. A local winner’s payment was calculated by the following formula:
Price = (the highest total bid if that winner were NOT present) − (the other win-
ner’s bid in the current highest total bid).
For each object she wins, the global pays the local bidder’s bid in that market.
Simultaneous second-price auctions and Vickrey auctions with resale (SPR and
VR): The auction stages of SPR and VR were the same as SPNR and VNR, respec-
tively. After the auction stage was over, the bidders learned all the bids in each
market and the resale stage started. Non-negotiable resale offers were made by the
winners of the auction stage. In the experiment, in order to decrease the number of
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decisions to be made, all the winners of the auction stage were asked to make resale
offers. Note that a winner who did not want to sell could always ask for an unac-
ceptable resale price.11 If a resale trade took place, then the object was transferred
to the buyer, the buyer paid, and the seller received the resale price. The timing of
the resale offers was as follows:
• If the global won in both markets, then she made simultaneous offers to the lo-
cals. Upon observing the resale offers, the locals simultaneously decided whether
to accept or reject the corresponding offer.
• If the two locals won the auctions, then one randomly determined local made
the first resale offer; after observing this, the other local made an offer. After
observing both locals’ offers, the global decided whether to buy any object(s)
in the resale stage.
• If local i won the auction in market i, and the global won the auction in market
j, then first local i made a resale offer. After observing this, the global made
a resale offer to local j. Then local j decided whether to accept the global’s
offer. Upon observing this, the global bidder decided whether to accept the
local i’s offer. All the moves in the sequential resale game described above were
observable by the players.
3.3.2 Experimental Results
We start our analysis by considering the efficiency of the allocation in each treat-
ment. We use the efficiency measure that is also used in Chen and Takeuchi (2005).
In this definition, the efficiency of an auction is measured as the ratio of the total
surplus of the allocation to the highest possible surplus among all possible allocations,
where total surplus is the sum of bidder profit and auctioneer revenue. Then, for each
auction, the ratio is normalized by the average surplus of all possible allocations as
11Although subjects were not explicitly told what an unacceptable resale price was, the subjects
made unacceptable offers when they did not want to sell. 300 ECU was the highest unacceptable
offer for our parameters and subjects offered that price a few times (we observed resale price of 300
in 48 and 32 out of 900 auctions in SPR and VR, respectively).
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follows:
Efficiency = the total actual surplus − average surplus
the highest possible surplus − average surplus
Table 3.1 presents the efficiency rates for each auction format for all periods as
well as the first and second halves of the experiment. For the pairwise comparisons
of the efficiencies we run Mann–Whitney rank tests. Based on all periods’ data, at
the auction stage, SPR achieves significantly lower efficiency rates than VNR and
SPNR (z=−9.067; p =0.0000and z=−6.990; p =0.0000, respectively). However, after
the resale stage, the efficiency rate of SPR is significantly higher than that of SPNR
(z = 3.706; p = 0.0002) and is not significantly different from that of VNR (z =
1.031; p = 0.3024). Note that in SPR, VNR and SPNR, the efficiency rates improve
in the second half of the experiments; nevertheless, these efficiency comparisons are
preserved. The difference between the efficiencies of VNR and SPNR is significant
in the overall data (z = 2.585; p = 0.0098). However, due to learning in SPNR, this
difference becomes insignificant when we look at the last 15 periods (z = 1.004; p =
0.3154).
VR achieves lower efficiency rates than other formats. We believe this is due to the
difficulty of understanding both the Vickrey pricing rule and the resale protocol. Note
that the efficiency rate after resale of VR is lower than its auction stage efficiency, and
this is due to inefficient resale activities in the first half of the experiment. However,
there is a learning effect, i.e. the inefficient resale was corrected in the second half of
the experiment. But still the efficiency rate after resale is not significantly different
from the one in the auction stage (z = 0.481; p = 0.6303). Due to the subjects’
apparent difficulty understanding the VR format, the detailed analysis of VR for
Periods 16–30 is presented in online Appendix C.12
Recall that the equilibrium of VNR is efficient. However, the efficiency rate in
the experiment is significantly less than 1 (p = 0.0000, one-sided t-test). This lack
of efficiency is actually not surprising in Vickrey auction experiments (see Kagel and
Levin, 2010 for a detailed survey). Particularly, overbidding in single-object Vickrey
auctions (see e.g. Kagel and Levin, 1993) and underbidding or truthful value bidding
12Appendix C also includes all the analysis restricted to the second half of the experiment for all
the formats. As can be seen, the main results of the paper are not affected qualitatively.
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Table 3.1: Average Efficiency Rates
Auction Format Periods 1-15 Periods 16-30 All Periods
Vickrey - No Resale 0.769 0.788 0.779
(0.044) (0.027) (0.030)
Vickrey - Resale
Auction Stage 0.771 0.701 0.736
(0.026) (0.024) (0.008)
Resale Stage 0.616 0.715 0.666
(0.045) (0.039) (0.041)
SP - No Resale 0.708 0.783 0.745
(0.024) (0.014) (0.012)
SP - Resale
Auction Stage 0.560 0.570 0.565
(0.056) (0.051) (0.051)
Resale Stage 0.796 0.827 0.811
(0.039) (0.027) (0.025)
Notes: Session-clustered standard errors are in parentheses.
in multi-object Vickrey auctions (see Chen and Takeuchi, 2005) have been reported.
Although the demand of each bidder is symmetric in the corresponding literature, our
results extend these findings such that local bidders who are interested in only a single
object overbid, while global bidders who are interested in two objects bid truthfully
or underbid. For the draws used in the experiment, the equilibrium efficiency rate
of SPNR stated in Proposition 4 is 0.95, but the efficiency rate in the experiment is
significantly less (p = 0.0000, one-sided t-test). For SPR, we calculate the expected
efficiency rate for the pooling equilibrium characterized in Remark 1 by the following
simulation exercise. We assume that locals bid zero and the global with any signal s
always wins the auctions and sets the rational resale price of given that the auction
stage is uninformative. Then, we calculate the expected efficiency rate based on
five million signal draws by using the parameters of the experiment. Such a pooling
equilibrium leads to an efficiency rate of 0.77, which is significantly less than what
we observed in the experiments (p = 0.0061, two-sided t-test).13 Next we investigate
13Given the complementarities, the equilibrium where the global wins the auction all the time will
lead to higher efficiency than the equilibrium where the locals win the auction since the resale stage
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Table 3.2: Efficiency Leaks in VNR Format
Efficient Outcomes
Observed Count %
Outcomes L-L L-G, G-L G-G L-L L-G, G-L G-G Total
Local-Local 234 28 89 89.7 44.4 15.5 39.0
LG, GL 16 31 72 6.1 49.2 12.5 13.2
Global-Global 11 4 415 4.2 6.3 72.0 47.8
Total 261 63 576 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Local-Local or LL denotes outcomes where each local bidder obtains the object
in the corresponding market; LG (GL) denotes outcomes where local bidder A (B)
obtains object A and Global bidder obtains B (A); Global-Global or GG denotes
outcomes where Global bidder obtains both objects.
the sources of the inefficiencies. The first three columns of Tables 3.2-3.4 present the
number of auctions where the efficient outcome allocates both objects to the locals
(column 1), one object to a local and one object to the global (column 2), and both
objects to the global (column 3). The rows of Tables 3.2-3.4 classify actual allocations
based on the type of winning bidders: both locals receive an object in the experiment
per treatment (row 1), one local and the global receive one object each (row 2),
and the global receives both objects (row 3). The 4th, 5th, and 6th columns show
for each type of efficient allocation, how actual allocations distributed in percentage
terms. For example, out of 900 VNR auctions, in 576 auctions the global should
have received both objects in the efficient allocation, but this happens in only 415
(72%) auctions. In 72 (12.5%) auctions one object is inefficiently allocated to a local,
and in 89 (15.5%) of them both objects are inefficiently allocated to the locals. Note
that, in Table 3.4, we classify the efficiency rates at the auction stage and at the
resale stage separately. The percentages of efficient allocations at the auction stage
are 40.6% when the globals do not win any auction, 31.2% when the globals win only
one auction, and 28.2% when the globals win both of the auctions. Similarly after
the resale, those percentages are 32.9%, 18.1% and 49%, respectively.
Tables 3.2-3.4 demonstrate that the major source of inefficiency in all the formats
arises from allocating an object to a local bidder inefficiently. For example, in VNR,
when one local and the global should receive one object each, in 44.4% of the auctions
takes place with no information regarding the signals in both cases.
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Table 3.3: Efficiency Leaks in SPNR Format
Efficient Outcomes
Observed Count %
Outcomes L-L L-G, G-L G-G L-L L-G, G-L G-G Total
Local-Local 218 17 40 83.5 27.0 6.9 83.5
LG, GL 30 39 170 11.5 61.9 29.5 11.5
Global-Global 13 7 366 5.0 11.1 63.5 5.0
Total 261 63 576 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Local-Local or LL denotes outcomes where each local bidder obtains the object
in the corresponding market; LG (GL) denotes outcomes where local bidder A (B)
obtains object A and Global bidder obtains B (A); Global-Global or GG denotes
outcomes where Global bidder obtains both objects.
Table 3.4: Efficiency Leaks in SPR Format
Efficient Outcomes
Observed Count %
Outcomes L-L L-G, G-L G-G L-L L-G, G-L G-G Total
Local-Local
Auction Stage 219 22 124 83.9 34.9 21.5 40.6
Resale Stage 222 19 55 85.1 30.2 9.5 32.9
LG, GL
Auction Stage 33 40 208 12.6 63.5 36.1 31.2
Resale Stage 33 41 89 12.6 65.1 15.5 18.1
Global-Global
Auction Stage 9 1 244 3.4 1.6 42.4 28.2
Resale Stage 6 3 432 2.3 4.8 75.0 49.0
Total 261 63 576 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Notes: Local-Local or L-L denotes outcomes where each local bidder obtains the
object in the corresponding market; L-G (G-L) denotes outcomes where local bidder
A (B) obtains object A and Global bidder obtains B (A); Global-Global or G-G
denotes outcomes where Global bidder obtains both objects.
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both locals receive the objects inefficiently. Similarly, when both of the objects need
to be allocated to the global, in 28% (12.5% +15.5%) of the auctions at least one
local receives an object inefficiently. However, when locals should receive both objects
efficiently, this happens 89.7% of the time. The main reason for the local bidders to
win inefficiently is due to their aggressive bidding strategy. In the next subsection,
we analyze the bidding behavior of the local and global bidders in detail and show
that while locals overbid, the globals do not. The lowest efficiency rate is observed in
the auction stage of the SPR. This is mainly due to the observed inefficiencies when
the global should have received both objects for the outcome to be efficient. In only
42.4% of these auctions does the global win both auctions. Given that under the
complementarities the global should receive the package efficiently for most of the
draws (in 576 out of 900 auctions), the loss of efficiency in this case affects the overall
efficiency rate of SPR at the auction stage. At the resale stage of SPR, the locals
who win the auction inefficiently sell the objects to the global, and the efficiency rate
of SPR improves to VNR’s rate.
Bidding behavior
The globals’ bids for single objects are mostly symmetric in all formats. The
percentages of auctions where globals’ bids in different markets are the same are
56.8%, 76.6%, and 71.2% for VNR, SPNR, and SPR, respectively. Furthermore, the
percentages of auctions where globals’ bids in different markets differ from each other
by at most 5 ECUs are 79%, 87.6%, and 86.1%, respectively for VNR, SPNR, and
SPR. The average absolute difference between the two single-object bids of a global
is 5.1, 3.1 and 3.9, respectively for VNR, SPNR, and SPR.
In all formats, the median bids as well as the frequencies of winning are non-
decreasing with signals. This is in line with the monotone strategy of VNR and
SPNR; however, it also indicates that neither the locals nor the global are using the
pooling equilibrium strategies described in Remark 1 in SPR. In Figs. 1–3, we plot
the raw data, the linear regression as well as the mean and median of bids conditional
on signals for each format.
In VNR, although value bidding is the weakly dominant strategy for both the
global and the locals, the global is in-different among bids in a range for certain
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Figure 3.1: Bidding behavior in VNR
realization of signals provided that the locals bid their signal. In Figure 3.1, the
equilibrium is not drawn for those signals. In particular, for signals above 50, the
global is indifferent among any bids less than her signal for single-object. In the data,
80.5% of the global’s single bids are below her signal when the global’s signal is above
50. Similarly, for signals above 66, she is indifferent among any bids more than 200
for the two-object package. Of the globals with signals higher than 66, 77.1% bid
more than 200 for two-object packages. Note also that both mean and median curves
are almost linear up to signal 50 in single-object bids of the global in Figure 3.1, and
they are non-linear and below the 45 degree line for signals above 50. Similarly, the
mean and median in the package bids of the global are almost linear up to signal 66,
and they are above 200 after signal 66.
The bid regressions for VNR are presented in Table 3.5. The global’s two-object
package bids are in line with the theoretical prediction. In the regression analysis
restricted to signals less than 67, the test of the constant being zero and the coefficient
of the signal being equal to 3 is not rejected (p =0.170). The global’s single-object
bids are mostly less than the value of the single object. We reject the hypothesis that
the coefficient of the signal is significant and equal to 1 and the rest is zero in the
regression for the globals’ single-object bids (p =0.000). On the other hand, locals
tend to bid more than the equilibrium prediction. In Table 3.5, the coefficient of
the signal is more than 1 for the local (p =0.000). This can be explained by joy of
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Table 3.5: Bid Regressions for VNR
Depvar: Depvar: Global’s
Locals’ Bids Single-Object Bids Package Bids
(for Signal < 50) (for Signal <67)
Signal 1.174*** 0.830*** 2.885***
(0.029) (0.050) (0.073)
Constant 4.041 1.267 3.048
(5.701) (1.909) (3.977)
N 1800 882 616
Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random
effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level. * <0.10, ** < 0.05, and ***
<0.01.
winning (see e.g. Cooper and Fang, 2008).
The joy of winning has an interesting implication for the global bidders in VNR.
For example, say the global’s signal is 30, and the locals bid 10 and 70. If the global
bids truthfully, she wins only one item, but by underbidding for the single items, she
will win two items. Assuming that she enjoys winning two items more than winning
one item, she may want to underbid on single item and not do so on the package.
This is what we see in our VNR data. Nevertheless, while joy of winning explanation
would predict overbidding for the packages as well, as in Chen and Takeuchi (2005),
we do not observe overbidding in the package bids.
Figure 3.2 shows the behavior in SPNR. The locals bid more aggressively than
theory predicts. For local bidders, the coefficient of the signal is significantly higher
than 1 in the regressions in Table 3.6 (p =0.00). This is also consistent with the joy
of winning explanation.
By Proposition 4, for the parameters used in the experiment, the equilibrium
strategy of the global is as follows: for signals higher than 50, any bid on the interval
[100, 300] is equally good; for signals less than 50, bg(s) = 100s100−s . By log-transforming
this equation, we get a linear equation y = α+ βs̃ where y = ln bg(s), α = ln(100) =
4.605, β = −1, and s̃ = ln(100
s
− 1). In the second column of Table 3.6, for the
realized signals less than 50, we estimated the coefficients of this linear model with
random effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level. We find that the
coefficient and the constant are significantly different from the theoretical prediction
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Figure 3.2: Bidding Behavior in SPNR.
Table 3.6: Bid Regressions for SPNR
Depvar: bl Depvar: ln(bg)










Notes: The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random
effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level. * <0.10, ** < 0.05, and ***
<0.01.
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(p =0.000); hence, the globals’ bids are less than what the theory predicts except
for very low signals. Also, for globals’ signals higher than 50, only 40.4% of bids
are above 100. To sum up, as in Vickrey auction, here the global bidders who are
interested in more than one object tend not to overbid except for very low signals.
This is also observed in Figure 3.2. Due to complementarities, the global bidders
face an exposure problem in SPNR. Although joy of winning motivation may imply
overbidding for the globals in SPNR, the exposure problem is more severe since the
locals are overbidding. The observed underbidding of the globals in this format can
be explained by the globals’ fear of paying too much for single item. Moreover, the
globals with low signals are unlikely to experience exposure problem and for them the
joy of winning may dominate exposure problem effect. Hence, by this explanation
those globals may tend to overbid. This is indeed what we see in the data.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the bidding behavior of the locals and the globals in SPR.
This figure shows that the bidders are not playing a pooling equilibrium where only
one type of bidder always wins (see Remark1). Only 9 out of 1800 local bids were
zero, and 15 out of 1800 global bids were 300.14 We observe that the locals bid more
than their value. Additionally, bidding more than one’s value is more pronounced
in the SPR format compared to the SPNR (p =0.000by Kolmogorov–Smirnov test).
On the other hand, the bids of the global in SPR are less than those in SPNR (p
=0.000by Kolmogorov–Smirnov test). One reason for this might be that, given the
aggressive behavior of the locals in SPR, the global wants to lower her bid to make
the locals think that her value is not much and hence get a lower resale prices from
them.15
The literature considers nonzero bids of bidders with zero values as speculation
since zero valued bidders are the only bidders who are bidding solely to benefit from
the resale activity (see e.g. Garratt and Tröger, 2006). In SPR, 87.5% of the zero
valued local bidders submit positive bids. Nevertheless, zero valued bidders may be
submitting positive bids without strategically considering the resale activity. For
example, even in SPNR, where there is no resale possibility, 68.8% of the zero valued
local bidders submit positive bids. Furthermore, 58.3% of the zero valued globals
14Also less than 1% of the global bids for signals less than 50 were higher than 150.
15This explanation is supported by the price regressions in Table 3.8 where a local’s resale price
offer increases with the bid of global when the global needs to buy the second object in the resale
stage.
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Figure 3.3: Bidding behavior in SPR.
submit positive bids in SPR and 50% in SPNR. We conclude that locals speculate
more than the globals when we allow for resale.
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 compare, respectively, the bids of locals and globals for dif-
ferent signal bins in SPR and SPNR.16 Especially for low signal bins, locals bid more
aggressively in SPR than in SPNR. In fact, for all signal ranges up to 70 (except for
the range [41, 50]), the median bid of SPR is significantly above the median bid in
the SPNR format. On the other hand, the globals’ median bids for any signal bin
above 20 are significantly lower in SPR than in SPNR.
Resale stage in SPR
In the resale stage of SPR, the percentage of locals posting profitable offers (i.e.
those who asked for resale prices above their own valuation) is 91.7%, and the per-
centage of rational acceptance (i.e. acceptance of resale terms if and only if doing
so was profitable) among all losing bidders is 95.5%. The high rate of rational ac-
ceptance of resale offers has been also reported in a context where the seller offers a
take-it-or-leave-it price to the losing bidder for the sale of a second unit (see Wilson
and Salmon, 2008).17
16The box plots are created using standard techniques. The box represents the interquartile range
(IQR); the whiskers extend to the furthest point within 1.5 ×IQR; the horizontal line in a box
represents the median.
17However, in VR, only 77.5% of local offers were profitable, while the rational acceptance of resale
offers was 90.4%. This result indicates that the major source of the inefficient sales is due to locals
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Figure 3.4: Locals’ bids box-plots for SPR and SPNR.
Figure 3.5: Globals’ bids box-plots for SPR and SPNR.
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Table 3.7: Average Resale Prices in SPR








Notes: LG (GL) denotes outcomes where local bidder A (B) obtains object A and
Global bidder obtains B (A).
Table 3.7 reports that higher resale prices are paid by the global when she buys
the second object in the post-auction trade than when she goes to resale after losing
both objects in the auction. The difference is significant (p=0.000 in the comparison
of 70.1 and 84). This finding is intuitive because the locals know that the marginal
utility of the second object to the global is higher than the value of single object due to
complementarities and they try to extract the additional surplus generated when the
global receives the second object. As another implication of the complementarities,
after the auctions where only one object is received by the global, the resale price is
higher when the global buys than when she sells (p =0.000 in the comparison of 84
and 42). Similarly, when the global offers resale price for both objects, she charges a
higher price than that when she sells only one object (p =0.023 in the comparison of
42 and 63.5). This is due to the additional value to the global of keeping an object
when she has two versus one object.
Table 3.8 reports the results of the regressions for the locals’ resale offers. When
the locals win both objects in the auctions, their offers are affected only by their own
signals. However, when the locals win only one auction, the offer of the winning local
depends not only on her own signal but also on the global’s bid in the same market
(how much this local paid in the auction) and the bid of the other local (how much
the global paid in the other auction that she won). These results suggest that when
the global gets only one object in the auction, the local who has the other object is
aware that the global must buy it to enjoy the extra payoff of the complementary
object. Hence, when setting the price, this power gives an additional motive to the
offers.
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Table 3.8: Regressions for Locals’ Resale Offers in SPR
LL LG, GL
First Offer Second Offer Local’s Offer
Signal 0.876*** 0.932*** 0.647***
(0.060) (0.072) (0.079)
Global Bid (same object) 0.15 -0.042 0.453***
(0.148) (0.190) (0.129)
Global Bid (other object) -0.127 -0.034 0.158
(0.154) (0.185) (0.138)
Other Local Bid -0.034 0.021 -0.195**
(0.034) (0.048) (0.096)
First (local) Offer 0.044
(0.056)
Constant 28.014*** 16.391** 20.652***
(6.639) (7.968) (6.143)
N 365 365 281
Notes: L-L denotes the auction outcome where locals win both objects. LG or GL
denote the auction outcome where one local wins an objects and Global wins the
other object. The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with
random effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05,
and ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01.
local to take into account all the relevant information. For example, if the global’s
bid is high, she sets a high price to extract more from the global’s payoff from the
complementary objects; when the global’s bid is low, she thinks that the global may
sell it to the other local or be unwilling to pay a high price for the complementary
object. The negative and significant coefficient of the other local’s bid (i.e. how much
the global paid in the market she won) in the third regression of Table 3.8 may be
interpreted as follows: The higher bid by the other local may indicate a high value by
that local and therefore the high probability of the global selling to that local rather
than buying one more object. As a response, the offering local should lower her price
in the resale if she wants the global to buy from her rather than sell to the other
local. On the other hand, in the auction stage, if the global does not get any of the
objects, a local is no longer the sole seller to the global, and the other local’s price
plays a role in the decision of the global as well. In this case, the locals just set a
profitable price.
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Table 3.9: Regressions for Globals’ Resale Offers in SPR




Local Bid (same object) 0.354*** -0.014
(0.081) (0.054)







Notes: The games where the offers are less than or equal to 100. The standard errors
are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at individual level and
fixed effect at session level. ∗ < 0.10, ∗∗ < 0.05, and ∗ ∗ ∗ < 0.01.
Table 3.9 reports the regression results for globals’ resale offers for the offers not
higher than 100. This is because we assume that any resale offer exceeding a price of
100 can only be made with the intent not to sell. In the regressions, the locals’ bid is
significant only when the global wins a single object. If a global offers a price less than
100 to sell the single object she has, she wants to extract as much as she believes she
can from the losing local based on the information received from the auction stage.
When the global wins both auctions and considers selling the objects, only her own
signal is significant. In this case, there is room for an exposure problem because the
global who aims to sell both objects may end up selling only one. To avoid this, the
global sets profitable prices and increases the chance that both locals buy when she
wants that.
Auction revenue
Table 3.10 reports the average observed auction revenue in each treatment as well
as the average revenue predicted by the equilibrium for the Vickrey auction and for
SPNR, for the draws used in the experiment. Using the 6 independent sessions per
treatment, the Mann–Whitney test is used to compare the revenues. There is no
significant difference between actual auction revenues in the different formats (for
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Table 3.10: Average Revenues







Notes: Session-clustered S.E. reported in parentheses.
Vickrey vs. SPNR, z=0.320 and p =0.749; for Vickrey vs. SPR, z=0.801 and p
=0.423; for SPNR vs. SPR: z=−0.961 and p =0.337). There is also no signifi-
cant difference between the actual and predicted revenues of SPNR (z=1.363 and p
=0.173). However, the actual revenue in Vickrey auctions is significantly higher than
that predicted by the theory (z=1.992 and p =0.046).
The Vickrey format generates more revenue than its equilibrium prediction be-
cause the locals bid aggressively in the experiment, as argued earlier. Also, in SPR
auctions, locals bid more aggressively, but globals bid less aggressively than they do
in SPNR. Those behaviors have opposite effects on revenue and thus cancel each other
out. Hence, these two formats generated similar revenues in the experiment.
Bidder’s payoff
Next we compare the formats from the bidders’ perspective in Table 3.11. Using
independent session averages, Mann–Whitney tests demonstrate that the payoff of the
local is the highest in the SPR format. On the other hand, the payoff of the global
is not significantly different across auction formats (i.e. globals have statistically
equivalent mean and median payoffs in all formats, for all signal ranges, see also
Figure 3.6). Figure 3.7 highlights that the mean and median payoffs of local bidders
with signals above 70 are statistically higher in SPR than those in the other two
formats.
3.4 Conclusion
We have studied multi-object auctions when post-auction resale among bidders
is possible. Theoretically, Vickrey auc-tions (both with and without resale) have
94
Table 3.11: Bidders’ Average Profits
Treatment Locals’ Profits Global’s ProfitsTheoretical Observed Theoretical Observed
Vickrey 12.28 12.7 67.8 49.99(0.972) (1.218) (1.704) (1.922)
SPNR 11.66 12.23 67 51.19(0.981) (0.705) (1.737) (2.472)
SPR 15.89 48.59(1.800) (1.119)
Notes: Session-clustered S.E. reported in parentheses.
Mean Median
Figure 3.6: Globals’ mean and median profits.
Mean Median
Figure 3.7: Locals’ mean and median profits.
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an efficient equilibrium; however, in any equilibrium of simultaneous second-price
auctions (either with or without resale), the final allocation is not guaranteed to be
efficient. In spite of the theoretical attractiveness of the Vickrey format, in practice,
simultaneous second-price auctions are used more often than Vickrey auctions. This
is mainly due to the complexity of the Vickrey format (see e.g. Rothkopf, 2007). It
is notable that the Vickrey auction does not work so well even in a relatively simple
environment. Experimental evi-dence highlights the trade-off between simple pricing
rules that may lead to exposure problems and complex combinatorial auctions (see
Bichler et al., 2014; Brunner et al., 2010).
In our experiment, we took the efficiency rate of Vickrey as our benchmark, and
analyzed the effect of resale on simul-taneous second-price auctions. According to our
results, although the possibility of resale decreases the efficiency rate in the auction
stage of simultaneous second-price auctions, the final efficiency is improved to the ob-
served efficiency rate in a Vickrey auction. Furthermore, in simultaneous second-price
auctions, preventing resale hurts efficiency without changing the auction revenue, and
allowing resale benefits the locals without diminishing the global bidder’s expected
payoff. Based on these results, we can conclude that when simultaneous second-price
auctions are inevitable or preferred due to simplic-ity of their implementation, resale
markets should be allowed. Nevertheless, in practice, the resale of objects usually
leads to transaction costs in bargaining and delays in the actual use of the auctioned
objects. It may be important to investigate the effect of such costs on auction stage
efficiency rates.
Finally, this paper contributes to the literature by combining theory and experi-
ment. Our experiment highlights the importance of simplicity of the pricing rule that
we cannot detect by simply focusing on the theoretical results. Along this line, per-
haps rather than Vickrey auction, a simpler pricing rule, such as pay-as-bid package
auctions, may be better for combinatorial auctions when resale is possible. We leave
this fruitful exercise for future research.18
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Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Proofs to Propositions
Proposition 1
Proof. For simplicity, here I provide the proof for non-corner solutions and differ-
entiable g. First, notice that in either choice problem (risk taking with fair risks
and with unfair risks) DM and her counterpart face the exact same marginal risk.
Therefore, D = 0 always and utility becomes U = Eg(x, y). That is, this proposition
is a result emerging purely emerging from ex post motives.
Consider now the problem of chosing the optimal risk taking with fair risks, αf∗.
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(A.2)
Similarly, for the problem of chosing the optimal risk taking with unfair risks, αuf∗,
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where the first inequality holds because g satisfies strict supermodularity (see Defini-
tion 1), and the second inequality holds because g was assumed to be concave along
the 45 degree line (to capture aversion to fair risks). Expression (A.5) contradicts the
FOC for αf∗(Equation A.2) and therefore αf∗ > αuf∗
Proposition 2
Proof. I prove 2.i by constructing outcomes A and B that satisfy the proposition for
given preferences Eg − δD. Recall it is assumed g is increasing in x and y, µ(t) = t
and p > 1. It can be seen that for some k > 0 we can always form outcomes
A = (xl, yh) and B = (xh, yl) such that: (i) g(A) =g(xl, yh) = g(xh, yl)= g(B), and
(ii) yh − xl = xh − yl = k. Since D = k when either outcome A or B occurs for sure,
we also have that B ∼ A. Therefore, to show that the optimal probability of A is
non trivial – i.e. pA ∈ (0, 1), we only need to work with the ex ante term D.
Define L = 12A ⊕
1
2B and denote by F
L
x and FLy as the corresponding marginal







< k. To see this claim, notice that given the conditions
imposed on A and B, we have either: yl ≤ xl ≤ xh ≤ yh or xl ≤ yl ≤ yh ≤ xh.










p(yh − xh) ≤ 21−pk < k. This implies L  A ∼ B, as desired.1
1Importantly, notice I constructed outcomes A and B that will trigger ex ante fairness behavior
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Next, I prove 2.ii. For simplicity, , I assume the exponent p inside equation (1.4)
equals 2. Also, without loss of generality let me focus on the case where yA−yB
xB−xA
> 0;
that is, where each outcome is relatively advantagous to one of the agents (DM and
her counterpart) and no outcome is dominated. Otherwise, optimal pA will be zero
or one.
First, recall again that, given the assumptions, the utility is given by U = Eg(x, y)−
δD(Fx, Fy). Because we are restricted to the two outcome (A and B) case, it can
be shown that: (i) as in the standard EU theory, Eg(x, y) is a linear form on pA:
pAg(xA, yA) + (1 − pA)g(xB, yB), and (ii) D is a quadratic form over pA: D =
c0 − c1pA + c2p2A, with cj > 0. Also, coefficients cj will depend on xA, yA, xB,
yB. If we assume non-corner solution and, therefore, the solution is given by the first
order condition, ∂U
∂pA
= 0, then the optimal pA can be expressed as:
pA =





g(xA, yA)− g(xB, yB)
2c2
− c12c2
From this solution, we can see that for small enough δ, pA will depend positively on
xA, yA and negatively on xB, yB, regardless how these outcomes affect c1 and c2. The
proof is complete.
Proposition 3
Proof. For simplicity, I assume the case of a non-corner solution. In the GEIA model,
U(L) = δsu(E[x, y]) + (1 − δs)E[u(x, y)]. Also, because the proposition is restricted
to the case of fair lotteries, we can define v(z) = u(z, z) which we have already
assumed to be concave. Further, using the definition of fair lotteries Lfair(α) in the
















+ v ((1− α)Z)) (A.7)
Using the first and second order conditions as well as the implicit function theorem,
we have that:












, where Uα = ∂U(L
fair(α))
∂α







is negative as it is simply the second order condition
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− Zv ((1− α)Z) ≤ 0 at optimal α, then the proof is complete.




− Zv ((1− α)Z) > 0, then the cor-















Proof. This proof is immediate from the contunuity and differentiability of u, and
from the fact that purely ex ante decision makers will choose to maximize the expected
value regardless whether the lotteries are fair or unfair. That is, if δs = 1, then
αfair∗ = αunfair∗ = 1.
Proposition 5
Proof. I assume that u is increasing in x everywhere, and u is increasing in y it
x > y. I had already assumed that u is concave, I strenghten this by assuming u
is also strictly concave at least somewhere (e.g. if u is the F&S utility, u is strictly
concave along the 45 degree line). Under these rather general conditions, it is easy
to see that there exist a and b such that this deterministic-dictator choice problem:
max
s∈[0,1]
u(s0 + (1− s)b , sa+ (1− s)0) (A.10)
has an non-corner solution s∗ ∈ (0, 1).
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Consider any arbitrary a and b such that the corresponding s∗is in fact in the
interval (0, 1). We want to study the choice problem:
max
p∈[0,1]
δsu ((1− p) b , p a)) + (A.11)
(1− δs) (pu(0, a) + (1− p)u(b, 0))
whose solution is denoted by p*. This is the probabilistic giving problem where
A = (0, a) and B = (b, 0). Let me assume, WLOG, that B  A – i.e. u(B) > u(A).
The following four claims suffice for Proposition 5.
Claim 1: if δs = 0, then p∗ = 0.
This is an immediate result from the fact that in this case we are in the standard
expected utility model.
Claim 2: if δs = 1, then p∗ = s∗.
This is a result emerging from the fact that for purely ex ante driven decision makers
the probabilistic giving problem (expression A.11) is equivalent to the standard deter-
ministic giving problem (expression A.10). Therefore their solutions are equivalent
as well.
Claim 3 : if δs < 1, then p∗ < s∗
Consider the following function:
h(p) = u ((1− p) b , p a)) (A.12)
which is concave in p necessarily. It is easy to see that the utility we are maximizing
can be expressed as:
δh(p) + (1− δ) ( p h(1) + (1− p)h(0) ) (A.13)
and the corresponding FOC is:
Up = δh′(p∗) + (1− δ) (h(1)− h(0) ) = 0 (A.14)
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Suppose that p∗ ≥ s∗. Notice that h(1)− h(0) < 0 – as I assumed B is preferred over
A – and h′(s∗) = 0. Then h′(p∗) ≤ 0 and so Up < 0 regardless p: a contradiction.




Notice that (i) Claim 3 implies h′(p∗) > 0, (ii) ∂Up
∂δ
> 0 at p = p∗, and (iii) ∂Up
∂p
> 0










This is an experiment in decision-making. Several research foundations have provided 
funds for this study. Your final earnings today will depend partly on your decisions, partly 
on the decisions of others and partly on chance. Precise rules will be explained below. 
Please pay careful attention to the instructions.  At the end of the experiment, you will be 
paid in cash. All payments will be made in private. Also, you will receive $7 as a 
participation fee, simply for showing up on time.  
During the experiment we will use Experimental Tokens instead of dollars. At the end of 
the experiment, your earnings in tokens will be translated into dollars. You will receive 1 
dollar for every 5 tokens you have earned in the session. 
It is important that you do not talk or in any way try to communicate with other people 
during the session. If you have a question, raise your hand and an experimenter will attend 
to your station to answer your question privately. The experiment should be finished in 
approximately one hour.  
Pairs 
At the beginning of the experiment, you will be randomly and anonymously matched with 
one other participant to form a pair. Within each pair there will be one person with the role 
of “Decider” and another person with the role of “Partner.” These roles will be assigned 
randomly, and will remain for the entire session. No participant will learn in any way the 
identity of his/her counterpart at any moment of the session.  
In each pair, only choices made by the Decider will determine final payoffs. Although the 
Partner will face the same kinds of tasks, his/her choices will not determine anyone’s 
payoffs.  
Tasks, Decision Rounds and Earnings 
This experiment will consist of a series of decision rounds of five different types of tasks. 
Each kind of task will be detailed below. At the end of all decisions, the computer will 
randomly select one choice made by the Decider and generate payoffs for both Decider 
and Partner based on that selected choice. The selected choice as well as the final payoffs 
it generates will be disclosed to both participants. 
 
Please, raise your hand if you have any questions. Do not ask any questions out loud. 
Remember not to discuss your role, choices or results with any other participant at any time 
during the experiment.  When you are done, please wait quietly until the rest of participants 





Task Type 1 
 
Decider Task: 
In this task, you are given two fixed, mutually exclusive outcomes. You are then asked to 
decide the probabilities of these two outcomes.  
Figure 1: Task 1 
[in text] 
In the left-side graph, your tokens are represented on the horizontal axis and Partner’s 
tokens on the vertical axis. Each of the two possible outcomes is represented by a cross or 
a bubble in this graph. You must decide what the probability of each outcome is, in 
percentage (%) terms. Figure 1 shows an example of this task where the two fixed outcomes 
are A = (You: 10, Partner: 90) and B = (You: 80, Partner:  10).  
On the right side of the screen you have a slider tool where you can chose the chance of 
Outcome A, from 0% to 100%.  Drag the green triangle onto your chosen percentage. If 
you choose 100, outcome A will occur for sure. If you choose 0, outcome B will occur for 
sure. In the graph, the size of each outcome bubble will increase with the chances it is given. 
You can try as many combinations as you want before you decide. The same information 
of the graph is displayed in the small table below the slider bar. Throughout this session, 
your tokens will be represented in blue and Partner’s tokens in orange. Once you make 
your choice, press the submit decision button and continue to the next round. Please think 
your decisions carefully. 
Partner Task: 
You will face the same kind of task as your counterpart, the Decider, except your choices 
will be hypothetical. They will not affect payoffs for any participant. Please think your 
decisions carefully. 
 
Interface for Tasks 2 and 3 
 
In each decision round, there will be two probable states: State A and State B. Think of 
these states as the weather: it could be either sunny or cloudy. However, when you make 
your decision, it is uncertain which state will occur.  
Your decision will be represented by a point on a graph like the one in Figure E. In this 
graph, the horizontal axis indicates Tokens paid if State A occurs, and the vertical axis 
indicates Tokens paid if State B occurs. The chance that each state will occur is displayed 
in parentheses on the corresponding axis label. In Figure E, for instance, the probability of 
State A is 50%, and the probability of State B is 50%, as well. However, beware that these 




The position of a point on this graph represents a lottery. For example, in Figure E, the 
point on location (40, 27) indicates that if State A is realized, the lottery pays 40 tokens; 
and if State B is realized, the lottery pays 27 tokens. Decider’s lottery will be depicted by 
a blue square and Partner’s lottery by an orange circle. 
 
Figure E: Decision Interface Tasks 2, 3 
[in text] 
Task Type 2 
 
Decider’s Task: 
For Task 2, both Decider and Partner share the same fortune: in each state, the amount of 
tokens both receive is the same. See for example, Figure 2. Here states A and B each occur 
with a 50% chance. Also, since both participants face the exact same fate, Decider’s blue 
square and Partner’s orange circle are always located on the same spot. In Figure 2, they 
both are on location (40, 27). This means, if State A happens, you and your Partner will 
both get 40 tokens and if State B occurs instead, you both get 27 tokens.  
At the beginning of each decision screen, the square and the circle will appear by the (0, 0) 
combination. To make a choice drag the square or the circle to your chosen location. The 
other shape will follow. Only combinations on the purple line are feasible choices. The 
computer will not let you choose a combination outside the purple line. The same 
information displayed in the graph is shown in the table next to it. Each row represents one 
possible state and the tokens paid if such state occurs. You can try as many combinations 
as you want before you decide. Once you make your choice, press the submit decision 
button and continue to the next round.  
Please beware that the probabilities of each State might vary across different decision 
rounds. Please think your decisions carefully. 
Figure 2: Task 2 
[in text] 
Partner’s Task: 
You will face the same kind of task as your counterpart, the Decider, except your choices 
will be hypothetical. They will not affect payoffs for any participant. Please think your 
decisions carefully. 






For Task 3, Decider and Partner have opposite fortunes. What Decider would get in State 
A equals what Partner would receive in State B. Similarly, what Decider would get in 
State B is what Partner would get in State A.  
See example in Figure 3 where states A and B both occur with 50% chance. Here, since 
both counterparts face reverse fate, Decider’s blue square and Partner’s orange circle are 
always in mirror positions on the graph. In Figure 4, for example, Decider’s square is at 
(A⟶20, B⟶54) and Partner’s circle at (A⟶54, B⟶20). This means, if State A happens, 
Decider receives 20 and Partner gets 54; and if State B happens Decider gets 54 and 
Partner gets 20. Also, beware that the probabilities of each State might vary across 
different decision rounds. 
At the beginning of each decision screen, the square and the circle will appear by the (0, 0) 
combination. To make a choice drag either the square or the circle to your chosen location. 
The other shape will locate accordingly. For the Decider, feasible combinations are along 
the light blue line and for Partner along the light orange line. The computer will not let 
you choose a combination outside these lines. The same information displayed in the graph 
is shown in the table next to it. Each row represents one possible state and the tokens paid 
if such state occurs. You can try as many combinations as you want before you decide. 
Once you make your choice, press the submit decision button and continue to the next 
round. Please think your decisions carefully. 
Figure 3: Task 3 
[in text] 
Partner’s Task: 
You will face the same kind of task as your counterpart, the Decider, except your choices 
will be hypothetical. They will not affect payoffs for any participant. Please think your 
decisions carefully. 
 
Task Type 4 
 
Decider Task: 
In this task, you will be given a set of possible token combinations for you and your Partner. 
You are asked to choose one combination and submit your decision. 







Figure 4 shows an example of this kind of task. You will see a graph on a white background 
representing token allocations. In all rounds of this task, your tokens will be indicated on 
the horizontal axis and your Partner’s tokens on the vertical axis. The same information is 
also displayed in the table on the right of the screen. Throughout this session, your tokens 
will be represented in blue and Partner’s tokens in orange.  
 
For example, the point (32, 38) depicted in Figure 4 by a red square indicates that you will 
receive 32 tokens and your counterpart will receive 38 tokens. This is also indicated in the 
label “You: 32, Partner: 38” and in the table (see projector screen). 
At the beginning of each task, the red square will appear by the (0, 0) combination. To 
make a choice, click, hold and drag the red square with the mouse to any position within 
the gray line.  Only combinations along this gray line are feasible, valid choices. The 
computer will not let you chose any point but those. You can try as many combinations as 
you want before you make your decision. Once you have the red square at the intended 




You will face the same kind of task as your counterpart, the Decider, except your choices 




Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Additional Results and Figures
Table B.1: Statistics by Pool
TAMU
FM OFU SLTM NM
Number of pairs 25 29 19 21
Labor Income Type 1 ($) 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3
Labor Income Type 2 ($) 10.3 10.3 10.3 10.3
Take ratio (percent) 38.8 62.7 62.2 58.3
Expected take ratio (percent) 58.6 50.9 47.8 50.5
WTP for msg. ($) 0.87 0.37
Final Earnings Type 1 ($) 17.3 19.8 19.7 19.4
Final Earnings Type 2 ($) 9.3 6.7 6.8 7.3
UMD
FM OFU SLTM NM
Number of pairs 32 42 25 43
Labor Income Type 1 ($) 10.4 10.3 10.4 10.4
Labor Income Type 2 ($) 10.4 10.4 10.4 10.4
Take ratio (percent) 57.1 65.0 67.6 77.4
Expected take ratio (percent) 48.5 61.7 63.5 59.4
WTP for msg. ($) 0.69 0.28
Final Earnings Type 1 ($) 19.3 20.1 20.4 21.4
Final Earnings Type 2 ($) 7.5 6.5 6.3 5.4
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Table B.2: Take Rate and Expected Take Rate Regressions












Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Standard errors in parentheses. FM is
the comparison group.
Table B.3: Probit Regressions of Positive WTP in OFU




Take Ratio (squared) 0.001∗∗∗
(0.000)
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Figure B.2: Take Rate, MEI and WTP
Notes: One outlayer observation regarding the mood emotions reports was
disregarded from this estimation.
B.2 Instructions
Welcome to the Economic Research Laboratory. This is an experiment in decision-
making. The National Science Foundation has provided funds for this research. Just
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for showing up you have already earned 5 dollars. During the course of the ex-
periment, you will be called upon to make a series of decisions. If you follow the
instructions carefully and make good decisions, you can earn real money, which will
be paid to you in cash at the end of the experiment. It is important that you remain
silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, or need
assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you.
If you talk, laugh, exclaim out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will
not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation. We will first jointly go
over the instructions. After we have read the instructions, you will have time to ask
clarifying questions. Each of you will then need to answer a few brief questions to
ensure everybody understands. Please do not touch the computer or its mouse until
you are instructed to do so. Thank you.
Participants An even number people are participating in today’s experiment.
There are two possible roles for each participant, the role T and the role P. Each of
you will be randomly assigned to have one of them. You will remain in the same
role throughout the entire duration of the experiment. That is, you will either be
T for the entire experiment or you will be P for the entire experiment. You will be
informed about your role on your computer screen once the experiment starts. There
will be an equal number of participants in role T and role P.
Today’s experiment consists of four parts. Each of those is explained below.
Part 1 and Part 4: Questionnaires
For the first and the last part of the experiment you will not make any decisions.
In these parts we ask you to answer a series of brief questions. Please, read each
screen carefully and follow the instructions to answer those questions.
Part 2: Earning Money
The second part of the experiment is where you will generate earnings. In this
part, each participant receives an endowment of $3.00 and then can earn additional
income by completing a sequence of search tasks. In each of the search tasks you
are asked to find the top of a mountain. The current location is given by a maroon
square, which you have to drag with the mouse onto new locations until you get to
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the top. You will be assisted by an altitude instrument, called the Points Indicator,
that will tell you the direction you should follow to the only peak of the mountain
(up/down-right/left) (see Figure 1). At each location you will know how many points
you will earn if you stopped searching. For each of the search tasks you can try as
many locations as you want within a time limit of 35 seconds. The point indica-
tor and a message saying “Well Done!” will tell you when you have reached the top
of the mountain. You are given two untimed practice tasks before the real tasks start.
Figure B1: Search Task
All search tasks you will be given are exactly of the same type. Though, each of
them has potentially different earnings possibilities. Do your best in each task, you
will receive $1.00 for every 100 points you accumulate throughout this part of the
experiment. Your endowment ($3.00) plus the income you make in these search tasks
will be the balance in your account at the beginning of Part 3.
Part 3: Interacting
For this part of the experiment each of you will be randomly paired with another
participant through the computer. Each pair will consist of one participant of role
T and one participant of role P. Roles will be assigned randomly. You will never be
informed about the identity of the person you are paired with, neither during nor
after the experiment. Similarly, the participant you are matched with will never be
informed about your identity. At the beginning of this part you will be informed
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about your role (either T or P) and about the previous earnings of your counterpart.
Decisions made in this part of the experiment will determine the final amount of
money you will take home.
T’s Task T is given the authority to transfer money from P’s account to T’s
own account. The maximum amount of money T can collect is what P has earned as
income in the search tasks of Part 2. The endowment of $3.00 cannot be transferred.
In the corresponding screen, T will be asked what percentage of P’s task income T
wants to transfer into his/her own account. T will use a percentage slider, as shown
in Figure 2, to make his/her decision. The screen will show the percentage selected
as well as the corresponding dollar amount. Additionally, T’s final earnings given the
selection will be displayed. After T has made this choice, no other decision made by
him/her or P will affect T’s final earnings.
P’s Task After being informed about T’s decision, each P will be given the op-
portunity to write a message for T to read it. The content of the message depends
entirely on what P wants to express. Sending a message, however, is costly. Each P,
before knowing the actual price of sending a message, will be asked about the highest
amount (in $) he/she is willing to pay for doing so. After P submits this amount,
the actual price will be randomly determined by the computer and revealed on a new
screen.
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Figure B2: T’s Decision Screen
If P’s willingness to pay is greater than or equal to the actual price, then P will
be able to send a message and will pay the actual price generated by the computer.
If P’s willingness to pay is lower than the actual price, then P will not be able to send
any message and will not be charged. Before being asked to state a willingness to pay,
each P will be informed about his/her available earnings (see Figure 3). Available
earnings are defined as the balance P obtained in Part 2 MINUS what T transferred
to T’s own account ($3.00+ Task Income - Transfer to T). These earnings represent
all of the money that P can spend at that point, i.e. the stated willingness to pay
cannot exceed that amount. The computer draws the actual price randomly from a
uniform distribution ranging from $0 (zero dollars) to $3 (three dollars). This means
that all prices in that range are equally likely to be drawn as the actual price. A new
price is drawn for each P, with each draw being independent from the price drawn for
any other P. Notice that even though the price is randomly generated, it will never
exceed the amount of the endowment ($3.00), which is the minimum possible amount
that P can have available after T takes a proportion of P’s task income.
125
Figure B3: P’s Information Screen and Willingness to Pay
Figure B4: P’s Message Box
A screen with a message box like the one shown in Figure 4 will appear for P par-
ticipants who are able to send a message. Those who get this screen must remember
to press the ENTER key to record the written message. You will be able to verify if
the message is in fact recorded by pressing the verify button. Once you have verified
the message was recorded, you can press the SEND button. The message will not be
recorded unless P presses the ENTER key and sees the message on the upper part of
the message box. P will be informed once T has read the message.
Determination of Earnings
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Earnings of T depend only on the decisions he/she makes. While earnings of P
depend on both, T’s as well as P’s own decisions. The following three rules summarize
the earnings.
1. T’s final earnings are calculated as follows: Endowment + Task Income +
Money Transferred from P’s Account
P’s earnings depend on whether or not P actually sent a message. A different rule
applies for each of these cases:
2. Earnings of those participants P who were able to send a message are calculated
as follows: Endowment + Task Income - Money Transferred to T’s Account - Actual
Price of Messaging
3. Earnings of those participants P who were NOT able to send a message are
calculated as follows: Endowment + Task Income - Money Transferred to T’s Account
At the end of the experiment, your total earnings in dollars (plus the $5 show up fee)
will be privately paid to you in cash.
B.3 Mood - Emotions Variables Questionnaire
• Right now how would you describe yourself? 9-valued scale: Extremely Un-
happy to Extremely Happy.
• Please, give the number that best describes the emotions you are experiencing at
this moment: 7-valued scale: form “Emotion is not present at all” to “Emotion
feels very intense”
– Irritation, Anger, Contempt, Surprise, Envy, Jealousy, Sadness, Happiness,
Fear, Joy, Shame.
• Below you are given pairs of opposite feelings. Use the following scale to indicate
your current mood relative to these feelings (1: you are experiencing the feeling
on the left side very strongly. 5: neutral. 9: you are experiencing the feeling on
the right side very strongly.)
– Bad mood/Good mood; Sad/Happy; Depressed/Elated; Gloomy/Cheerful;
Displeased/Pleased; Sorrowful/Joyful
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– Nervous/Calm; Tense/Relaxed; Uncomfortable/Comfortable; Apathetic/Carinf;
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Proofs to Propositions  
Proof of Proposition 1. 
For contradiction, assume that there exists an equilibrium with bid profile 
{𝑏𝑖(𝑠𝑖), 𝑏𝑔𝑖(𝑠𝑔)}𝑖≤𝑁
 such that the auction stage allocates the objects efficiently. Consider a 
realization of signals such that 𝑠𝑖 = 0 for all 𝑖 ≥ 2 and 𝑠𝑔 = > 0. Notice that by strict 
superadditivity, 𝑣𝑛( ) − 𝑣𝑛−1( ) > 𝑣1( ) =  for 𝑛 > 1.   
Pick 𝑠1
∗ ∈  (𝜖,𝑚𝑖𝑛
𝑛≥2
{𝑣𝑛(𝜖) − 𝑣𝑛−1(𝜖)}). Since 𝑣𝑁(𝜖) − 𝑣𝑁−1(𝜖) > 𝑠1
∗, efficiency implies 
that the global should receive all objects under this signals realization. Since we assumed 
efficiency of this equilibrium, we should have  𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 = 𝜖) > 𝑏1(𝑠1 = 𝑠1
∗). Note that we 
have not imposed any constraint on > 0, yet. 
Now consider another set of realizations where local 1 and the global have the same signals 
as before (𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑠1 = 𝑠1
∗, 𝑠𝑔 = ) but all the other locals receive signal ?̅? which is the highest 
possible signal (𝑖. 𝑒. 𝑠𝑖 = ?̅? for all 𝑖 ≥ 2).  
By the continuity of 𝑣𝑛 and the strict superadditivity, there exists ?̃? > 0 such that for any 
𝑛 ≥ 2, 𝑣𝑛(?̃?) < (𝑛 − 1)?̅?. So pick ∈  (0, ?̃?). It is easy to see that for all 𝑘 such that 0 ≤
𝑘 ≤ 𝑁 − 2,  it is true that 𝑣𝑁−𝑘( ) < (𝑁 − 𝑘 − 1)?̅? < (𝑁 − 𝑘 − 1)?̅? + 𝑠1
∗. Then,  
𝑘?̅? + 𝑣𝑁−𝑘( ) < (𝑁 − 1)?̅? + 𝑠1
∗. 
This inequality means that for this realization it is efficient to allocate the objects to the 




should lose the auction in market 1 for this realization of signals, i.e. 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 = ) <
𝑏1(𝑠1 = 𝑠1
∗). This is a contradiction.  □ 
Proof of Proposition 2. 
For contradiction, let us assume there exists an equilibrium {𝑏𝑖(𝑠𝑖), 𝑏𝑔𝑖(𝑠𝑔)}𝑖≤𝑁
 where the 
allocation after resale stage is efficient for any realization of signals. It can be easily shown 
that all 𝑏.(. ) is weakly increasing since in the efficient equilibrium, the auction stage utility 
of a losing bidder cannot increase after resale. Assume that all 𝑏.(. ) is right continuous. 
By Proposition 1, the allocation at the auction stage is sometimes inefficient. Therefore, 
there exists a realization (𝑠1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑔) where at least in one market either the global or 
local loses inefficiently.  
Without loss of generality, let us assume that the global loses market 1 inefficiently, i.e.  
𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔) < 𝑏1(𝑠1), or 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔) = 𝑏1(𝑠1) and the global loses as a result of tie-breaking rule. 
We know that in a neighborhood of 𝑠𝑔, 𝑏𝑔1(. ) is strictly increasing. Otherwise, the global’s 
signal would not be perfectly revealed and efficiency of the resale stage could not be 
guaranteed.1 Hence, when 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔) = 𝑏1(𝑠1) and the global loses as a result of tie-breaking 
rule, consider  𝑠𝑔
− close enough to 𝑠𝑔 from the left hand side such that the global loses 
market 1 inefficiently and 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔
− ) < 𝑏1(𝑠1). 
We require the following Lemma before we can proceed with the proof of Proposition 2. 
                                                     
1 If Local 1 is winning inefficiently against a global who is playing on the flat part of her bid, then 
Local 1 must offer a price low enough so that in a neighborhood of 𝑠𝑔, all global types should 




Lemma 1: There exist (𝑏, ?̅?) ⊂ 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝜖, 𝑠𝑔 + 𝜖) such that 𝑏1(. ) is strictly increasing on 
𝑏1
−1(𝑏, ?̅?). 
Proof: Assume not. Then there are two cases: (i) local 1 never bids on 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝜖, 𝑠𝑔 + 𝜖)  
or (ii) Local 1’s bid on 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝜖, 𝑠𝑔 + 𝜖) is a step function. 
In case (i), for any 𝑠 ∈ (𝑠𝑔 − 𝜖, 𝑠𝑔 + 𝜖) bidding 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝜖) is strictly preferred to 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠). 
To see this, notice that 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝜖) and 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠) lead to the same winning/losing position in 
the auction. However, by bidding 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝜖)  the global will buy the object in resale at a 
lower price when she loses inefficiently. Such a resale trade is a positive probability event 
in a neighborhood of (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑠𝑔). This contradicts with 𝑏𝑔1(. ) being part of an 
equilibrium. 
For case (ii), consider 𝑡 ≡ 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑏1(. ): 𝑏1(. ) ∈ 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝜖, 𝑠𝑔 + 𝜖)} < 𝑏1(𝑠1). So for any 
global with 𝑠 such that 𝑏𝑔1
−1(𝑡) ≤ 𝑠 ≤ 𝑠𝑔 + 𝜖, bidding 𝑡 rather than 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠) does not affect 
her winning/losing position but in the event that she loses inefficiently, she gains in the 
resale market by making local 1 think that the global has lower signal than s. Such a resale 
trade is a positive probability event in a neighborhood of (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑠𝑔). This contradicts 
with 𝑏𝑔1(. ) being part of an equilibrium. 
Finally, take 𝛿 small enough that 𝑏𝑔 is strictly increasing on (𝑠𝑔 − 𝛿, 𝑠𝑔 + 𝛿) and 𝑏1 is 
strictly increasing on 𝑏1
−1(𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝛿), 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 + 𝛿)). That is, define 𝑏 ≡ 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 − 𝛿) and 
?̅? ≡ 𝑏𝑔1(𝑠𝑔 + 𝛿). □ 
Now, we can continue with the proof of Proposition 2. Next, we show that there exists a 




complicating the notation too much, we will show it for 𝑁 = 2, but the same result can be 
shown with any 𝑁.  
To simplify the notation, we denote the four possible auction outcomes as 𝐴𝐿𝐿 , 𝐴𝐿𝐺 , 𝐴𝐺𝐿 
and 𝐴𝐺𝐺  when the equilibrium strategies are followed. 𝐴𝑥𝑦 represents the set of signals 
where by following the equilibrium strategies bidder x wins market 1 auction and bidder y 
wins market 2 auction. Analogously, the whole signal space can be partitioned in four 
regions based on the nature of efficient allocation: 𝐸𝐿𝐿 , 𝐸𝐿𝐺 , 𝐸𝐺𝐿 and 𝐸𝐺𝐺 . 
Consider the global’s problem when she has signal 𝑠 ∈ (𝑠𝑔 − 𝛿, 𝑠𝑔 + 𝛿) and she considers 
bidding 𝑏𝑔.(𝑧) where ∈ (𝑠𝑔 − 𝛿, 𝑠𝑔 + 𝛿) . This problem can be written as:  
𝑀𝑎𝑥𝑧∈(𝑠𝑔−𝛿,𝑠𝑔+𝛿) ∬  𝑙(𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠, 𝑧)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐿𝐿(𝑧)⏟                
𝐿(𝑠,𝑧)
+ ∬  ℎ𝐿𝐺(𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠, 𝑧)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐿𝐺(𝑧)⏟                  
𝐻𝐿𝐺(𝑠,𝑧)
+ ∬  ℎ𝐺𝐿(𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠, 𝑧)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐺𝐿(𝑧)⏟                  
𝐻𝐺𝐿(𝑠,𝑧)
+ ∬  𝑤(𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑠)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐺𝐺(𝑧)⏟                
𝑊(𝑠)
 
Where, 𝐴𝐿𝐿(𝑧) ≡ {(𝑠1, 𝑠2): (𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑧) ∈ 𝐴𝐿𝐿}; 𝐴𝐿𝐺(𝑧) ≡ {(𝑠1, 𝑠2): (𝑠1, 𝑠2, 𝑧) ∈ 𝐴𝐿𝐺}; and 
so on. Also, 𝑙(. ), ℎ𝐿𝐺(. ), ℎ𝐺𝐿(. ) and 𝑤(. ) represents the global’s contingent payoffs in 
equilibrium conditional on auction outcomes 𝐴𝐿𝐿 , 𝐴𝐿𝐺 , 𝐴𝐺𝐿 and 𝐴𝐺𝐺 , respectively. Note 
that 𝑤(. ) does not depend on 𝑧 because, conditional on global winning both objects, locals’ 
beliefs about the global’s signal will not play any role in the resale stage. 𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙) denotes 
𝑓(𝑠1)𝑓(𝑠2)𝑑𝑠1𝑑𝑠2. 





𝐿−(𝑠, 𝑧) = ∬  0𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐿𝐿(𝑧)∩𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝑧)
+ ∬  (𝑠 − 𝑧)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐿𝐿(𝑧)∩(𝐸𝐿𝐺(𝑧)∪𝐸𝐺𝐿(𝑧))




In the equation above, the first term is zero because in that region where the locals win the 
auctions and it is efficient, there is no trade. The second term has (𝑠 − 𝑧) inside of the 
integral because in that region, where locals win the auctions but the global should receive 
exactly one object in efficient allocation, there is trade in one market and theglobal can 
keep the difference between the actual surplus and what the local seller believes it is. The 
third term has 𝑣2(𝑠) − 𝑣2(𝑧) inside of the integral because in this region the global buys 
both objects in the resale stage and lying gives him the difference between the total surplus 












= ∬  (−1)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐿𝐿(𝑧)∩(𝐸𝐿𝐺(𝑧)∪𝐸𝐺𝐿(𝑧))




















All square brackets converge to zero as 𝑧 goes to 𝑠 by the almost everywhere smoothness 













On the other hand, it is easy to see that 𝐿+(𝑠, 𝑧) = 0 because making the locals think that 
the global’s signal is higher than it actually is leads to rejection of locals’ offers in the 
resale stage. This is because the locals will make unacceptable offers to the global when 
they believe that the global has higher signal than it actually has. Therefore, the global 
keeps the interim payoff from the auction stage, which is zero in this case. Therefore, if the 













𝐻𝐿𝐺−(𝑠, 𝑧) = ∬ max{𝑠, 𝑠2} − 𝑏2(𝑠2)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐿𝐺(𝑧)∩(𝐸𝐿𝐿(𝑧)∪𝐸𝐿𝐺(𝑧))
+ ∬  𝑠 − 𝑧 + max{𝑧, 𝑠2} − 𝑏2(𝑠2)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐿𝐺(𝑧)∩𝐸𝐺𝐿(𝑧)
 
+ ∬  𝑣2(𝑠) − 𝑣2(𝑧) + 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝑧, 𝑠2} − 𝑏2(𝑠2)𝑑𝐹(𝐬𝑙)
𝐴𝐿𝐺(𝑧)∩𝐸𝐺𝐺(𝑧)
 








































































The last inequality above holds because the derivative of value function is strictly 




(𝑠) = 1 ≥ 𝜒{𝑠 > 𝑠2}. 
  






































 necessarily. Therefore, 
bidding 𝑏𝑔.(𝑠) cannot be a locally optimal behavior since we assumed that in a 





Similarly, in this equilibrium, if local 1 loses inefficiently when signals are (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑠𝑔), 
one can show that there exists (𝑎, ?̅?) ⊂ 𝑏1(𝑠1 − 𝜖, 𝑠1 + 𝜖) such that 𝑏𝑔1(. ) is strictly 
increasing on 𝑏1
−1(𝑎, ?̅?)  (a similar statement to Lemma 1). In a neighborhood of  𝑠1 ,  we 
can show that the derivative of the expected payoff of local 1 when we approach to 𝑠1 from 
right is greater than that from left.  
We found that strictly increasing bidding in a neighborhood of signals where inefficient 
losing is possible is non-optimal, but the efficiency of the resale stage cannot be 
guaranteed. □ 
Proof of Proposition 3. 
Consider the following strategies: In the auction, locals bid their signals in their markets. 
The global bids 𝑣𝑛(𝑠) for each package with n objects. After the auction, the winning locals 
may offer some price only if there exists signal 𝑠𝑔 such that 𝑏𝑔𝐼(𝑠𝑔) = 𝑣
𝑛(𝑠𝑔) for any 𝐼 ⊆
{1,… ,𝑁} and |𝐼| = 𝑛.  
In the resale market, when the set of winning locals is 𝐴 ⊆ {1,… ,𝑁}, the resale strategy of 
winning local j, when she makes the first offer, is 𝑝 = 𝑣𝑁−|𝐴|+1(𝑠𝑔) − 𝑣
𝑁−|𝐴|(𝑠𝑔) only if 
𝑝 ≥ 𝑠𝑗. If she is not the first local who makes an offer then she asks for 𝑣
𝑁(?̅?). 
In the resale market, when the set of winning locals is 𝐴 ⊆ {1,… ,𝑁} and a set of offers 
{𝑞𝑗}𝑗∈𝐾 , where 𝐾 ⊆ 𝐴, are made to the global, the global will offer 
{𝑝𝑖}𝑖∈𝐵 for 𝐵 ⊆










If such B does not exist, global will not sell in the resale market. The condition above 
checks whether there exists any set of losing locals, B, such that the global is better off 
when she sells to those locals and buys from a subset, C, of winning locals rather than not 
selling to those locals in set B. 
Define (𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑠𝑔) ≔ 𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐴⊆{1,…,𝑁}𝑣
𝑁−|𝐴|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐴  . Hence, 𝐸(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑠𝑔) 
is the set of locals who receive objects in the efficient allocation.  
 
Suppose locals play using the strategy above. We show next that it is the best response for 
the global with signal 𝑠𝑔 to bid 𝑣
𝑛(𝑠𝑔) for packages with n objects. The global’s payoff 
from this strategy is 𝑣𝑁−|𝐸|(𝑠𝑔) − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∉𝐸 . 
 
Assume that the global deviates and bids in a way that is not in line with any signal 
according to the locals’ equilibrium belief (i.e. ∄𝑠 such that 𝑏𝑔𝐼 = 𝑣
𝑛(𝑠) for any 𝐼 ⊆
{1,… ,𝑁} and |I|=n.) In this case, the winning locals will not sell to the global but the global 
may sell some objects at a price that is equal to the sum of the values of the buying locals. 




















The left hand side above is the global’s payoff when she deviates; the right hand side is the 




Now assume that the global deviates and bids as if her signal is 𝑧 ≠ 𝑠𝑔. Note that if 
𝐸(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑧) = 𝐸(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑠𝑔), then no trade occurs and, similar to the above argument, 
the global cannot be better off in the auction stage either. If, instead,  ?̃? ≡ 𝐸(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑧) ≠
𝐸(𝑠1, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑠𝑔) =: 𝐸, then no winning local makes an offer to the global since from a 
winning local i’s perspective, the outcome is efficient and therefore the highest price the 
global can pay is 𝑣|{𝑁\?̃?}|+1(𝑧) − 𝑣|{𝑁\?̃?}|(𝑧) ≤ 𝑠𝑖. To see this, note that 
𝑣𝑁−|?̃?|(𝑧) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈?̃? ≥ 𝑣
𝑁−|𝐾|(𝑧) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐾  for all 𝐾 ⊆ {1,… ,𝑁}.  
 In particular, for 𝐾 = ?̃?\{𝑖}, 𝑣𝑁−|?̃?|(𝑧) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈?̃? ≥ 𝑣
𝑁−|?̃?|+1(𝑧) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈?̃?\{𝑖}   
Therefore, 𝑣𝑁−|?̃?|+1(𝑧) − 𝑣𝑁−|?̃?|(𝑧) ≤ 𝑠𝑖  . Hence, local i will not sell. This implies that the 
only benefit for the global can come from selling some objects. 
Consider any 𝐴 ⊂ 𝑁\?̃? (a subset of losing locals in the after deviation outcome of the 
auction.) The global can sell to locals in A at most at ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐴 . If some resale trade takes 
place 
  Global’s payoff after resale ≤ ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐴 + 𝑣
𝑁−|𝐴∪?̃?|(𝑠𝑔) − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝑁\?̃?  
=∑𝑠𝑖
𝑖∈𝐴












              ≤ 𝑣𝑁−|𝐸|(𝑠𝑔)  + (∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐸 − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝑁 ) 
                                               ≤ 𝑣𝑁−|𝐸|(𝑠𝑔) − ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝑁\𝐸  
          =Global’s payoff from the equilibrium strategy 




Next, consider a local, say local 1. Assume that all the bidders except local 1 follow the 
equilibrium strategies. Let us define 𝐸−1 ≔ arg max
A⊆N\{1}
𝑣𝑁−|𝐴| (𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐴 . 
Case 1:  If 1 ∈ 𝐸 (i.e. if local 1should receive an object in the efficient allocation.) 
If local 1 bids 𝑠1, then she wins and her payoff is: 
𝑠1 − [(𝑣
𝑁−|𝐸−1|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑖∈𝐸−1
) − (𝑣𝑁−|𝐸|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑖∈𝐸\{1}
)] 
If, instead, local 1 bids 𝑏1 > 𝑠1 she wins and does not trade later since 1 ∈ 𝐸. Her payoff 
is: 𝑠1 − [(𝑣
𝑁−|𝐸−1|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐸−1 ) − (𝑣
𝑁−|?̃?|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈?̃?\{1} )] 
Where ?̃? denotes the current allocation when local 1 bids 𝑏1. However, efficiency implies 
that bidding truthfully will give a weakly better payoff to local 1 than bidding 𝑏1. 
Now consider a deviation of local 1 where she bids below her signal, i.e. 𝑏1 < 𝑠1. Let ?̃? ≔
𝐸(𝑏1, 𝑠2, … , 𝑠𝑁 , 𝑠𝑔)  
Case 1.1: If 1 ∈ ?̃? then 1 will not trade later, and her auction payment when she bids 𝑏1 is 
not less than what it would be if she bid 𝑠1. Therefore, it cannot be a profitable deviation. 
Case 1.2: If 1 ∉ ?̃?, we need to check whether local 1 can buy from the global and be better 
off. As analyzed in the global’s strategy above, the winning locals will not make any offer 
since they believe that the equilibrium is played and the allocation is efficient. Local 1 may 
buy from the global in resale since the current allocation is not efficient. For any subset of 
losing locals that contain local 1, i.e. ∀𝐵 ⊆ {1,… ,𝑁}\?̃?  such that 1 ∈ 𝐵, the global thinks 




𝑣𝑁−|?̃? |(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈?̃? ≥ 𝑣
𝑁−|𝐵∪?̃? |(𝑠𝑔) + 𝑏1 + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐵∪?̃?\{1}   by the definition of ?̃?. Then 
𝑣𝑁−|?̃? |(𝑠𝑔) − 𝑣
𝑁−|𝐵∪?̃? |(𝑠𝑔) ≥ 𝑏1 + ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑖∈𝐵\{1} 
 
Hence, the global will not sell to any subset of losing locals that include local 1 at the  resale 
stage. Therefore, the local 1’s payoff from the deviation is zero, which is not profitable.  
Case 2: If  1 ∉ 𝐸. Then local 1 loses market 1 when she bids 𝑠1 and her payoff is zero.  
If she bids 𝑏1 < 𝑠1, she loses and the global thinks that local will pay at most 𝑏1. Note that 
by definition of E 
𝑣𝑁−|𝐸|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐸 ≥ 𝑣
𝑁−|𝐸|−1(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖𝑖∈𝐸 + 𝑠1.  
Then 𝑣𝑁−|𝐸|(𝑠𝑔) − 𝑣
𝑁−|𝐸|−1(𝑠𝑔) ≥ 𝑠1 > 𝑏1 and the global will not sell at any price that 
she thinks that local 1 is willing to pay.   
If local 1 bids 𝑏1 > 𝑠1 and she loses, the global will offer at least 𝑏1, which will not be 
accepted by local 1 and then local 1’s payoff will be zero.  
If she bids 𝑏1 > 𝑠1 and she wins then she can sell it at 𝑣
𝑁−|?̃?|+1(𝑠𝑔) − 𝑣
𝑁−|?̃?|(𝑠𝑔). In this 
event, her payoff is 
𝑣𝑁−|?̃?|+1(𝑠𝑔) − 𝑣
𝑁−|?̃?|(𝑠𝑔) − [(𝑣
𝑁−|𝐸−1|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑖∈𝐸−1
) − (𝑣𝑁−|?̃?|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑖∈?̃?\{1}
)] 
= 𝑣𝑁−|?̃?|+1(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑖∈?̃?\{1}
− (𝑣𝑁−|𝐸
−1|(𝑠𝑔) + ∑ 𝑠𝑖
𝑖∈𝐸−1
) 




and zero was her payoff if she bid 𝑠1. Recall that zero was local 1’s payoff when she bid 
𝑠1, truthfully. The last inequality above holds because 𝐸
−1 achieves the highest total bid 
among all the allocations where the global receives the object in market 1. 
Cases 1 and 2 together show that for local 1 there is no profitable deviation from truthful 
signal bidding, while other bidders follow the equilibrium strategies. □  
 
Proof of Proposition 4. 
Each local is participating in a second-price auction for a single privately valued object. 
Therefore, truthful signal bidding is their weakly dominant strategy.  
Define 𝛱(𝑏𝑔1 , 𝑏𝑔2; 𝑠) as the global’s expected payoff of bidding 𝑏𝑔1 and  𝑏𝑔2 in markets 1 
and 2, respectively when her signal is 𝑠. Then 





(3𝑠 − 𝐸[𝑝|𝑏𝑔1] − 𝐸[𝑝|𝑏𝑔2]) 












) (𝑠 − 𝐸[𝑝|𝑏𝑔2]) 













 where 𝐸[𝑝|𝑏𝑔𝑖] is the expected auction price when the global wins in market i by bidding 
𝑏𝑔𝑖, and Δ




First, we show that the global’s optimal bidding function is object-symmetric (i.e. 
𝑏𝑔1 = 𝑏𝑔2). For contradiction, suppose not, and assume without loss of generality that  










































































⇔  𝛱(𝑏𝑔1 , 𝑏𝑔1; 𝑠) > 𝛱(𝑏𝑔1 , 𝑏𝑔2; 𝑠) 
This contradicts with (𝑏𝑔1 , 𝑏𝑔2) being optimal. Therefore, in equilibrium 𝑏𝑔1 = 𝑏𝑔2. 















It is easy to see that, when complementarities exist, the global’s optimization problem has 
an interior solution for low signals and a corner solution at 𝑏 = 100 for high signals. The 
interior solution is a solution to the first order condition  
𝜕𝛱(𝑏;𝑠)
𝜕𝑏




+ 𝑠 − 𝑏 = 0. Hence,  𝑏 =
100𝑠
100−𝑠
 for s<50. When 𝑠 ≥ 50, the global is indifferent 
between 100 or anything more than 100. When the bidding space is restricted to the signal 






Experimental Instructions  
 
INSTRUCTIONS FOR VICKREY AUCTION 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research foundations have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
All amounts in the experiment are expressed in Experimental Currency Units  (ECU). The money 
you make in ECUs will be converted to US Dollars at a rate of 50 ECU= $1, and paid to you in 
addition to your $10 participation fee.  
 This experiment will have 30 periods. 
  You will be randomly assigned one of the two following roles: Local bidder and Global 
bidder.  
 Your role will be the same in all 30 periods.  
 In every period two Locals and a Global will be randomly matched into a group of 3 people.  
 Matching will change every period: you are not playing against the same people every time. 
 Each period consists of an Auction where you will bid. 
 The exact rule of earning calculation will be explained shortly. 
AUCTION  
 In each group of 3, bidders will bid for items of two markets (Market A and B). 
 In each of these markets, there is one item for sale and two bidders (one Local and the 
Global). 
 In each market, there is one Local bidder who is able to bid only for the item in that market.  
 The Global bidder is interested in both markets, so the Global is able to bid for the items 
in both markets. 
Values: 
 In each period, prior to bidding, Global and Local bidders are assigned values for the items.  
 There are three values: one for Global bidder (Global value) and one for each Local bidder 
(Local values). 
 Values are privately known. That is, Global bidder does not know the values of the Local 
bidders. Similarly, a Local bidder does not know the value of the Global bidder or the other 
Local bidder. 
 For each Local bidder, her Local value represents the amount she will receive if she wins 
an item in the auction. 
 The Global value represents instead the amount that the Global will receive if she wins 




 If the Global wins both items, she receives 3 TIMES the Global value. (for example: 
when the Global value is 40, the global receives 40 if she ends up with a single item and 
receives 3x40=120 if she ends up with both items). 
 All values are random integer numbers between 0 and 100. Each number is equally likely.  
 All values are drawn independently (meaning they are most likely different). 
Bidding: 
 The item in Market A and the item in Market B are auctioned simultaneously. 
 Each Local bidder will submit a bid only for the item in her market. 
 The Global bidder will submit bids for each item and a bid for the package containing both 
items. Therefore, Global submits three bids (a bid for item A, a bid for item B and a bid 
for the package) 
 Bids can be any integer number from {0, 1, 2, 3,…,300}. So the smallest possible bid is 
zero and the largest one is 300 in an auction. 
Example: 
In this example, you see the values of everybody to understand the environment. 
However, in the real experiment, values are private information and you only observe your own 
value. 
 
Note first that each Local has a single column that indicates variables that are specific to her or 
decisions she makes. Global instead has three columns representing her value from getting only the 
item in market A, the package including both items, and only the item in market B. After observing 
the values, bidders enter their bids. 
 Market A  Market B 
 Local Global Global 
Package 
Global Local 
Value 45 32 96 32 64 




 The computer allocates the items to the bidders who submitted the highest combined bids 
for the two items.  
 In particular, the computer has four cases to look at:  
1) Locals win in both markets, 




3) Global wins in Market A, Local wins in Market B,  
4) Global wins both markets. 
 The computer will compute the total bids in each case. Then it will allocate the items as 
in the case with the highest total bids. 
Example: 
Allocation of the Items 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Market A Local A Local A Global Global 
Market B Local B Global Local B Global 
Total bids for two items 42+39=81 42+30=72 25+39=64 76 (package bid) 
 
In this example, Case 1 has the highest total bids for the two items; therefore, Local bidders will 
get the items. 
Prices:       
 If you did not get an item, you do not pay anyting. 
 Only the winning bidders pay some amount for the item(s) they get in the auction. 
 A winning bidder, however, will not pay her bid. Instead, she will pay the difference 
between how much the highest total bid would be if she was not present and how much the 
other winning bidder bid in the current highest total bid. 
That means, if you win, the price you pay is 
(the highest total bid if you were NOT present) – (the other winner’s bid in the current highest total bid) 
 Notice that when the Global bidder wins both items, there is no other bidder in the wining 




In the example above Locals won the items and this allocation has a total bid of 81. 
 Price paid by Local A: Note that if Local A did not participate, the allocation would be as 
in Case 4, and Global would get both items. This is because when we sorted the total 
submitted bids in cases where Local A is not present (cases 3 and 4), the highest total bid 
would be 76  (see the table below). In the highest total bids in the presence of Local A, the 




 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Market A Local A Local A Global Global 
Market B Local B Global Local B Global 
Total bids for two items 42+39=81 42+30=72 25+39=64 76 (package bid) 
 
 Price paid by Local B: Note that if Local B did not participate, the allocation would be as 
in Case 4, and the Global would get both items. This is because when we sort the total 
submitted bids in cases where Local B is not present (Cases 2 and 4), the highest total bid 
would be 76 (see the table below). In the highest total bids in the presence of Local B, the 
other bidder’s bid is 42. Hence, Local B will pay 76 – 42 = 34. 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Market A Local A Local A Global Global 
Market B Local B Global Local B Global 
Total bids for two items 42+39=81 42+30=72 25+39=64 76 (package bid) 
Earnings: 
 Your earnings in a period will depend on two things: (1) the values of the items you get in 
the auction (if any), and (2) the price that you paid. 
 If a bidder does not win any item in the auction then her payoff will be zero. 
 
 If a Local bidder wins an item, her payoff is:  Local Value – Price  
 
 If Global wins a single item, her payoff is:      Global Value – Price 
 
 If Global wins both items, her payoff is:        (3 x Global Value) – Price 
 
 
The computer will randomly pick 20 periods out of 30 periods. The selection of each period is 
equally likely. Your final earnings will be the sum of your earnings in those 20 periods and $10 






Consider the values, bids, the winning allocation and the prices in the previous example, the 
earnings of bidders become: 
Local A:  45 - 37 = 8 
Global:     0 






Answer the following questions: 
 Market A  Market B 





54 46 138 46 60 
Bids 
 
54 34 110 10 90 
Got Item  
 
     
Auction Price 
 
     
 
 
 Case 1 Case 2 Case 3 Case 4 
Market A Local A Local A Global Global 
Market B Local B Global Local B Global 
Total bids for two 
items 
    
 
1) Compute the Total Bid for each of the four possible allocations of the two items in the 
second table above. 
2) Complete the table identifying the auction winners and how much each bidder pays in the 
first table above. 
3) Find the earning of each bidder? 
 





INSTRUCTIONS FOR SIMULTANEOUS SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS WITH 
RESALE 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research foundations have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
All amounts in the experiment are expressed in Experimental Currency Units  (ECU). The money 
you make in ECUs will be converted to US Dollars at a rate of 50 ECU= $1, and paid to you in 
addition to your $10 participation fee.  
 
 This experiment will be 30 periods. 
  You will be randomly assigned one of the two following roles: Local bidder and Global 
bidder.  
 Your role will be the same in all 30 periods.  
 In every period two Locals and a Global will be randomly matched into a group of 3 people.  
 Matching will change every period: you are not playing against the same people every time. 
 Each period consists of two stages: an Auction Stage where you will bid, followed by a 
Resale Stage where you may trade the items allocated in the Auction stage. 
 The exact rule of earning calculation will be explained shortly. 
1. AUCTION STAGE 
Bidding: 
 In each group of 3, bidders will bid for items in auctions in two markets (Market A and B). 
 In each of these markets, there is one item for sale and two bidders (one Local and the 
Global). 
 In each market, there is one Local bidder who participates in the auction only in that market.  
 The Global bidder is interested in both markets, so the Global is present in both markets. 
 Therefore, the Global and Local A bid in Market A auction and the Global and Local B bid 
in Market B auction. 
 How much a person values an item will be explained later. 
 Each Local bidder will submit a bid for the item in her market. 
 The Global bidder will submit bids for the items in both markets. 
 Bids can be any integer number from {0, 1, 2, 3,…,300}. So the smallest possible bid is 
zero and the largest one is 300 in an auction. 




o If the Global’s bid is greater than the Local’s bid in a given market, the item of that 
market goes to the Global bidder. 
o If instead the Local’s bid is greater than the Global’s bid, the item goes to the Local 
bidder in that market. 
Auction Prices: 
 If a Local bidder gets the item in a market, she pays the Global’s bid in that market. 
 Similarly, if the Global bidder gets the item in a market, she pays the Local’s bid in that 
market. 
2. RESALE STAGE 
 Once the Auction Stage is over, a Resale Market for each item will open: Resale Market 
A, and Resale Market B.  
 The same three people who participated in the auction stage continue in the resale stage. 
 In each resale market, the bidder who got the item of that market in the auction stage may 
sell it to the other bidder.  
 For each item, the current owner of the item will offer a price to sell the item.  
 After seeing the offer, the other bidder either accepts the offer and buys the item at the 
offered price, or rejects the offer and have no item. 
 This is a take-it-or-leave-it offer, and there is no room for further negotiation. 
 The exact timing of the resale offers will depend on the outcome of the auction and are 
explained below. 
Timing of the Resale Market Offers 
Since we have two markets, we have four different cases for the outcome of the Auctions. The 
timing of the resale market is explained below for each of these cases. 
 
Case 1: Global bidder wins the auctions in both markets. 
 In this case, the Global bidder makes simultaneous offers to each Local bidder. The Global 
may offer different prices to each Local. 
 Upon observing the offers, each Local bidder decides whether or not to accept the offer. 
 If an offer is accepted, the buyer receives the item and pays the offered price to the seller. 
Case 2: In Market A, Local bidder wins the auction; in Market B, Global bidder wins the auction. 
 First, Local bidder in market A makes an offer to sell the item to the Global bidder. 
 After seeing that offer, the Global bidder makes an offer to sell the item of market B to the 
Local bidder in market B. 




 After learning the decision of Local bidder in market B, Global bidder decides whether or 
not to accept the offer in Market A. 
 If an offer is accepted, the buyer receives the item and pays the offered price to the seller. 
Case 3: In Market B, Local bidder wins the auction; in Market A, Global bidder wins the auction.  
 This is analogous to Case 2 switching A and B. 
 First, Local bidder in market B makes an offer to sell the item to the Global bidder. 
 After seeing that offer, the Global bidder makes an offer to sell the item of market A to the 
Local bidder in market A. 
 Local bidder A sees Global’s offer and decides whether or not to accept it. 
 After learning the decision of Local bidder in market A, Global bidder decides whether or 
not to accept the offer in Market B. 
 If an offer is accepted, the buyer receives the item and pays the offered price to the seller. 
Case 4. Local bidders win the auctions in both markets. 
 In this case, at the beginning of the resale market the computer randomly determines which 
local bidder offers a price first. Both local bidders have 50% chance to make the first offer. 
The rest of the timing goes as follows. 
 The local that goes first, makes the offer to sell the item to the Global bidder. 
 The local that goes second sees the first offer in the other market and makes her own offer 
to the Global bidder. 
 The Global bidder sees both offers and decides which items she wants to buy if any. 
 If an offer is accepted, the buyer receives the item and pays the offered price to the seller. 
Earning of the Period 
 Earnings of the period will depend on three things: (1) the values of the items to their final 
owners, (2) the prices paid in the Auction stage, and (3) the prices paid or received in the 
Resale stage. 
 Prices in the Auction and in the Resale markets have been explained previously. It only 
remains to explain how values of the items to their final owners are determined. 
 
Values: 
 In each period, prior to bidding, Global and Local bidders are assigned values for the items. 
There are three values: one for Global bidder (Global value) and the values for each Local 
bidder (Local values). 
 Values are privately known. That is, Global bidder does not know the values of the Local 





 Each Local value represents the amount that the Local bidder with that value will receive 
if she becomes the final owner of an item after the Resale Market. 
 The Global value represents instead the amount that the Global will receive if she becomes 
the final owner of only one item (either in market A or in market B). 
 If the Global gets both items at the end of the period, she receives 3 TIMES the Global 
value. (for example: if the Global value is 40, the global receives 40 if she ends up with a 
single item and receives 3x40=120 if she ends up with both items). 
 Values are random integer numbers between 0 and 100. Each number is equally likely.  
 All values are drawn independently (meaning they are most likely different). 
Earnings: 
Values are not equal to earning of the period. Prices paid or received during the Auction and the 
Resale stages must be taken into account as well. When a period is over, you will receive the value 
of the item(s) you own after the resale stage, if any, and the amount of money you got in the resale 
stage (if you sold some item). From this amount, all the payments you made in the auction and 
resale stages will be subtracted. 
 
The computer will randomly pick 20 periods out of 30 periods. The selection of each period is 
equally likely. Your final earning will be the sum of your earnings in those 20 periods and $10 







In this example, you see the values of everybody to understand the environment. However, in the 
real experiment, values are private information and you only observe your own value. 
 Market A  Market B 





54 46 138 46 60 
Bids 
 
30 55  40 65 
Got Item in 
Auction 
 
No Yes  No Yes 
Auction Price 
 
 30   40 
Resale Offer  45   70 
Decision  Accepted   Rejected  
Owns Item 
after Resale 
Yes No  No Yes 
 
In this table you can see the whole sequence of events within one period. Note first that each Local 
has a single column that indicates variables that are specific to her or decisions she makes. Global 
instead has three columns representing her value from getting only the item in market A, the 
package including both items, and only the item in market B. 
 
Each bidder sees her value privately (i.e. no one else can see it in the whole period.). In this 
example, Local A has a value of 54 and Local B has 60. Global has values of 46 for single items, 
and 138 for the package of two items.  
 
Immediately below, bidders are allowed to bid simultaneously in their corresponding fields (no 




and Global bid 55 and 40 in markets A and B, respectively. In each market the highest bidder 
wins and pays the other bid of that market. As 30 < 55, the Global wins item A and pays 30; and 
as 65 > 40 local bidder wins the item in market B, and pays 40. 
 
The second part of the table represents the resale stage. The resale starts when each winner of the 
auction puts for sale the item she got in the auction. An auction winner does that by posting a Resale 
Offer that indicates at which price she wants to sell her item. In our example, first the Local B asks 
70 for item B. After observing this, Global asks 45 for item. Then Local A decides to accept or 
reject and in this example Local A accepted the Global’s offer. Then Global decides whether to 
accept or reject Local B’s offer. Here the Global rejects to buy item B at price 70. 
 
In the end, in our example, Local bidders own the corresponding items and Global does not own 
any item. 
 
Earnings are as follows.  
 Local A, did not win the auction so paid nothing in the auction. However, she bought the 
good in the resale market at price of 45. Since she is the final owner of item A, she receives 
her value of 54 and her earning is 54 – 45 = 9.  
 Local B won the auction and paid 40. Later, she put item B for sale at price of 70, but the 
Global rejected the offer so there was no resale trade in Market B. In the end Local B kept 
the item and since her value is 60, her earning is 60-40=20.  
 Global won item A in the auction and paid 30. Later Global put that item for sale at 45 and 
Local bidder A bought it in market A. In market B, Global did not win the auction and 
rejected Local’s offer in the Resale. Since Global owns nothing in the end, she does not 
receive any value. In sum, Global receives the resale price of 45 for item A and pays the 










In this example, you see the values of everybody to understand the environment. However, in the 
real experiment, values are private information and you only observe your own value. 
 Market A  Market B 





63 20 60 20 39 
Bids 
 
42 30  25 34 
Got Item in 
Auction 
 
Yes No  No Yes 
Auction Price 
 
30    25 
Resale Offer 70    35 
Decision   Rejected  Rejected  
Owns Item 
after Resale 
Yes No  No Yes 
 
As before, each Local has a single column that indicates variables that are specific to her or those 
decisions she makes. Global instead has three columns in the middle representing, respectively, her 
value from getting only the item in market A, the package including both items, and only the item 
in market B. 
 
Each bidder sees only her value privately (i.e. no one else can see it in the whole period.). In this 
example, Local A has a value of 63 and Local B has 39. Global has values of 20 for single items, 
and 60 for the package of two items.  Immediately below, bidders are allowed to bid simultaneously 
in their corresponding fields (no one sees other’s bid while bidding). Locals bid 42 and 34 in 
markets A and B, respectively; and Global bid 30 and 25 in markets A and B, respectively. In each 
market the highest bidder wins and pays the other’ bid of that market. As 42 < 30, the Local wins 
item A and pays 30; and as 34 > 25 Local bidder wins the item in market B, and pays 25. So in this 





The second part of the table represents the resale stage. The resale starts when each winner of the 
auction puts for sale the item she got in the auction. An auction winner does that by posting a Resale 
Offer that indicates at which price she wants to sell her item. If both locals win the auction (as here), 
the computer randomly picks one local to post the first resale price. In our example, first the Local 
A asks 70 for item A and Local B asks 35 to resale item B. After observing these offers, Global 
rejects both. So none of the resale deals takes place and Locals keep the items (meaning they are 
the final owners) and Global does not own any item in the end. 
 
Earnings are as follows: 
 Local A won the auction in market A and paid 30 to the auctioneer. Since she is the final 
owner of item A, she receives her value of 63 and her earning is 63 – 30 = 33.  
 Local B won the auction and paid 25. Later, she put item B for sale at price of 35, but the 
Global rejected the offer so Local B could not sell the item and she is the final owner of 
item B. Her value is 39 and so her earning for the period is 39-25=14.  
 Global did not win any item in the auction so she paid nothing to the auctioneer. In the 
resale market, Global is offered 70 and 35 ECUs for each item but she rejected them. Since 
Global owns nothing in the end, she does not receive any value. In sum, Global paid 






Answer the following questions: 
1) In the example below, who wins each auction and how much do they pay? 
 Market A  Market B 





54 46 138 46 60 
Bids 
 
54 34  10 90 
Got Item in 
Auction 
 
     
Auction Price 
 






2)  In the example below, who is the final owner of each item and what is each bidder’s earning? 
 Market A  Market B 





54 46 138 46 60 
Bids 
 
54 34  10 90 
Got Item in 
Auction 
 
Yes No  No Yes 
Auction Price 
 
34    10 
Offer Resale 45    70 
Decision   Accepted  Rejected  
Owns Item 
after Resale 
     
 







INSTRUCTIONS FOR SIMULTANEOUS SECOND PRICE AUCTIONS 
WITHOUT RESALE 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research foundations have 
provided funds for this research. The instructions are simple, and if you follow them carefully and 
make good decisions, you may earn a considerable amount of money, which will be paid to you in 
cash at the end of the experiment. 
 
All amounts in the experiment are expressed in Experimental Currency Units  (ECU). The money 
you make in ECUs will be converted to US Dollars at a rate of 50 ECU= $1, and paid to you in 
addition to your $10 participation fee.  
 
 In this experiment, you will participate in 30 auction periods. 
  You will be randomly assigned one of the two following roles: Local bidder and Global 
bidder.  
 Your role will be the same in all 30 periods.  
 In every period two Locals and a Global will be randomly matched into a group of 3 people.  
 Matching will change every period: you are not playing against the same people every time. 
 The exact rule of earning calculation will be explained shortly. 
Bidding: 
 In each group of 3, bidders will bid for items in auctions in two markets (Market A and B). 
 In each of these markets, there is one item for sale and two bidders (one Local and the 
Global). 
 In each market, there is one Local bidder who participates in the auction only in that market.  
 The Global bidder is interested in both markets, so the Global is present in both markets. 
 Therefore, the Global and Local A bid in Market A auction and the Global and Local B bid 
in Market B auction. 
 How much a person values an item will be explained later. 
 Each Local bidder will submit a bid for the item in her market. 
 The Global bidder will submit two bids: one for each item in each market. 
 Bids can be any integer number from {0, 1, 2, 3,…, 300}. So the smallest possible bid is 
zero and the largest one is 300 in an auction. 
 In each market the bidder with the higher bid wins the item: 
o If the Global’s bid is greater than the Local’s bid in a given market, the item of that 
market goes to the Global bidder. 
o If instead the Local’s bid is greater than the Global’s bid, the item goes to the Local 





 If a Local bidder gets the item in a market, she pays the Global’s bid in that market. 
 Similarly, if the Global bidder gets the item in a market, she pays the Local’s bid in that 
market. 
Values: 
 In each period, prior to bidding, Global and Local bidders are assigned values for the items. 
There are three values: one for Global bidder (Global value) and the values for each Local 
bidder (Local values). 
 Values are privately known. That is, Global bidder does not know the values of the Local 
bidders. Similarly, a Local bidder does not know the value of the Global bidder or the other 
Local bidder. 
 Each Local value represents the amount that the Local bidder with that value will receive 
if she wins an item in the auction. 
 The Global value represents instead the amount that the Global will receive if she wins 
only one item (either in market A or in market B). 
 If the Global wins both auctions, she receives 3 TIMES the Global value. (for example: 
if the Global value is 40, the global receives 40 if she ends up with a single item and 
receives 3x40=120 if she ends up with both items). 
 Values are random integer numbers between 0 and 100. Each number is equally likely.  
 All values are drawn independently (meaning they are most likely different). 
Earnings: 
In each period, you will receive the value of the item(s) you won in the auction. From this amount, 
the price you paid in the auction will be subtracted. 
Auction Payoff = Value of the Item(s) – Auction Price      (If you win any auction) 
Auction Payoff = 0                                  (If you do not win)  
The computer will randomly pick 20 periods out of 30 periods. The selection of each period is 
equally likely. Your final payoff will be the sum of your earnings in those 20 periods and $10 






1) In the example below, answer the following questions: Who wins each auction? How much do 
they pay? What are the earnings of each bidder? 
 Market A  Market B 





54 46 138 46 60 
Bids 
 
54 34  10 90 
Got Item in 
Auction 
 
     
Auction Price 
 
     
 
Earning of Local A = _____ 
Earning Local B = _____ 





2) In the example below, answer the following questions: Who wins each auction? How much do 
they pay? What are the earnings of each bidder? 
 
 
 Market A  Market B 





93 50 150 50 12 
Bids 
 
90 67  48 11 
Got Item in 
Auction 
 
     
Auction Price 
 
     
 
Earning of Local A = _____ 
Earning Local B = _____ 










Appendix - EXPERIMENT SCREENSHOT  








Empirical Results for all Treatments in Periods 16-30 
 
Table B1: Efficiency Leaks in VNR Format - Periods 16-30 
 
 
Table B2: Efficiency Leaks in VR Format - Periods 16-30 
 
 








Local-Local LG/GL Global-Global Local-Local LG/GL Global-Global Total
Local-Local 120 10 49 90.9 41.7 16.7 39.8
LG/GL 9 13 40 6.8 54.2 13.6 13.8
Global-Global 3 1 205 2.3 4.2 69.7 46.4




Local-Local LG/GL Global-Global Local-Local LG/GL Global-Global Total
Local-Local
Auction Stage 111 10 53 84.1 41.7 18.0 38.7
Resale Stage 106 11 32 80.3 45.8 10.9 33.1
LG/GL
Auction Stage 15 10 47 11.4 41.7 16.0 16.0
Resale Stage 15 8 53 11.4 33.3 18.0 16.9
Global-Global
Auction Stage 6 4 194 4.6 16.7 66.0 45.3
Resale Stage 11 5 209 8.3 20.8 71.1 50.0




Local-Local LG/GL Global-GlobalLocal-Local LG/GL Global-Global Total
Local-Local 112 8 21 84.9 33.3 7.1 31.3
LG/GL 15 15 80 11.4 62.5 27.2 24.4
Global-Global 5 1 193 3.8 4.2 65.7 44.2






Table B4: Efficiency Leaks in SPR Format - Periods 16-30 
 
 









Local-Local LG/GL Global-GlobalLocal-Local LG/GL Global-Global Total
Local-Local
Auction Stage 107 9 63 81.1 37.5 21.4 39.8
Resale Stage 110 10 26 83.3 41.7 8.8 32.4
LG/GL
Auction Stage 21 15 105 15.9 62.5 35.7 31.3
Resale Stage 19 14 44 14.4 58.3 15.0 17.1
Global-Global
Auction Stage 4 0 126 3.0 0.0 42.9 28.9
Resale Stage 3 0 224 2.3 0.0 76.2 50.4
Total 132 24 294 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Efficient Outcomes
Count  %
VNR VR SPNR SPR VNR VR SPNR SPR
0-10 10 10 9 10 0.17 0.2 0.17 0.24
11-20 20 20 19 21 0.28 0.26 0.16 0.21
21-30 30 30 29 31 0.25 0.42 0.24 0.38
31-40 43 50 40 46 0.33 0.39 0.29 0.46
41-50 52 60 50 52 0.47 0.39 0.38 0.54
51-60 69 70 60 65 0.6 0.59 0.55 0.71
61-70 80 75 70 70 0.59 0.55 0.61 0.62
71-80 90 80 80 80 0.68 0.59 0.65 0.75
81-90 99 100 91 100 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.8
91-100 111 100 99 100 0.77 0.67 0.77 0.84













0-10 4 15 4 15 7 10 0.05 0.07 0.03 0.12
11-20 14 45 14 49 16 20 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.13
21-30 23 70 22 70 30 30 0.22 0.2 0.27 0.22
31-40 30 110 30 100 43 42 0.35 0.47 0.4 0.28
41-50 40 132 40 125 62 51 0.55 0.56 0.61 0.51
51-60 48 160 45 151 80 62 0.69 0.53 0.74 0.45
61-70 50 198 56 180 90 75 0.82 0.79 0.81 0.61
71-80 56 220 60 210 111 95 0.87 0.89 0.9 0.74
81-90 78 250 75 240 124 110 0.81 0.92 0.94 0.74
91-100 75 275 80 266 150 111 0.91 0.91 0.94 0.77
SPNR SPR














Table B7: Bid Regressions for VNR - Periods 16-30 
 Locals’ Bids 
Globals’ 
Single-Object Bids 
For Signal < 50 
Globals’ 
Package Bids 
For Signal <67 
    
Signal 1.233*** 0.818*** 2.990*** 
 (0.036) (0.071) (0.105) 
    
Constant 0.608 2.313 -0.497 
 (6.146) (2.929) (6.017) 
N 900 446 323 
The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at 













Table B8: Bid Regressions for VR - Periods 16-30 
  Locals’ Bids 
Globals’ 
Single-Object Bids 
For Signal < 50 
Globals’  
Package Bids 
For Signal <67 
    
Signal 1.079*** 0.737*** 2.632*** 
  (0.039) (0.056) (0.110) 
    
Constant  8.925 9.642*** 5.567 
  (8.755) (2.329) (6.277) 
N 900 446 323 
The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at 








Figure B3: Bidding Behavior in SPNR - Periods 16-30 
 
 
Table B9: Bid Regressions for SPNR - Periods 16-30 
 Locals’ Bid 
Globals’ 
𝒍𝒐𝒈(𝒃𝒈) 
if 𝑺𝒈 ≤ 𝟓𝟎 
   
Signal 1.153***  




− 𝟏 )  -0.843*** 
   (0.020)  
Constant 7.305  4.274*** 
  (5.823)   (0.057) 
N 900 436 
The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at 














Figure B5: Locals’ Bids in VNR and VR (CDF) - Periods 16-30 
 
 




























































Table B10: Average Resale Prices in VR - Periods 16-30 
Auction 
Outcome 


















 Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
Table B11: Average Resale Prices in SPR - Periods 16-30 
Auction 
Outcome 

























  Table B12: Regressions for Locals’ Resale Offers in VR - Periods 16-30 
  









Signal   0.769***   0.569*** 0.683*** 
  (0.144) (0.160)  (0.241) 
Global Bid (same object)  -0.685   1.747   -0.799**  
  (1.187) (1.394)  (0.357) 
Global Bid (other object)   0.618  -1.960 0.209 
  (1.191) (1.392)  (0.258) 
Global Package Bid  -0.026   0.044 0.429**  
  (0.108) (0.119)  (0.176) 
Other Local Bid    0.069   0.012   -0.061 
  (0.079) (0.075)  (0.310) 
First (local) Offer      0.011   
     (0.074)   
Constant  23.816  47.476***   28.696 
   (16.320)  (17.856) (20.332) 
        
N   174 174 72 
The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at 






Table B13: Regressions for Globals’ Resale Offers in VR - Periods 16-30 





   
Signal 0.727*** 0.222*** 
  (0.150) (0.082) 
Local Bid (same object) 0.112 0.243*** 
  (0.126) (0.062) 
Local Bid (other object) -0.008 0.050 
  (0.064) (0.056) 
Other Offer -0.018  
 (0.048)  
Constant 12.653 39.841*** 
  (7.773) (5.845) 
   
N 62 190 
Restricted to offers below 100 ECUs. The standard errors are in parentheses. These are 
regressions with random effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level.* 







Table B14: Regressions for Locals’ Resale Offers in SPR - Periods 16-30 
  









Signal   0.912***   0.875***   0.484*** 
  (0.083) (0.076) (0.120) 
Global Bid (same object)   0.095   0.008   0.436*** 
  (0.164) (0.166) (0.163) 
Global Bid (other object)  -0.149  -0.016   0.183 
  (0.174) (0.159) (0.176) 
Other Local Bid   -0.005   0.059  -0.105 
  (0.051) (0.048) (0.137) 
First (local) Offer     -0.041    
     (0.058)    
Constant  35.895***  18.979**   44.457*** 
  (9.284) (8.275)  (10.935) 
     
N 179 179 141 
The standard errors are in parentheses. These are regressions with random effect at 








Table B15: Regression for Globals’ Resale Offers in SPR - Periods 16-30 





   
Signal 0.718*** 0.655*** 
  (0.113)    (0.096)    
Local Bid (same object)   0.244**   -0.076    
  (0.119)    (0.074)    
Local Bid (other object)  -0.004      0.024    
  (0.063)    (0.056)    
Other Offer  -0.140**     
 (0.054)       
Constant  36.116***  39.762*** 
  (7.977)    (6.211)    
N 93 94 
Restricted to offers below 100 ECUs. The standard errors are in parentheses. These are 
regressions with random effect at individual level and fixed effect at session level.* 




























          Session-clustered S.E. reported in parentheses. 
 
 
Table B17: Bidders’ Average Profits - Periods 16-30 
Treatment Locals Globals 










































Figure B15: Globals’ Mean and Median Profits - Periods 16-30 
 




Figure B16: Locals’ Mean and Median Profits - Periods 16-30 
 
         Mean                         Median 
 
 
 
